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Abstract 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the sustainable management of non-renewable resources 
in general and phosphate rock in particular. 
The first chapter presents the current situation, future trends and geopolitical issues pertaining to 
the global phosphate market. The analysis shows a large deficit in world phosphate supply in the 
future, inciting producers with sufficient phosphate reserves to invest in new capacities. 
The second chapter develops a multi-leader-multi-follower Stackelberg model, calibrated using real 
data from the phosphate market. This model derives the optimal future capacities for different 
producers according to their reserve levels and their development costs. The results show that the 
market would become more concentrated in 2100, with Morocco being the dominante country 
wich already holding three quarters of the world's reserves. 
The third chapter presents and calculates the linkage effects generated by Morocco’s phosphates 
exploitation. Using the Input-Output model, the proposed empirical analysis compares the socio-
economic impacts of extraction to those related to transformation or valorization. The results of 
this analysis show that phosphates transformation is more linked to the other sectors and generates 
higher socio-economic impacts in terms of added value, income and employement. 
The last chapter contributes to the literature on the natural resources curse by linking agricultural 
performance and urbanization to the abundance of resources. The empirical study, based on a 
panel of African countries, shows a significant link between the abundance of mineral resources, 
the underdevelopment of the agricultural sector and urban explosion. 
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Résumé 
Cette thèse a pour objet l’examen de la gestion durable des ressources non renouvelables en général 
et du phosphate naturel en particulier. 
Le premier chapitre expose l’état, les perspectives et les enjeux économiques et géopolitiques du 
marché mondial des phosphates. Il s’attache à mettre en exergue de cette analyse un important 
déficit, à long terme, de l'offre mondiale par rapport à la demande incitant les producteurs des 
phosphates, qui ont suffisamment des réserves, à investir dans des nouvelles capacités.  
Le deuxième chapitre développe un modèle Stackelberg à plusieurs joueurs, calibré sur des données 
effectives du marché des phosphates et permet de calculer les capacités optimales à mettre en place 
par les producteurs selon leurs niveaux de réserves et leurs coûts de développement. Les résultats 
de ce modèle montrent que le marché deviendrait plus concentré, en 2100, qu’il est aujourd’hui 
avec une dominance du Maroc, le pays qui détient les trois quarts des réserves mondiales.  
Le troisième chapitre vise à évaluer les effets d’entraînement que le Maroc dégage de son 
exploitation des phosphates. En utilisant le modèle Input-Output, l’analyse empirique proposée 
compare les impacts socio-économiques de l’extraction à ceux liés à la valorisation ou à la 
transformation. Les résultats de cette analyse montrent que la transformation des phosphates est 
plus reliée en amont avec les autres branches de l’économie et génère plus de valeur ajoutée, de 
revenues et d’emplois. 
Le dernier chapitre s’évertue à traiter à de nouveaux frais la question de la malédiction des 
ressources naturelles en reliant la performance agricole et l’urbanisation à l'abondance de ces 
ressources. L’étude empirique, basée sur un panel de pays africains, exhibe un lien significatif entre 
l’abondance de ressources minières, le sous-développement du secteur agricole et l’explosion 
urbaine.
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General introduction 
 
The relationship between natural resources and economic growth is, in essence, controversial. In 
theory, an abundance of natural resources will boost economic growth. A rising natural resources 
output would increase public revenues, enabling governments to increase investments in physical 
and human capital, while private returns on resource production would boost both private 
domestic and foreign investments. However, many resource-rich developing countries fail to 
realize the full development potential of their natural resources. This is the case in many countries 
in the Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) region, especially when it comes to non-renewable resources (also 
called finite or exhaustible resources) such as oil, gas and minerals. A large body of literature has 
highlighted the causes and the mechanisms of this underperformance—often referred to as the 
“resource curse”— reliving a complex and often-ambiguous set of associations. 
World demand for non-renewable resources grows continuously. If efficiently produced and traded 
and sustainably managed, those resources can generate important revenues for governments. 
Those revenues can in turn be invested in education, health, and infrastructures which are indeed 
critical to development and poverty reduction. 
Geologically speaking, most of the non-renewable resources are unevenly distributed throughout 
the world and this may leads to an oligopolistic market structure.  
In this research, three major economic questions are raised in relation with the production and 
management of non-renewable natural resources. The first question is : How producers of non-
renewable natural resources, facing a growing demand, make their investment decisions in order 
to meet their optimal market share? The seconde question is: How do non-renewable natural 
resources affect the economic and social development of a producing country? The third question 
is: How can non-renewable natural resource-rich developing countries, especialy in the SSA region, 
avoid or escape the resource curse? 
The present research is mainly focused on phosphate rock (PR) for four reasons. First, PR is a 
non-renewable resource. Second, this resource plays a key role in global food production and to 
this date, there are no agricultural alternatives for it. It is then directly linked to food security. Third, 
global PR reserves are unevenly distributed and highly concentrated. Worldwide reserves are 
estimated to 68 billion tons, with almost 85% of total reserves located in five countries: Morocco, 
China, Algeria, Syria and South Africa. Morocco alone holds 75% of the world’s highest-quality 
reserves. Fourth, PR has for a long time been a commodity with low and stable prices. But since 
2008, when prices jumped up dramatically by 900% and then dropped to around twice the pre 2008 
level, PR has exhibited significant price volatility rising therefore questions about future availability 
and prices. Before 2011, numerous articles concerning a looming scarcity of PR had argued that 
global reserves might be depleted in 50–100 years and a peak of world production had been 
predicted to occur around the mid-21s centry. 
 
 
 
2 
 
Given the large number of studies on non-renewable resource management, this research does not 
pretend distinguishing itself by absolute novelty; yet, the way of approaching the subject is an 
innovative one, representing a distinctive element regarding the study of this topic.  
Given the nature of the subject, the methodology adopted for this research is based on both 
theoretical and practical frameworks. The research strategy is a deductive one performed using  a 
combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches (empirically – by using real data, 
econometric estimation and game theory models), thus providing a strong support for the 
conclusions. 
0.1 Objectives of the thesis 
Sustainable management of phosphate rock represents a major challenge for policy-makers, 
scientists and the civil society. The current economic context requires more rationality and 
optimality at both production and consumption levels. From this perspective, the first objective of 
this research is to get a better economic understanding of the global phosphate market (Chapter 1) 
and the second objective is to develop an equilibrium model for future competition in order to 
help producers  reach optimality in terms of investment decisions (Chapter 2).  
Mining and mineral processing can generate several types of positive externalities. The third 
objective of this research is to gain a better understanding of the socioeconomic impact of resource 
extraction and transformation on the national economy. The study considers the case of phosphate 
mining and processing in Morocco and identifies three broad channels through which the national 
economy may be potentially affected by extractive activities and through links that exists with other 
economic sectors. These three channels are production, income and employment (Chapter 3).  
However, natural resource extraction can also generate negative externalities. The theoretical 
explanations for the resource curse can be grouped into four broad categories: Dutch Disease, 
volatility in commodity prices, rent seeking/corruption and institutional quality. The fourth 
objective of this research is to highlight the resource curse explanations and to test two potential 
channels for African countries: First, can mineral resources abundance explain the poor agricultural 
performance? Second, is there a relationship between natural resources abundance and 
urbanization trends? (Chapter 4). 
0.2 Outline of the thesis and main results 
The PhD thesis entitled “Management of non-renewable resources: Market equilibrium, socio-
economic impacts and potential channels of resource curse  ─ An application to Phosphate Rock 
─” is divided into four chapters. Each generates some results and conclusions that may be of 
interest to policymakers. 
Chapter 1: Global Phosphate Rock Market: An economic overview of future 
competition 
Considered as a non-renewable resource, phosphate is an essential raw material for the fertilizer 
industry and therefore for agricultural production. Global distribution of phosphate reserves and 
production, as well as global supply, is highly concentrated and controlled by a limited number of 
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countries. Demand for phosphate is expected to rise as a consequence of an increasing population 
and a growing production of biofuels. Since there is no yet known substitute for phosphate, this 
imbalance between demand- and supply-sides leads to price volatility or a price setting behavior by 
suppliers with significant market power. This Chapter overviews the recent literature and data on 
the availability of phosphate, and shows that the restricted number of producing and exporting 
countries give rise to factors which can potentially affect future supply and thereby future 
competition in the phosphate rock market. 
Chapter 2: Equilibrium Phosphate Rock Capacity Expansion under 
imperfect competition 
This chapter examine how the distribution of phosphate rock (PR) reserves may affect the supply 
and capacity investment decision in the future. Given the oligopolistic situation of PR market and 
the sequencing of decision making, we propose a multi-leader multi-follower Stackelberg model. 
For forward-looking considerations, we introduce the development costs (CAPEX) as a function 
of reserves in the producer’s decision program. We show the properties of the model equilibrium, 
and obtain the solution in analytic form. The model is then calibrated to the PR real data. The 
overall analysis supports the notion that PR market will become more concentrated than it is today. 
The equilibrium capacities show that Morocco's annual production will rise significantly from 27 
Mt to more than 127 Mt by 2100. The country should thus multiple its capacity of extraction by 
3.7 by 2100. Additional capacities will come from 9 followers, with most important increases by 
three followers (Australia, Syria, Algeria) who should multiply there capacities by 12 to meet their 
equilibrium market share. Consequently, the industry cost curve will become flatter at lower cost 
in the future as the major new capacities will come from producers with low cost of production 
and lager reserves. 
Chapter 3: Economic impacts of phosphate extraction and valorization on 
the Moroccan economy: An input-output analysis 
This Chapter aims to estimate and analyze the impact of phosphate extraction and valorization 
activities on the Moroccan economy. By using an input-output framework, the study evaluate how 
an increase in final demand (e.g. export demand for phosphate rock or for fertilizers) of each of 
these industries affect the Moroccan economy. To do this, we have combined the detailed Profit 
and Loss (P&L) statement from OCP group, the state-owned company that has a monopoly in 
phosphate sector, with the latest 2014 Moroccan I-O table to bring out OCP activities and to split 
them into two sectors: “OCP-mining” and “OCP-chemical”. From the estimated models, we 
calculate several multipliers (output, income and employment) and linkage measures. Our results 
indicate that the OCP-chemical sector has a high production-inducing effect and a high income 
and employment-inducing effect compared to OCP-mining sector. The OCP-chemical sector 
impact on production is the following: each 1US$ of fertilizers production generates a production 
valuated at 2,61 US$ in the Moroccan economy while the same amount of phosphate rock 
generates a production valuted at just 1,73 US$. In term of income, OCP-chemical activity 
generates 3,11 US$ for each 1US$ increase for the sector’s production while OCP-mining impact 
is equal to 2,25 US$. In addition, the calculations show that OCP-chemical sector has more capacity 
to generate employment opportunities compared to the OCP-mining sector. The total employment 
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multiplier is equal to 8 man-years for OCP-chemical sector while it is about 3 man-years for OCP-
mining sector. Our linkage analysis shows that OCP-chemical sector is much more backward linked 
with the others sectors of the economy than OCP-mining sector. However, we note that both 
sectors have a low forward linkage effect. 
Chapter 4: Natural Resources Revenues, Agriculture Development and 
Urbanization in African Countries: Evidence from a Static and Dynamic 
Panel Data 
This chapter analyzes the mechanism through which natural resource abundance leads to a poor 
agricultural performance and a rapid urbanization in African countries. We conducted a static and 
dynamic panel data analysis for a panel of 39 African countries during the period 2000-2013. Our 
findings show that natural resources rents have a negative impact on agricultural performance and 
a positive impact on food import dependency. In addition, the results show a significant positive 
impact of resource rents on rural-urban migration and on urbanization rate. We argue that these 
findings can be explained by the government choice to specialize in primary commodities to the 
detriment of the development of other productive sectors, especially agriculture. Because policy 
makers tend to invest resources rents in developing infrastructures, mostly in cities, this inevitably 
creates some pulling factors for rural population in search of a better life. Consequently, we observe 
a rapid urbanization associated with serious problems (Expansion of urban slums, limited access 
to improved water and sanitations facilities) in many African countries, highly dependent on natural 
resource rents.    
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Chapter 1 
 
Global Phosphate Rock Market: An economic 
overview of future competition 
 
 
Résumé  
La croissance des plantes depends essentiellement d’eau, d’azote et de phosphore, des éléments 
naturellement présents en quantités variables dans les sols. Le phosphore utilisé en agriculture 
provient de roches phosphatées, une ressource non renouvelable. L’épuisement de cette ressource 
est susceptible d’avoir des conséquences dramatiques sur la sécurité alimentaire mondiale. Ce 
chapitre expose l’état, les perspectives et les enjeux économiques et géopolitiques du marché 
mondial des phosphates. En s’appuyant sur des données statistiques, il s’attache à mettre en exergue 
un potentiel déficit, à long terme, de l'offre mondiale par rapport à la demande incitant les 
producteurs des phosphates, qui ont suffisamment de réserves, à investir dans des nouvelles 
capacités.  
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1.1 Introdution 
Phosphate rock is important for crop nutrition because it contains phosphorus, an essential 
element for plant life, and is considered as a "primary" plant nutrient along with potassium and 
nitrogen. The most important use of phosphate rock is in the production of phosphate fertilizers 
for crops and animal feed supplements. Only about 5% of world production is used in other 
applications, such as construction, soaps and detergents (Prud’Homme, 2010).  
Demand for phosphate is expected to increase by an average rate of 1.5% per year (Argus Strategy 
Report, 2017) due to population growth and the necessity of nurturing that population. The 
growing market for biofuels is another factor that increases phosphate demand. Future demand 
will mainly come from developing nations in Asia-Pacific and Latin America. Additional demand 
will come from Sub-Saharan Africa where many poor farmers are working with phosphorus 
deficient soils (Giraud, 2017). Moreover, the recent decreases in phosphate consumption observed 
in Europe and North America are due to a more efficient use of fertilizer and a buildup of 
phosphate in the soil. This trend could be reversed as increased efficiency has its limits (Van Vuuren 
et al. 2010). On the supply side, world phosphate rock reserves are concentrated in a few countries. 
Morocco, for example, has 50 billion metric tons of phosphate rock reserves, which represent 75% 
of the world’s total reserves (USGS, 2017). The country plays an important role with regards to 
international trade as it is also the world’s largest exporter of phosphate rock accounting for about 
one-third of total exports. Looking to production, China and the US are among the top producers, 
but their production is mainly oriented to the domestic market.  
Phosphate was considered as a low price commodity for a long time. The picture has changed since 
2008, when phosphate rock prices jumped up dramatically by 900%. Following this peak, prices 
dropped in 2009 but remained above the pre-2008 prices and became more volatile. Moreover, as 
phosphate rock is a finite resource and global production of phosphate is rising fast, several studies 
have warned that a ‘peak phosphorus’ could be reached by mid-21st century (Déry and Andersson, 
2007; Cordell et al., 2009 and Rosemarin et al., 2009). Consequently, the world debate is becoming 
more focused on a looming scarcity and a threat to food security in developing countries (Cordell 
et al., 2009). Nevertheless, the methodology behind the peak phosphorus hypothesis and the data 
used in the studies have been rapidly disputed in a number of scientific studies (e.g., Vaccari and 
Strigul, 2011; Rustad, 2012; Giraud, 2012; Scholz and Wellmer, 2013). 
The purpose of this Chapter is to discuss the following questions: what is the situation of the global 
phosphate rock market as of today, in what direction may this market evolve in the future, and 
what are the consequences for future competition? To answer these questions, we first discuss the 
problematic of global phosphate availability. We show that given the current reserve estimates for 
phosphate rock, neither an exhaustion of global reserves nor a peak event is likely to occur during 
this century. We also show that the global phosphate reserves and production are highly 
concentrated in a few countries. Then, we make an inventory of the global phosphate rock market 
by looking at the major players and price developments. Finally, we discuss the factors affecting 
future supply and thereby future competition. 
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1.2 Global availability of phosphate rock 
1.2.1 Phosphate scarcity and the recent revision of reserves  
During the last decade, there have been numerous published articles concerning a looming scarcity 
of phosphate rock. For instance, Cordell et al., (2009) and Rosemarin et al., (2009) have argued that 
global reserves may be depleted in 50–100 years and a so-called peak phosphorus  is predicted to 
occur around 2033-2034. Before that, Déry and Anderson (2007) estimated that the world has 
already passed the phosphate peak in 1989. Nevertheless, the methodology behind the peak 
phosphorus hypothesis and the data used have been rapidly disputed in a number of scientific 
papers (e.g., Vaccari and Strigul, 2011; Rustad, 2012; Giraud, 2012; Scholz and Wellmer, 2013). 
Regarding the data, we note that all calculations of peak phosphorus published before 2011 are 
based on the previous U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) estimation of phosphate rock reserves. 
Moreover, the definition of reserves is a dynamic one because, when prices increase, deposits that 
were previously considered too expensive to access are reclassified as reserves (Vaccari, 2009). In 
2011, the USGS have increased global phosphate reserves from 16,000 million metric tons (mmt) 
in 2010 to 65,000 mmt and to 67,000 mmt in 2014. The last estimate is reported at 68,000 mmt 
(USGS, 2017). The most significant revision is made to reserves data for Morocco based on the 
International Fertilizer Development Center (IFDC) report published in 2010, which estimates 
Moroccan phosphate reserves to 51,000 mmt, compared with 5,700 mmt previously reported by 
USGS. Based on these revised estimates, Van Kauwenbergh, the IFDC’s Geologist and Principal 
Scientist, stated that there is no indication to an ongoing peak phosphorus event in the coming 20-
25 years and, assuming the current production rates, phosphate rock reserves to produce fertilizer 
will be available for the next 300-400 years. The methodological criticism to the peak phosphorus 
theory is that the modeling was based essentially on a static approach, such as the static lifetime or 
the Hubbert curve-based prediction of peaks. Giraud (2012) have explored the scientific 
foundations and therefore the scope of validity of these forecasting techniques. Looking at the 
basic assumptions of Hubbert’s thesis, he concludes that these techniques should not be used to 
forecast neither the peak (or plateau) of the annual production rate, nor the ultimate reserves of 
any mineral, unless given exceptional conditions. Scholz and Wellmer (2013) show that these 
analyzes do not sufficiently incorporate geological knowledge nor other aspects such as the 
dynamics of exploration and technology developments in phosphate mining and production, 
demand curves and market mechanisms. In addition, Ulrich and Frossard (2014) show that past 
worries about phosphate depletion have been systematically “refuted by means of new resource 
appraisals, indicating that the supply was substantially larger than previously thought”. 
1.2.2 Future capacities 
Generally, the exploration process takes many years and requires significant investments to 
complete and open up a new mine. It is therefore difficult to determine the impact of ongoing 
exploration activities on future supply of phosphate rock. This also explains why changes in 
phosphate rock supply are very slow to respond to changes in prices. 
World phosphate rock production capacity is expected to increase by 2% per year through 2020. 
The largest expected areas of growth are Africa and the Middle East (USGS, 2017). Morocco’s 
state-owned firm OCP announced in 2010 that it expects to double phosphate rock production 
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capacity from 28 to 55 mmt by 2020. An additional 5.3 mmt of phosphate capacity will come from 
Saudi Arabia in 2017. Other significant phosphate rock projects are expected to begin by 2020 in 
Algeria, Brazil, Egypt, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Peru, Russia, and Senegal (USGS, 2017). 
1.2.3 Phosphate reserves and production 
As we mentioned above, the USGS estimated global deposits of phosphate rock that are 
economically recoverable with current technology—known as reserves—at 68,000 mmt. 
Geographically, phosphate rock reserves are concentrated. Morocco holds 50,000 mmt of 
phosphate rock reserves, which is about 75 percent of the world’s total. Other major holders of 
phosphate rock reserves (ranked according to the size of their reserves, from large to small) are 
China, Algeria, Syria, South Africa, Russia, Egypt, Jordan, the US and Australia. All together, these 
countries hold about 14.5 mmt, or 20 percent of the world’s total.  
In terms of production, total world production of phosphate rock was estimated at 261 mmt in 
2016. Figure 1.1 shows that China was the leading producer accounting for 138,000 mmt, followed 
by Morocco (30 mmt) and the United States (27.8 mmt). 
Figure 1.1: Major phosphate rock producers 
 
Source: USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries 2017 
1.3 Global phosphate market and price development 
1.3.1 Major players in the global phosphate market  
Based on the IFA  data, Figure 1.2 shows that the major phosphate rock exporting countries, in 
2016, were Morocco, Jordan, Peru, Egypt and Russia. All together, these countries control about 
80 percent of the global phosphate rock export market. Morocco is the world’s largest exporter 
accounting for about one-third of total exports. Looking at production, China and the US are 
among the top producers of phosphate but their domestic consumption largely eclipses their 
exporting activities (Figure 1.1).  
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53%
U.S.A.
11%
Morocco
12%
Russia
4%
Jordan
3%
Others
17%
 
9 
 
Figure 1.3 shows phosphate rock imports by country. India is, by far, the world’s largest importer. 
Indonesia, Brazil and the USA have the largest share in global phosphate rock imports. Since the 
majority of phosphate rock is eventually turned into fertilizer products (e.g. Phosphoric Acid (PA), 
DAP, MAP and TSP), imports of phosphorus expressed as P2O51 in the form of fertilizer products 
is a viable alternative indicator. Looking at that indicator, India has an overwhelming lead, with 
26%, followed by the EU with 15%. Poland, Belgium, Lithuania, France and Spain are the major 
importers accounting for about 60% of the EU’s imports in 2016. Brazil comes third at 12% (Figure 
1.4). 
                                                 
1 P2O5, the chemical formula of phosphorus pentoxide, is generally used as the measurement of phosphorus 
concentration in phosphate rock and fertilizers. 
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Figure 1.2: Major phosphate rock exporting 
countries, 2016, (calculation based on tonne 
product) 
 
Figure 1.3: Major phosphate rock importing countries, 
2016,  (calculation based on tonne product) 
 
Figure 1.4: Major phosphate products (PR, PA, DAP, MAP and TSP) importing countries, 2016,  
(calculation based on tonne P205) 
 
Source: International trade statistics, IFA, 2016 
1.3.2 Structural price change 
As mentioned before, global phosphate rock demand is rising due to an increasing demand for 
phosphate fertilizers, associated with food demand caused by growing world population. For a long 
time, phosphate rock was considered as a relatively cheap commodity. However, because there is 
no known substitute for phosphorus and there were at the time (see above) a prospect of limited 
supply, prices of phosphate rock soared in 2008. From an average of 40 USD per ton, prices 
reached a peak of 350USD per ton in 2008.  Following this spike, prices dropped again in 2009, 
remaining nonetheless well above their pre-2008 level and oscillating between 120-145 USD per 
ton from 2009 to 2016. Prices are expected to remain around that level in the coming years. This 
structural change in price dynamics and volatility pattern (as culculted by Giraud (2017), PR volatity 
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varies from 1,7% for 1987-2006 period to 7% for 2006-2016 period) made industrials, politicians 
and governments aware of future supply vulnerabilities. 
1.4 Factors affecting future supply of phosphate rock 
1.4.1 Moving towards a near-monopoly position in phosphate supply  
Currently, production mainly takes place in China, the US and Morocco, including its disputed 
territory of Western Sahara. Given the distribution of world reserves, it is likely that oligopolistic 
or even monopolistic behaviors will become more pronounced in the future. Market power is 
increasingly concentrated in the hands of a few suppliers. Various studies show that Morocco, 
which accounts for more than 75% of global reserves, is moving towards a near-monopoly position 
in phosphate supply. That could potentially create a situation in which Morocco’s state-owned firm 
OCP (already the world’s largest exporter) would exhibit a price-setting behavior. Cooper et al. 
(2011) show that 70% of world production is currently produced from reserves that will be depleted 
in 100 years, and the combination with ever-increasing demand will result in a large global 
production deficit that will exceed current production by 2070. According to the author 
simulations, Morocco would need to increase production by around 700% by 2075 in order to 
meet most of this deficit. If this can be done, the country will then obtain a much greater share of 
worldwide production, rising from 15% in 2010 to 80% by 2100 (Cooper et al. ; 2011). In chapter 
2 of this report, I show, using a Staclkeberg model, that that Morocco would rise significantly its 
annual production from 27 Mt to more than 127 Mt by 2100 (representing an increases of 470%) 
to meet the equilibrium position. At this position the country will be responsible for over 37.5% 
of global production, compared to 23% today. Using a disaggregated curve fitting model based on 
the production of major phosphate rock producing countries, Walan et al. (2014) confirm that the 
global trade of phosphate rock could be completely dependent on Morocco in the future. 
1.4.2 Political instability in some major producing countries may disrupt 
trade flows 
Geopolitical problems and civil unrest is a potential issue for phosphate rock production. The Arab 
Spring, which started in December 2010, has had a significant impact on global phosphate rock 
supply since it affected several important producing countries in the MENA region. In addition, 
the protracted conflict in Syria continues to influence the supply of phosphate (de Ridder et al., 
2012). Although not as much affected by the Arab spring, Morocco is still receiving a lot of 
backlash due to the Western Sahara issue. 
1.4.3 Technical and environmental developments may also disrupt the 
global phosphate rock market   
Phosphate rock production process is highly water and energy intensive. Many countries producing 
phosphate rock, such as countries in the MENA region, already suffer from a shortage of fresh 
water (de Ridder et al., 2012). This presents a major constraint for producers and requires huge 
investments to overcome the problem. In Morocco, for example, seawater-desalination plants are 
built by OCP to cover its future needs (OCP 2011).  
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Since most phosphate rock is mined using large-scale surface mining, the producing countries are 
also faced with large environmental impacts as mentioned by the 2001 UNEP report (local 
landscape, water contamination, air emissions, noise and waste generation). Furthermore, the issue 
of cadmium, a toxic element often present in phosphate rock, is increasingly gaining attention, 
especially in the EU. Consequently, the increased awareness about the negative environmental 
impacts of phosphate rock will probably affect the structure of the global phosphate market. 
1.5 Conclusion 
In this study, we demonstrate that contrary to articles published before 2010 predicting a “peak 
phosphorus” in the nearest future, the current available data show no clear indications that 
phosphate rock deposits are facing depletion any soon. But, the “peak phosphorus” debate has 
contributed to a raising awareness about future phosphate supply from politician and scientist 
communities. The main reason for this is related to the phosphate reserves geographical 
distribution. The USGS data show that world phosphate rock reserves are concentrated in few 
countries mainly in the MENA region. Global trade is more concentrated, since some major 
producing countries are also among the major users. Recent studies have predicted that Morocco 
is moving towards a near-monopoly position in phosphate production and that could potentially 
create a price-setting behavior. The structural changes and the increasingly volatile phosphate rock 
prices observed since the 2007/2008 crisis may be the first warning to this situation. In this chapter, 
we have summarised the political, technical and environmental risks that can seriously affect future 
supply. 
Finally, given that phosphorus as a nutrient that is not substitutable in agriculture and phosphate 
rock is a finite natural resource, the search for optimization of production by producers and 
increasing phosphorus use efficiency by users are the only ways to ensure a safe and stable supply. 
Through an integrated system framework, D. Cordell et al. (2011) examine the full spectrum of 
sustainable phosphorus recovery and reuse options (from small-scale low-cost to large-scale high-
tech). Further researches are needed to help producers and users in their optimization process. Our 
next study will be focus on optimal capacity expansion for phosphate rock producers in order to 
satisfy future demand. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Equilibrium Phosphate Rock Capacity 
expansion under imperfect competition 
 
 
Résumé  
Le deuxième chapitre developpe un modèle de théorie de jeux permettant la modélisation de la 
décision d’investissement dans de nouvelles capacités par les producteurs selon leurs niveaux de 
réserves et leurs coûts de développement. Compte tenu de la structure oligopolistique du marché 
des phosphates et de la nature séquentielle de la prise de décision, un modèle Stackelberg à plusieurs 
joueurs est proposé et calibré sur des données effectives du marché des phosphates. L'analyse 
globale soutient la thèse selon laquelle le marché est amené à connaitre, à long terme, une très forte 
concentration. Les résultats de simulations montrent que la production annuelle d’équilibre du 
Maroc passera de 27 Mt à plus de 127 Mt d'ici 2100. Ce pays devrait donc multiplier sa capacité 
d'extraction par 3,7 d'ici 2100. Des capacités supplémentaires concernent neuf autres pays dont 
trois (Australie, Syrie et Algérie) devraient multiplier leurs capacités actuelles par 12 pour atteindre 
leur équilibre. 
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2.1 Introduction  
Phosphorus is an essential element for all form of life on earth. It is one of the three primary 
nutrients for plant growth, along with potassium and nitrogen. Up to 90% of global phosphorus is 
used in modern agriculture in the form of phosphate fertilizer and animal feed supplements, the 
remainder is for industrial applications like detergents (Brunner, 2010). The main source of 
phosphorus is Phosphate rock (PR) – a finite and non-renewable resource. Global PR reserves are 
unevenly distributed and highly concentrated. The worldwide reserves are estimated to 68 billion 
tons, with almost 85% of total reserves located in four countries: Morocco, China, Algeria, Syria 
and South Africa. Morocco alone holds 75% of the world’s high-quality reserves (USGS, 2017). 
Global trade is even more concentrated, with only five countries controlling about 80% of the 
global phosphate rock export market (IFA, 2016). The major exporters are located in the MENA 
region, but some countries such as Tunisia, Egypt, Algeria and Syria are politically unstable. This 
could make agricultural production even more vulnerable to supply disruptions and price 
fluctuations, as there is no known substitute for phosphate to ensure high agricultural yields. 
Historically, PR was considered as a commodity with low and stable price. The picture has changed 
since 2008 where prices jumped up dramatically by 900%. Following this peak, prices dropped in 
2009 but remained above the pre-2008 prices and exhibiting much more volatility. In this period, 
several studies have warned that the maximumal phosphorus production could be reached before 
the mid-21st century (Déry and Andersson, 2007; Cordell et al., 2009a and Rosemarin et al., 2009). 
Therefore, the debate is becoming more focused on a looming scarcity and a threat to food security 
in developing countries (Cordell and Write, 2011). Nevertheless, the methodology behind the peak 
phosphorus hypothesis and the data that was used have been rapidly disputed in a number of 
scientific studies (e.g., Vaccari and Strigul, 2011; Rustad, 2012; Scholz and Wellmer, 2013).  
The market size of PR in terms of value is estimated at 22billion US$2 in 2016 and goes up to 
64billion US$3 if we integrate its derivatives (Phosphoric acid and fertilizers). There are at least four 
specific characteristics of the PR market. i) an oligopolistic structure since a small number of 
countries control about 80% of global exports; ii) the global trade is dominated by bilateral 
contracts between miners and fertilizer companies; iii) the producers have very different 
production costs (the range is between 25 to 90US$/ton); iv) the development of new capacities 
requires investments amounting to hundreds of millions dollars and takes several years (about 5-
10 years).  
The demand for phosphate rock (and therefore fertilizers) is projected to grow due to the 
combination of a growing world population, increasing standards of living and meat consumption 
and a growing production of biofuels (FAO, 2017). To keep up with future phosphate demand, 
mining companies will before have to increase their production capacity. The purpose of this study 
                                                 
2Source: “Phosphate Rock Market: Global Industry Analysis and Forecasts” published by Persistence Market 
Research (https://www.persistencemarketresearch.com/). 
3Source: “Phosphorus & Derivatives Market by Type by Application and by Region - Global Forecast to 2020” 
published by Markets and Markets (https://www.marketsandmarkets.com/Market-Reports/phosphorus-derivatives-
market-1148.html). 
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is to determinate by how much production or capacity must be increased, by country, in order to 
meet the projected production deficit.  
Several economic approaches have been used in the literature to examine and project future 
phosphate supply and market structure. For instance, Van Vuuren et al. (2010) developed a model 
for phosphate depletion, accounting for uncertainty in resource estimates, different types of 
resources, their geographic locations and using four realistic scenarios for phosphate demand. 
Cooper et al. (2011) used USGS data to derive reserve-to-production (R/P) ratios for individual 
countries, and combined this with a scenario based on increasing global demand hypothesis, to 
investigate how the global distribution of PR reserves and production will change throughout the 
21st century. Mohr, S. & Evans, G. (2013) applied the demand-production interaction resource 
model of Mohr (2010) on a country-by-country basis for both static and dynamic modes of 
operation. The model is based on a market approach, whereby the supply of a resource is 
influenced by: demand, production capacity, and the amount of reserves available to supply that 
market. Walan et al. (2014) developed a disaggregated curve-fitting model based on production in 
individual major producing countries. The potential PR production outlooks are fitted using logistic 
and Gompertz functions constrained by the estimated ultimately recoverable resource (URR). 
Essentially, all these studies concluded that the global PR production would be more concentrated 
in the future, and the depletion of resources in some countries might lead to a high share of 
Morocco in world PR supply, as the country holds the most of the current resource, around 80% 
by 2100 (Cooper et al., 2011). This means one single country will have a significant market power 
and increasing control over the market price in the future and, a potential bottlenecks (Mohr, S. & 
Evans, G. 2013 and Walan et al., 2014). 
In this study, we propose a strategic game theory based approach to examine the PR market 
structure in a forward looking manner. Given the structure of the PR market, Stackelberg and 
Cournot models are two of the leading frameworks widely used by economists to study 
oligopolistic competition. The Stackelberg model differs from the Cournot model by the 
sequencing of production choices. The producers act sequentially in a Stackelberg market and 
simultaneously in a Cournot market. We combine both models and propose a multi-leader multi-
follower Stackelberg model as developed by Stackelberg (1952) and extended by Sherali et al. 
(1983), Sherali (1984) and Frantsev et al. (2012). Such a model is widely applied by reaserchers to 
deal with many real-world problems, for example: in transportation (Marcotte and Blain, 1991), in 
the analysis of deregulated electricity markets (Hobbs et al., 2000), in wireless networks (Kim,2012; 
Hu and Fukushima, 2015) and in water management systems (Ramos et al., 2016). 
We distinguish between leader- and follower-producers according to their capacities and their 
ability to produce with a reasonable profit. This leads to a two-level strategic game where producers 
compete in terms of quantities. In the upper-level, the leaders who are supposed to predect 
correctly the follower’s reaction function, decide independently and simultaneously about their 
individual supply. In the lower-level, the followers decide simultaneously upon their quantity after 
learning about the total quantity supplied by the leaders. In order to estimate the future production 
costs, we explicitly introduce, in the decision program, the development cost as a function of the 
remaining reserves for both leaders and followers. This is due to the fact that  these reserves depend 
on long-term price developments and not so much on operating cash costs. We use the proposed 
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model to derive the equilibrium quantities that could be produced and the corresponding capacities 
to be installed by each country. The proposed model combines three important aspects: the leader’s 
market power, the sequencing of decisions, and the influence of reserves distribution on future 
competition.  
The chapter is structured in the following manner. Section 2 discusses three specific characteristics 
of the PR market: i) PR scarcity and its implications on global food security. ii) The market structure 
and geopolitical risks and iii) the sequencing of decision making to justify the proposed multi-leader 
multi-follower Stackelberg model. In section 3, we formulate the model and derive the conditions 
for equilibria. Section 4 presents the data used to calibrate the model and give a brief description 
of the industry cost curve. Section 5 shows the results and section 6 highlights some limitations of 
the model. Finally, section 7 presents the conclusions that can be drawn from our findings and 
identifies possible leads for future research. 
2.2 Three reasons why PR competition is interesting 
As discussed in the introduction, phosphate is mainly used in agricultural production. The 
availability of PR is directly linked to global food security. The geological distribution of reserve 
and the market structure present potential geopolitical risks. In addition to these general reasons, 
the timing of investment decisions in the phosphate market may have some theoretical and 
practical implecations. 
2.2.1 PR scarcity and vulnerability of the global food security 
Phosphate plays a key role in the global production of food. To this date, there are no agricultural 
alternatives for it. Phosphate is an exhaustible, non-renewable and mismanaged resource since 
more than the four-fifths of phosphate consumption is lost or wasted from mines to food 
production (Cordell and White, 2014). The massive price fluctuations on the PR market in 
2007/2008, with price increases exceeding 900%, hase given raise to a world debate on the question 
of physical PR scarcity and its implications on long-term phosphorus availability for meeting future 
global food demand. Soon after the spike, several scientific studies have emerged predicting that 
the “peak phosphorus”4 would occur around the year 2033 and that global reserves will start to run 
out within 75–100 years (Cordell et al. 2009; Rosemarin et al. 2009). Essentially, all these 
calculations were based on the 2008 USGS estimations of PR reserves and using static approaches 
such as static lifetime or Hubbert curve to predict the peak. However, theses analyses were rapidly 
criticized due to the methodology and data that was used: the Hubbert curve approach does not 
provide robust predictions (Vaccari and Strigul, 2011 and Giraud, 2012); dynamics of rise and 
decline in production for any mineral in the world, are not symmetric (Rustad, 2012); and the 
dynamics of resources and reserves are not properly acknowledged by the Hubbert curve 
applications (Scholz and Wellmer, 2013). Furthermore, the estimated world phosphorus reserves 
increased from 15 billion tons PR in 2008 (USGS, 2009) to 65 billion tons in 2010 (USGS, 2011). 
                                                 
4 The term “Peak phosphorus” denotes a moment in time at which the production of PR reaches its maximum due 
to the decreasing availability of reserves and demand for PR will exceed supply (Cordell et al. 2009a). 
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The USGS revision was based on the IFDC report (Van Kauwenbergh, 2010) which suggested 
that Morocco’s estimated reserves were in fact much larger than previously indicated (50 billion 
tons instead of 5.7 billion tons). Using this revised estimation, the reserve-to-production ratio 
suggests that the remaining PR deposits will now cover 300 to 400 years. Meanwhile, there is still 
a consensus that the quality and accessibility of the remaining phosphates reserves are decreasing 
and costs will increase (Cordell and White, 2011). 
2.2.2 PR as a strategic and geo-political commodity 
PR is currently mined in more than 20 countries worldwide, with only very few countries making 
up most of total production. World production of PR is estimated at 261 million tons in 2016 
(USGS, 2017). China is the largest producer in the world, accounting for 138 Mt or 53% of the 
total production of phosphate rock. Behind China, the largest producers are Morocco, the U.S. 
and Russia with respectively 11%, 12% and 4% of global output. Other important producers are 
primarily found in the Middle East North Africa (MENA) region with countries like Jordan, Egypt, 
Tunisia, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Algeria. The MENA region, including Morocco, currently 
contributes with about one quarter of the global production. The recent turmoil in some countries 
in the region such as Tunisia, Egypt, Algeria and Syria shows that there is a possibility of severe 
production restrictions.  
Global trade is even more concentrated. According to the Fertilizer Institute statistics, the major 
phosphate rock exporting countries are Morocco, Jordan, Peru, Egypt and Russia. All together, 
these countries control about 80% of the global phosphate rock export market. Morocco is the 
world’s largest exporter accounting for about one-third of total exports (IFA, 2016). China and the 
US are among the top producers but their domestic consumption largely eclipses their exporting 
activities. 
Phosphate companies in major exporting countries are state owned. This will put them in a position 
where can use their phosphate resources in a geo-strategic manner, through trade restrictions and 
strategic market behaviors (Keijser, 2016). The commodity should then be regarded as a strategic, 
geo-political commodity (Van Enk et al., 2011).  
2.2.3 Sequencing of decision making in PR market   
There is no doubt that phosphate demand will continue to raise. Producers need to undertake huge 
investments to build up their capacities in order to meet the future production deficit. 
In the real world, PR producers publicly announce their investment plans under full commitment 
(CRU, 2015). Moreover, following a positive demand shock in the market, the biggest producers 
such as the United States, Morocco, Russia, Jordan and Brazil take the lead, being the first ones to 
invest and expand their production levels. The second group-movers or the small producers such 
as Egypt, Tunisia, Israel, Saudi Arabia determine their investments after they observe the 
investment decisions of the biggest producers in the first group, as well as their private signals 
about the state of the demand. For instance, OCP Group, the Moroccan state-owned company for 
PR mining and processing of phosphoric acid and fertilizers, has initiated an investment program 
of 130 billion Moroccan Dirhams in 2008 (around 15billion US$) to double its mining capacity and 
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triple its fertilizer capacity. Five years later, Maaden Company, the Saudi phosphate mining 
compagny, announced a plan to invest 7.5billion US$ to develop two industrial sites (Ras Al-Khair 
and Wa’ad Al-Shamal) for an overall capacity of 16 million tons per year. 
Consequently, the global PR market can be considered as an oligopolistic market with sequential 
production and investment decisions. This leads to the multi-leader multi-follower Stackelberg 
model that we are going to analyze in this paper. 
2.3 Model 
In this section, we develop a multi-leader multi-follower Stackelberg model for the PR market. In 
this case, we assume that there are two distinct groups: a group of producers, acting as leaders and 
deciding first; and the other group, called followers, which reacts to the leaders’ decisions. Under 
some assumptions, we derive the optimality conditions and discuss the existence and uniqueness 
of equilibrium through a basic adaptation of Sherali’s results. In order to meet the future PR 
demand, we use the model to compute the equilibrium production quantity  and the corresponding 
capacity for each producer. 
2.3.1 Model setup  
We assume that the global demand curve for PR takes the linear form 𝑄(𝑃) = (𝛼 − 𝑃)/𝛽, with 
parameters 𝛼, 𝛽 > 0. This assumption is common in the literature (e.g. Pang and Fukushima, 2005; 
Huppmann, 2010 and Behar and Ritz, 2016) and will facilitate the empirical calibration of the model 
later on. On the supply side, we consider an oligopoly consisting of M leader-producers and N 
follower- producers that produce PR non-cooperatively. The distinction here between leader- and 
follower-producers is based on their capacity and their ability to produce a wide range of outputs 
with a reasonable profit margin. Because of its essential properties, and since there is no known 
substitute for it, demand for phosphate is only expected to increase in order to feed a growing 
world population. We study a situation where the global future demand of phosphate will exceed 
largely the current capacity of production. More formally, let’s note 𝑄𝑇 the global demand of 
phosphate at horizon T and 𝐾 is the current world capacity of production with {𝐾 =
 ∑ 𝑘𝑖
𝑙 + ∑ 𝑘𝑗
𝑓𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑀
𝑖=1 } where 𝑘𝑖
𝑙 , 𝑘𝑗
𝑓
 are the current capacity of production for the i-th leader and 
the j-th follower respectively. In this situation, where {𝑄𝑇 ≫ 𝐾}, each producer may have an 
interest to develop a new capacity of production in order to maximize its future market share. 
Because the leaders have the ability to move first, the followers choose their supply (or capacity 
expansion) after observing the aggregate leader supply (i.e. the announced capacity expansion 
program). This leads to a two-level strategic game where producers compete in quantities.  
‒ In the upper-level, the leaders who are supposed to correctly anticipate the reaction 
function of the followers decide independently and simultaneously about their individual 
supply. 
‒ In the lower-level, the followers decide simultaneously upon their quantity after learning 
about the total quantity supplied by the leaders.  
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As a consequence, each of the M leaders acts as a traditional Stackelberg leader towards the N 
followers, but as a Cournot firms with respect to the other leaders. Similarly, the N followers act as 
Stackelberg followers towards the leaders and as Cournot firms with respect to each other. 
For more simplicity, the production environment for the various producers are modelled by: 
‒ a zero fixed cost for all producers,  
‒ a constant per unit cost of production (OPEX) (denoted as 𝑐𝑖
𝑙 , 𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑀 for the leaders 
and by 𝑐𝑗
𝑓
, 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑁 for the followers)  
‒ a constant per unit investment cost for different producers (CAPEX), with 𝜏𝑖
𝑙 and 𝜏𝑗
𝑓
 the 
i-th leaders’ and j-th followers’ per unit cost for developing a new capacity.   
‒ the leader and follower producers’ decision variables are production quantities 𝑞𝑖
𝑙 and 𝑞𝑗
𝑓
 
respectively.  
Next, we adopt the additional following notations: the aggregate supply of all leaders and followers 
are defined as 𝑄𝑙 = ∑ 𝑞𝑖
𝑙𝑀
𝑖=1  and 𝑄
𝑓 = ∑ 𝑞𝑗
𝑓𝑁
𝑗=1  respectively. 𝑄
𝑙−𝑖 = ∑ 𝑞𝑖
𝑙𝑀
𝑘≠𝑖  is the aggregate 
leader’s supply except the leader i and 𝑄𝑓−𝑗 = ∑ 𝑞𝑗
𝑓𝑁
𝑘≠𝑗  denote the aggregate follower’s supply 
excluding the follower j. 
Then, the objective function of the j-th follower can be written as follow: 
Max
𝑞
𝑗
𝑓
≥0
𝜋𝑗
𝑓
= [𝑃(𝑄𝑙 + 𝑞𝑗
𝑓
+ 𝑄𝑓−𝑗)𝑞𝑗
𝑓
⏟              
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ−𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤
− 𝑐𝑗
𝑓
𝑞𝑗
𝑓
⏟
𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑋
− 𝜏𝑗
𝑓
×𝑚𝑎𝑥(0; 𝑞𝑗
𝑓
− 𝑘𝑗
𝑓
)⏟              
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋
 ]       𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑗 = 1 𝑡𝑜 𝑁 (2.1) 
which is maximized by  ?̂?𝑓 = 𝑞𝑓(𝑞𝑙). We call this result the follower’s best reaction function. 
The i-th leader problem is to maximize the following function with respect to the follower’s best 
reaction function: 
Max
𝑞𝑖
𝑙≥0
𝜋𝑖
𝑙 = [𝑃 (𝑄𝑙−𝑖+𝑞𝑖
𝑙 + ?̂?𝑓(𝑞𝑙)) 𝑞𝑖
𝑙
⏟                
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ−𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤
− 𝑐𝑖
𝑙𝑞𝑖
𝑙
⏟
𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑋
− 𝜏𝑖
𝑙 ×𝑀𝑎𝑥(0; 𝑞𝑖
𝑙 − 𝑘𝑖
𝑙) ⏟              
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋
 ]       𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 = 1 𝑡𝑜 𝑀 (2.2) 
where the amounts {𝜏𝑗
𝑓
×𝑚𝑎𝑥(0; 𝑞𝑗
𝑓
− 𝑘𝑗
𝑓
) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜏𝑖
𝑙 ×𝑀𝑎𝑥(0; 𝑞𝑖
𝑙 − 𝑘𝑖
𝑙) } represents the investment 
needed by the j-th follower and the i-th leader to develop the additional capacity. 
2.3.2 Generalized Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot (GSNC) equilibrium 
In this subsection, we first define the equilibrium solution for the proposed multi-leader multi-
follower Stackelberg model. Then, we present the assumptions and give the conditions for the 
existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium by using the main results of Sherali (1984). 
Definition: A set of output quantities (𝑞1
𝑙∗, ⋯ , 𝑞𝑀
𝑙∗, 𝑞1
𝑓∗
, ⋯ , 𝑞𝑁
𝑓∗
) for the M leaders and the N followers 
respectively is called a Generalized-Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot (GSNC) equilibrium if 𝑞𝑖
𝑓∗
 solves the following 
problem :  
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𝑀𝑎𝑥
𝑞𝑖
𝑙≥0
𝜋𝑖
𝑙 = {𝑃 (𝑄𝑙−𝑖+𝑞𝑖
𝑙 + ∑ 𝑞𝑗
𝑓∗
𝑁
𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑖
)𝑞𝑖
𝑙 − 𝑐𝑖
𝑙𝑞𝑖
𝑙 − 𝜏𝑖
𝑙 ×𝑚𝑎𝑥(0; 𝑞𝑖
𝑙 − 𝑘𝑖
𝑙)}      𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ  𝑖 = 1,⋯ ,𝑀 (2.3) 
And moreover,  𝑞𝑗
𝑓∗
= 𝑞𝑗
𝑓
(𝑄𝑙∗) 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑗 = 1,⋯ ,𝑁,   𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑄𝑙∗ = ∑ 𝑞𝑖
𝑙∗𝑀
𝑖=1  
Assumption A (equivalent to Assumption A in Sherali (1984)) 
Let 𝑇𝐶𝑖
𝑙(𝑞𝑖
𝑙) and 𝑇𝐶𝑗
𝑓
(𝑞𝑗
𝑓
) be the total cost function for the i-th leader and the j-th follower respectively with 
𝑇𝐶𝑖
𝑙(𝑞𝑖
𝑙) =  𝑐𝑖
𝑙𝑞𝑖
𝑙
⏟
𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑋
+ 𝜏𝑖
𝑙 ×𝑚𝑎𝑥(0; 𝑞𝑖
𝑙 − 𝑘𝑖
𝑙)⏟              
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋
 
 
 𝑇𝐶𝑗
𝑓
(𝑞𝑗
𝑓
) =  𝑐𝑙
𝑓
𝑞𝑗
𝑓
⏟
𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑋
+ 𝜏𝑗
𝑓
×𝑚𝑎𝑥(0; 𝑞𝑗
𝑓
− 𝑘𝑗
𝑓
)⏟              
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋
 
We assume that the inverse demand 𝑃(𝑄) is a strictly decreasing and twice differentiable function of aggregate 
production and  
𝜕𝑃(𝑞)
𝜕𝑞
+ 𝑞
𝜕2𝑃(𝑞)
𝜕𝑞2
≤ 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ 𝑞 ≥ 0 
And the total cost functions 𝑇𝐶𝑙(𝑞) and 𝑇𝐶𝑓(𝑞) are twice differentiable, nonnegative, and nondecreasing convex 
functions and that there exists a quantity 𝑞∗ > 0  such that for all 𝑞∗ > 𝑞 
𝜕𝑇𝐶𝑖
𝑙(𝑞)
𝜕𝑞
≥ 𝑃(𝑞),     𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑀 
𝜕𝑇𝐶𝑗
𝑓
(𝑞)
𝜕𝑞
≥ 𝑃(𝑞),     𝑗 = 1,… ,𝑁
 
Theorem 1 : If Assumption A holds and the aggregate follower reaction curve 𝑄𝑓(𝑞) is convex, then, by theorem 
2 (Sherali, 1984), there exists a GSNC equilibrium 
Theorem 2 : If Assumption A holds and 𝑃(𝑞) is linear, all follower marginal cost curves 
𝜕𝑇𝐶𝑗
𝑓
(𝑞)
𝜕𝑞
 are concave, 
and all leaders’ cost curves {𝐶𝑖
𝑙(𝑞) = 𝐶.
𝑙(𝑞) ∀𝑖} are identical then, by theorem 5 (Sherali, 1984), the GSNC 
equilibrium solution is unique. 
Therefore, for the proposed model, the GSNC equilibrium exists, but not unique, since all the 
conditions of theorem 1 are satisfied whereas the condition that all leaders have the same cost 
curve in theorem 2 is not (see Industry Cost Cuvre in Data section). 
2.3.3 Leader and follower equilibrium quantities 
In this subsection, we derive the equilibrium output strategies, using the backward-induction 
technique as illustrated in Gibbons (1992). We proceed in three steps. First, we solve the follower 
problem (2.2) and we compute the follower’s reaction as a function of the quantities chosen by the 
leaders ?̂?𝒇 = 𝒒𝒇(𝒒𝒍).  Second, we substitute the follower’s best response function into the leader’s 
problem (2.1) and we derive the leader’s equilibrium decision 𝒒𝒍
∗
. Finally, we substitute the 
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equilibrium quantities chosen by the leaders in the followers’ reaction functions to get the 
equilibrium quantities chosen by the followers 𝒒𝒇
∗
.  
Step1: follower’s reaction function  
From problem 2.2, the necessary and sufficient optimality conditions generate the follower’s 
reaction curve: 
?̂?𝒇(𝒒𝒍) = 𝒎𝒂𝒙(
𝟏
𝟐𝜷
𝑨𝒇
−𝟏𝑽𝒇 −
𝟏
𝟐
𝑨𝒇
−𝟏𝕝𝒇𝒒
𝒍; 𝟎) (2.4) 
where 
 𝒒(𝑁×1)
𝑓
= [
𝑞1
𝑓
𝑞𝑗
𝑓
𝑞𝑁
𝑓
], 𝒒(𝑀×1)
𝑙 = [
𝑞1
𝑙
𝑞𝑖
𝑙
𝑞𝑀
𝑙
],  𝐴𝑓(𝑁×𝑁)
= [
1 ⋯ 1 2⁄
⋮ 1 ⋮
1 2⁄ ⋯ 1
],  𝕝𝑓(𝑁×𝑀)
= [
1 ⋯ 1
⋮ 1 ⋮
1 ⋯ 1
], 
𝑉𝑓(𝑁×1)
=
[
 
 
 𝛼 − (𝑐1
𝑓
+ 𝜏1
𝑓
)
𝛼 − (𝑐𝑗
𝑓
+ 𝜏𝑗
𝑓
)
𝛼 − (𝑐𝑁
𝑓
+ 𝜏𝑁
𝑓
)]
 
 
 
 
 
Step2: leader’s decision  
The leaders solve the follower’s problem and thereby anticipate the choice of the quantity supplied 
by the follower. Therefore, their implied objective function becomes: 
 
𝐌𝐚𝐱
𝒒𝒊
𝒍≥𝟎
𝝅𝒊
𝒍 = [𝑷 (𝑸𝒍−𝒊+𝒒𝒊
𝒍 + ?̂?𝒇(𝒒𝒍)) 𝒒𝒊
𝒍
⏟                
𝑪𝒂𝒔𝒉−𝒇𝒍𝒐𝒘
− 𝒄𝒊
𝒍𝒒𝒊
𝒍
⏟
𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑪𝒐𝒔𝒕
− 𝝉𝒊
𝒍 ×𝑴𝒂𝒙(𝟎; 𝒒𝒊
𝒍 − 𝒌𝒊
𝒍) ⏟              
𝑰𝒏𝒗𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑪𝒐𝒔𝒕
 ]       𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒊 = 𝟏 𝒕𝒐 𝑴  
The necessary and sufficient optimality conditions gives the following solution:   
𝒒𝒍
∗
= 𝒎𝒂𝒙((𝑨𝒍 −
𝟏
𝟒
𝕝𝒍𝑨𝒇
−𝟏𝕝𝒇)
−𝟏
(
𝟏
𝟐𝜷
𝑽𝒍 −
𝟏
𝟒𝜷
𝕝𝒍𝑨𝒇
−𝟏𝑽𝒇) ; 𝟎) (2.5) 
Where 𝐴𝑙(𝑀×𝑀) =
[
 
 
 
 1 +
1
2
∑ 𝑑1𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 ⋯ 1 2⁄
⋮ 1 +
1
2
∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 ⋮
1 2⁄ ⋯ 1 +
1
2
∑ 𝑑𝑀𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 ]
 
 
 
 
, [𝑑𝑖𝑗 =
𝜕(?̂?𝑗
𝑓
(𝑞𝑙))
𝜕𝑞𝑖
𝑙 ], 
  𝕝𝑙(𝑀×𝑁) = [
1 ⋯ 1
⋮ 1 ⋮
1 ⋯ 1
] and 𝑉𝑙(𝑀×1) = [
𝛼 − (𝑐1
𝑙 + 𝜏1
𝑙)
𝛼 − (𝑐𝑖
𝑙 + 𝜏𝑖
𝑙)
𝛼 − (𝑐𝑀
𝑙 + 𝜏𝑀
𝑙 )
] 
Step3: follower’s decision  
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We substitute the equilibrium leader’s quantities (2.5) in the follower reaction function (2.4). We 
obtain the follower’s equilibrium quantities as a function of their production cost and the leader’s 
cost of production.  
𝒒𝒇
∗
= 𝒎𝒂𝒙(
𝟏
𝟐𝜷
𝑨𝒇
−𝟏𝑽𝒇 −
𝟏
𝟐
𝑨𝒇
−𝟏𝕝𝒇((𝑨𝒍 −
𝟏
𝟒
𝕝𝒍𝑨𝒇
−𝟏𝕝𝒇)
−𝟏
(
𝟏
𝟐𝜷
𝑽𝒍 −
𝟏
𝟒𝜷
𝕝𝒍𝑨𝒇
−𝟏𝑽𝒇)) ; 𝟎) (2.6) 
For demonstration: See Appendix A.1 
2.3.4 Leader’s and follower’s equilibrium capacities 
To derive the equilibrium production capacity, we use the following methodology: for each 
producer, if the equilibrium quantity is less than its actual capacity, then the producer will not invest 
in any capacity expansion. In this case, the producer’s equilibrium capacity is equal to its actual 
capacity. If the producer’s equilibrium quantity is above of it actual capacity and if we assume a 
capacity utilization rate of 95% in the mining sector, then the equilibrium capacity is equal to    
(𝑞𝑖
∗ − 𝑘𝑖)/95%. We summarize this in the following equation. 
𝑘𝑖
∗ = {
(𝑞𝑖
∗ − 𝑘𝑖)/95%  𝑖𝑓 𝑞𝑖
∗ > 𝑘𝑖
𝑘𝑖 𝑖𝑓 𝑞𝑖
∗ ≤ 𝑘𝑖
   ∀𝑖 ∈ [1, … ,𝑀; 1, … , 𝑁]       (2.7) 
2.4 Data  
In this section, we describe the observed data, the estimated development cost and the parameters’ 
empirical values for the model calibration and simulations. We also present the current industry 
cost curve and the potential future demand for PR.  
2.4.1 Data description 
Table 2.1 reports the dataset used for the analysis. The number of leaders and followers is fixed 
exogenously. We considers the top five producers (United States, Morocco, Russia, Jordan and 
Brazil) as leaders (M=5) and the remaining as followers (N=16). We do not include China in the 
analysis for two main reasons: the chinise market is mainly oriented towards domestic consumption 
and the official statistics were incomplete and unreliable. We note that the selected leader group 
members produced, in average from 2010 to 2015, around 70% of the global annual PR production.  
On the supply side, the estimated reserves per country for the year 2015 (column (a), Table 2.1), 
are extracted from USGS (2016). The production (column (b)), capacity (column (c)) and the 
weighted average production costs (column (d)) are computed using the detailed CRU database5 
(by site and by company). Handling missing values is done through the use of average values over 
the period 2010-2015 for production. Looking at the capacity utilization ratio, which represents 
                                                 
5 Unfortunately, this type of data is not public. We have an exceptional access with non-publication condition. All 
data used in this study were extracted from “CRU Phosphate Rock Cost Report - Cost Sheets” 
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how the phosphate producers in a country use their installed capacities and approximated by the 
ratio between production and capacity, we note that the top teen producers for the period 2010-
2015 have used in average 80% of its installed capacity. Tunisia and Syria have respectively used 
only 23% and 35% of their capacity mainly due to the frequent social unrest in Tunisia and the 
political instability in Syria. 
The production costs (also called cash operating costs or OPEX) expressed in US$ per ton, include all 
royalties, fees and taxes associated with the extraction of ore as well as the others traditional costs 
associated with mining, internal transportation and beneficiation (raw materials, labor, energy, 
consumables, maintenance materials and services). Globally, we note that the production costs of 
PR averaged 43US$/t in 2015. The most competitive mines are found in Syria and Australia with 
just 25US$/t while the highest operating cost mines are located in South Africa with more than 
88US$/t. 
Table 2.1: Data set used for model calibration 
Leader/ 
Follower  
 
Country 
Reserves, 
2015, 
'10^6t 
Capacity, 
2015, 
'10^6t 
Producti
on, 
2010-15, 
'10^6t 
Prod. 
cost, 
2015, 
US$/t 
Devep. 
Cost, 
US$/t 
Total 
Cost, 
US$/t 
 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) ((d)+(e)) 
Leader’s 
Group 
1 United States 1 100 34,6 27,9 42,32 1,73 44,04 
2 Morocco 50 000 35,8 26,6 33,11 0,90 34,01 
3 Russia 1 300 14,9 10,8 50,84 1,68 52,52 
4 Jordan 1 200 11,1 6,9 50,15 1,70 51,86 
5 Brazil 320 8,3 5,9 44,57 2,13 46,71 
Follower’s 
Group 
6 Egypt 1 200 6,5 4,8 35,72 1,70 37,43 
7 Tunisia 100 9,8 3,9 29,50 2,60 32,10 
8 Israel 130 4,8 3,3 48,61 2,49 51,09 
9 Peru 820 4,0 3,0 40,99 1,82 42,81 
10 Vietnam 30 3,5 2,5 41,00 3,20 44,20 
11 Saudi Arabia 680 5,3 2,5 30,28 1,87 32,15 
12 Australia 1 100 3,0 2,2 25,24 1,73 26,97 
13 South Africa 1 500 2,7 2,1 88,61 1,64 90,25 
14 Syria 1 800 3,3 2,0 25,01 1,59 26,60 
15 Mexico 30 2,2 1,9 58,87 3,20 62,06 
16 Kazakhstan 260 6,0 1,8 31,27 2,21 33,48 
17 India 65 3,1 1,5 48,00 2,80 50,80 
18 Senegal 50 3,1 1,4 60,00 2,93 62,93 
19 Algeria 2 200 2,3 1,3 30,39 1,53 31,92 
20 Togo 30 2,0 1,0 59,88 3,20 63,08 
21 Finland 10 1,0 0,9 59,81 3,86 63,67 
Sources: USGS, CRU and Author’s calculations. 
2.4.2 Estimation of development costs 
The development costs represent the capital expenditures (CAPEX) associated with an increase in 
capacity. Depending on the location of the mine, the stripping ratio and the quantity of phosphate 
ores, development costs can vary considerably across different mining projects. Most phosphate 
ores require some degree of beneficiation after mining (size reduction, washing, mineral separation 
and thermal drying) to meet commercial specifications. Beneficiation facilities should be included 
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in CAPEX calculations. Infrastructure requirements can also be a large capital cost for projects 
that are not located close to an existing railroad, a slurry pipeline, gas, water or electricity supply 
networks. Therefore, mining data play a key role in mining project development costs. 
To obtain an average estimate of the CAPEX associated with a production unit in each country, 
we need to explore the historical data on the detailed CAPEX for all phosphate-mining projects in 
the world. In general, this information can be found on the companies’s balance sheets, news 
releases or presentations on their website. However, in practice this approach is not feasible 
because we need to know, beforehand, the name and the start-up year for each mining. Moreover, 
historical data related to some mining projects are not publicly released or aggregately published. 
Consequently, in this study, we proceed to an econometric estimation of the per-unit development 
cost using data collected from CRU phosphate reports for some selected mining project currently 
planned in different countries.  
We start out the theoretical formulation by the general agreement that the size of the deposit has 
a strong influence on the production rate (Smith, 1997) and thereby on the size of installed 
capacities. We use this agreement to estimate the producers CAPEX as a function of proved 
reserves at country level. In addition, to achieve economies of scale and higher output, the 
producers with large reserves tend to invest in a large capacity of production and vice versa. 
Consequently, the per-unit CAPEX is lower for producers with large reserves. Moreover, the 
majority of the current phosphate production is mined using conventional open-pit operations and 
where draglines or shovel excavators are the norm. We can then easily assume that there is a 
universal process and technology to extract phosphate. Thus, the proposed function can be 
expressed as: 
𝜏𝑖 = 𝜅𝑖𝑅𝑖
−𝛾
 (2.8) 
Where 𝜏𝑖 is the per-unit CAPEX in the country i, 𝑅𝑖  is the proved reserves and parameters             
 𝜅𝑖 , 𝛾 >0. The parameter 𝜅𝑖 may represents the specific characteristic of the producer’s mining 
projects.  
In this study, we assume that the 𝜅𝑖 are constant and equal to 𝜅, and we estimate these parameters 
by regressing actual and announced CAPEX on the corresponding capacities for some selected 
projects. The data is collected from CRU’s phosphate rock cost report, edition 2015 (Table 2.4 in 
Appendix A.2). To compute the per-unit CAPEX, we need an additional assumption on the period 
over which mining companies depreciate their CAPEX. We assume that this period is equal to 25 
years in average (see box 1 in Appendix A.2). The estimation results show 𝜅 = 5.72 and  𝛾 =
−0.17 (Figure 2.3 in Appendix A.2). We conducted a sensitivity analysis of parameter 𝛾 to show 
how it can affect the result (see Table 2.5 in Appendix A.2).  
The estimated per-unit development costs (column (e), Table 2.1) are varying from 0.90 to 
3.86US$/t (column (e)). Morocco, which has considerably greater reserves than any other country, 
or all other countries added together, has therefore the smallest development cost. Due to its 
smallest reserve size, Finland has the highest development cost.  
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2.4.3 Industry Cost curve 
We combine capacity with the production costs to derive the industry cost curve as shown in Figure 
2.1. Looking at this chart, the low end of the curve is mostly occupied by exporting countries in 
the MENA region. The most competitive producers, with respect to capacity, are Morocco, Tunisia 
and Saudi Arabia. The average production cost in this area is around 30US$/t due to either high 
quality ores or low energy costs. The mines in these countries are fully or in the process of being 
integrated with downstream chemical complexes. This can provide a picture of future PR exporting 
operations. In the middle of the cost curve, we can find producers located in net importing regions, 
primarily the United States and Brazil, with an average production cost around 40US$/t. Both 
regions consume large volumes of phosphate rock and phosphate fertilizers, but are far behind the 
major exporting countries of the MENA region. The highest cost producers are generally located 
in exporting countries with unfavorable mining environments and locations far from key markets. 
Jordan and Russian mines are an example, with production costs above of 50US$/t due in part to 
location and lower quality. 
Figure 2.1: PR Cost Curve by country, OPEX at capacity in 2015, US$/ton 
 
Sources: CRU and Author’s calculations. 
2.4.4 Future trends of PR demand  
Since the majority of PR is used to produce fertilizers, the key input to modern agricultural 
production, the future demand for PR is driven by factors affecting the long-term trends of crop 
and food demand. The literature review indicates that there are two long term drivers of phosphate 
demand. First, the growing population will lead to a significantly increase in global food demand. 
By 2050, global population is expected to reach 9.8 billion people according to the UN’s medium 
scenario (UN 2017). Second, the increasing income per capita in developing countries is likely to 
lead to a shift in dietary habits; from a mostly vegetarian diet to one with a higher share of meat 
and dairy based products, which in turn, results in a sharper increased demand for crops and animal 
feeds (IFA 2011; Cordell et al. 2009b; Smit et al. 2009; Schröder et al. 2011). Consequently, fertilizer 
demand is expected to increase by around 1–1.5% per year to 2030 (FAO, 2000, 2002) and slowing 
to 0.9% per year between 2030 and 2050 (FAO, 2002). Cordell et al. (2009b) suggest that the 
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probable demand for phosphorus will grow by 2% per year up to 2050. Beyond 2050, the world’s 
population is expected to peak and stabilize, or even slightly decline towards the end of the century 
(UN, 2017; IIASA, 2007). This is likely to influence growth in food, fertilizer and phosphate rock 
production. Cordell et al. (2009b) estimate that the demand for phosphorus will grow by 0.5% 
during the second-half of the century, whereas Smit et al. (2009), Cooper et al. (2011) and Mew 
(2011) expect phosphorus demand to plateau around mid-century. In term of quantities, the global 
PR consumption, excluding China, was estimated at 118 million tons in 2015 (according to the IFA 
statistics). If we apply the forecasts of Cordell et al. (2009b), this would lead to a future demand 
for PR of approximately 235 million tons by 2050 and more than 302 million tons by 2100. 
2.4.5 Model Calibration 
We use 2015 as the base year for the model calibration because it is a year with no exceptional 
events (no strike, no production shutdown, and no price fly-up) and the last year in the database 
with minimum missing values.  
On the demand side, the parameters α and β are estimating using a log-regression models based 
on CRU data from 2007 to 2016 for the major exporting countries (Morocco, Russia, Peru, Joran 
and Egypt). The more significant results show that α values are included in the range [6.3-7.3] and 
β values in the range [0.255-0.822] (see Table 2.6 in Appendix 2.3). For model simulation, we 
simply choose the central value of these intervals and we set α=7 and β=0.5. 
2.5 Results 
This subsection presents the numerical results for the proposed multi-leader multi-follower 
Stackelberg model. The equilibrium quantities are reported in Table 2.2 and the corresponding 
capacities are shown in Table 2.3. 
Using the calibrated inverse demand parameters and the estimated development costs, the 
equilibrium quantities show a total production of 339 million tons of PR (Table 2.2). If we consider 
a time horizon T equal to 2100, this means that global PR production will grow at a CAGR of 
around 1.28%. At this peace, the producers will be able to meet future demand  which is supposed 
to reach, as discussed before, 302 million tons by 2100. It is important to note that the result should 
not be interpreted as a projection of future PR supply, but as an equilibrium situation when both 
the leaders and the followers act strategically.  
The analysis shows, at equilibrium, that future production will become more concentrated than it 
is today. The PR will be produced by only 11 countries instead of more than 20 countries today. 
Eigh countries alone will provide more than 90% of global PR production by 2100 (China 
excluded). Results also suggest that producers with a per-unit total production cost 
(OPEX+CAPEX) above 46US$ will be out of the market. The equilibrium quantities show that 3 
of 5 selected leaders (Russia, Jordan and Brazil) and 7 of 16 selected followers (India, Israel, Mexico, 
Togo, Senegal, Finland and South Africa) will be inactive due to their high costs of production (see 
also their positions in the industry cost curve Figure 2.2). The observation of an increasing market 
concentration is consistent with the findings of Van Vuuren et al. (2010) who concluded that  global 
production will concentrate in Asia, Africa and West Asia. 
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In term of individual country production, the equilibrium quantities show that Morocco's annual 
production will rise significantly from 27 Mt to more than 127 Mt by 2100, representing an 
increases of 470%. The country will be responsible for over 37.5% of global production, compared 
to 23% today. This seems to be a more realistic conclusion than the one drawn by Cooper et al. 
(2011) which suggest that Morocco will need to increase production by around 700% by 2075 in 
order to meet the phosphate demand deficit and, moreover, the country will obtain a much greater 
share of worldwide production, from 15% in 2010 to 80% by 2100. The others majors’ producers 
are mainly located in the MENA region (Syria, Tunisia, Algeria, Saudi Arabia and Egypt), in 
Australia and in Kazakhstan. The share of these 7 countries is projected to increase to more than 
56% of global PR production. Thus, these results point to the fact that the PR market will remain 
in an oligopolistic situation and will mitigate any eventual future monopoly as it is shown in Cooper 
et al. (2011), Mohr, S. & Evans, G. (2013) and Walan et al., (2014). 
Table 2.2: Phosphate Rock Equilibrium Quantities 
  Country Real Production (avrg. 
2010-2015) 
 Equilibrium Quantity 
(2100) 
   '10^6t %  '10^6t % 
Leader’s 
Group 
1 United States 27,9 24,4  13,36 3,94 
2 Morocco 26,6 23,3  127,08 37,47 
3 Russia 10,8 9,4  - - 
4 Jordan 6,9 6,0  - - 
5 Brazil 5,9 5,2  - - 
Follower’s 
Group 
6 Egypt 4,8 4,2  15,6 4,6 
7 Tunisia 3,9 3,4  26,2 7,7 
8 Israel 3,3 2,9  - - 
9 Peru 3,0 2,6  4,8 1,4 
10 Vietnam 2,5 2,2  2,1 0,6 
11 Saudi Arabia 2,5 2,2  26,1 7,7 
12 Australia 2,2 1,9  36,5 10,8 
13 South Africa 2,1 1,9  - - 
14 Syria 2,0 1,7  37,3 11,0 
15 Mexico 1,9 1,7  - - 
16 Kazakhstan 1,8 1,6  23,5 6,9 
17 India 1,5 1,3  - - 
18 Senegal 1,4 1,2  - - 
19 Algeria 1,3 1,2  26,6 7,8 
20 Togo 1,0 0,9  - - 
21 Finland 0,9 0,8  - - 
Total   114,3 100,0  339,1 100,0 
Sources: CRU and Author’s calculations. 
Increasing production requires extensions to existing mines and the development of new mines 
and related infrastructures. The results suggest that Morocco is the only leader who will invest in 
order to increase capacity, from 36 Mt/y to over 133Mt/y by 2100 (Table 2.3). But such a 
development plan, requires investments in the billions of U.S. dollars (Van Kauwenbergh, 2010) 
and may not be possible with regards  to the country’s financial capacities. However, and keeping 
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in mind the country’s reserve size, it is clear that no other country would be capable to producing 
such volumes.  
Additional capacities will come from 9 followers, with the most notable increases exhibited by 
three followers (Australia, Syria, Algeria) who should multiply there capacities by about 12 times in 
order to meet their equilibrium market share. The future industry cost curve (Figure 2.2) will 
become flatter at lower costs, as new capacities will mainly come from producers with low 
production costs and larger reserves. 
Table 2.3: Phosphate Rock Equilibrium Capacities 
  Country Capacity (2015)  Equilibrium Capacity (2100) 
   '10^6t  '10^6t xCap.2015 
Leader’s 
Group 
1 United States 34,6  34,6 - 
2 Morocco 35,8  133,4 3,7 
3 Russia 14,9  14,9 - 
4 Jordan 11,1  11,1 - 
5 Brazil 8,3  8,3 - 
Follower’s 
Group 
6 Egypt 6,5  16,4 2,5 
7 Tunisia 9,8  27,6 2,8 
8 Israel 4,8  4,8 - 
9 Peru 4,0  5,1 1,3 
10 Vietnam 3,5  3,5 - 
11 Saudi Arabia 5,3  27,4 5,2 
12 Australia 3,0  38,3 12,7 
13 South Africa 2,7  2,7 - 
14 Syria 3,3  39,1 12,0 
15 Mexico 2,2  2,2 - 
16 Kazakhstan 6,0  24,7 4,1 
17 India 3,1  3,1 - 
18 Senegal 3,1  3,1 - 
19 Algeria 2,3  27,9 12,1 
20 Togo 2,0  2,0 - 
21 Finland 1,0  1,0 - 
Total   167,2  431,1  
Sources: CRU and Author’s calculations. 
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Figure 2.2: PR Cost Curve by country, OPEX&CAPEX at capacity by 2100, US$/ton 
 
Sources: CRU and Author’s calculations. 
 
2.6 Limitations of the model 
Under a potential scenario of the future PR production deficit, the analysis shows the equilibrium 
quantities of PR production and the corresponding capacities to be installed by country in a non-
cooperative competition. To do this, a number of assumptions were adopted and thus should be 
considered when interpreting these results. 
‒ We simplify reality by considering PR as a homogenous good, neglecting quality 
differences of PR produced in different regions. 
‒ As we model PR competition in quantities, we do not make any monetary adjustments to 
future costs. 
‒ The depletion of low-cost and high-grade resources will have consequences for the future 
operating costs, which are supposed to be linear and constants in the analysis.  
‒ The future structure of operating costs may also changes with the arrival of 
unconventional energy resources. 
‒ Long-term technology innovation may change the PR mining process and accelerate 
reductions in both CAPEX and OPEX. For instance, bucket excavators may become 
bigger, and change from a human to a robotic operation mode. 
‒ The distribution and the size of PR reserves taken as constants in the analysis are likely to 
be different in the future than it is today. The marine deposit of PR that are generally 
omitted from any reserves calculation could be unlocked with the arrival of dredging 
technology. The technology that was initially developed for diamond mining at a depth of 
about 150m is being now adapted to deeper-water mining (Argus, 2017). 
2.7 Conclusions and Future Directions  
Two particular conclusions could be considered as the most important: First, the research shows 
that game theory can be used as a strategic tool for forward-planning decision-making. Given the 
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oligopolistic situation of the PR market, the sequencing of decision making and by introducing the 
development cost in the producer’s decision program, this study proposes a multi-leader multi-
follower Stackelberg model to investigate how the distribution of PR reserves may affect the share 
of supply and capacity investment decision in the future. Second, the empirical results contribute 
to the discussion on the future PR market structure. The main findings are summarized below:  
- The future PR market will become more concentrated than it is today. World PR will be 
produced by 11 countries and just 8 countries will provide more than 90% of global PR 
production by 2100 (China excluded). This is in line with the conclusions of Van Vuuren 
et al. (2010) who show that global production will concentrate in Asia, Africa and West 
Asia, by using a model for phosphate depletion and under different potential future 
phosphate demand trajectories. 
- Besides China, long-term supply will mainly come from Morocco (about 37% of global 
production), Syria (11%), Australia (10.8%), Algeria (7.8%), Tunisia and Saudi Arabia 
(7.7% each) and Kazakhstan (6.9%). Therefore, we conclude that the PR market will 
likely remain in an oligopoly situation and mitigate the eventual future monopoly as it is 
shown in Cooper et al. (2011), Mohr, S. & Evans, G. (2013) and Walan et al., (2014). 
- By contrast, three of the current major producers (Russia, Joran and Brazil) will be 
inactive, at equilibrium, due to their highest costs of production. 
- New capacities will come from Morocco, with a capacity multiplied by 3.7 times. From a 
present capacity of 36 Mt/y to over 133Mt/y by 2100. The Moroccan phosphate mining 
company, OCP Group, is already engaged in an investment program, which spans 10 
years (2011-2020) and aims to double its mining capacity and triple its fertilizer capacity.  
- Additional capacities will come from 9 followers, with the most significant increases 
exhibited by three followers (Australia, Syria, Algeria) who should multiply there 
capacities by about 12 times to meet their equilibrium market share. However, such 
development plans require hudge investments amounting to billions of U.S. dollars (Van 
Kauwenbergh, 2010) and may not be possible according to the financial difficulties in 
some countries like, Syria, Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt. 
As the major PR producing countries are moving toward vertical integration, where mining 
companies will also produce fertilizers, phosphoric acid and other derivatives of phosphate rock, 
phosphate rock producers will face two options: exporting phosphate rock or exporting fertilizers. 
The proposed model could similarly be used to examine the equilibrium state and compute the 
equilibrium quantities of PR to be exported with or without transformation. However, some 
extensions are required to better capture the specific characteristics of the fertilizers industry. First, 
the production of phosphate fertilizer requires three major raw materials: Sulphur, phosphate rock 
and nitrogen. Some PR producers (for example: Morocco and Tunisia) need to purchase Sulphur 
and nitrogen at market prices while others PR producers (Saudi Arabia) have access to a cheaper 
raw materials. The cost function of phosphate fertilizers should explicitly take into account these 
differences. Second, there is a variety of phosphate fertilizer products (DAP, MAP, TSP and others) 
each corresponding to specific soil needs in different regions. Therefore, phosphate fertilizers 
cannot be considered as a homogenous good and a regional market dimension should be 
introduced. 
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2.9 Appendices A 
Appendix A.1: Proof of Analytical solution for Multi-leader Multi-follower Stackelberg Model 
 
Step 1: Follower's decision as a function of leader’s strategy 
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𝜕𝜋𝑗
𝑓
𝜕𝑞𝑗
𝑓
= 𝑃′(𝑄𝑙 + 𝑞𝑗
𝑓
+ 𝑄𝑓−𝑗)𝑞𝑗
𝑓
+ 𝑃(𝑄𝑙 + 𝑞𝑗
𝑓
+ 𝑄𝑓−𝑗) − (𝑐𝑗
𝑓
+ 𝜏𝑗
𝑓
) = 0 
⇒
𝜕(𝛼−𝛽(𝑄𝑙+𝑞𝑗
𝑓
+𝑄𝑓−𝑗)
𝜕𝑞𝑗
𝑓 𝑞𝑗
𝑓
+ (𝛼 − 𝛽(𝑄𝑙 + 𝑞𝑗
𝑓
+ 𝑄𝑓−𝑗) − (𝑐𝑗
𝑓
+ 𝜏𝑗
𝑓
)=0 
⇒ −2𝛽𝑞𝑗
𝑓
− 𝛽(𝑞1
𝑓
+⋯+ 𝑞𝑖≠𝑗
𝑓
+. . +𝑞𝑁
𝑓
) − 𝛽(𝑞1
𝑙 +⋯+ 𝑞𝑖
𝑙+. . +𝑞𝑀
𝑙 ) + 𝛼 − (𝑐𝑗
𝑓
+ 𝜏𝑗
𝑓
) = 0 
⇒ 2𝛽𝑞𝑗
𝑓
+ 𝛽(𝑞1
𝑓
+⋯+ 𝑞𝑖≠𝑗
𝑓
+. . +𝑞𝑁
𝑓
) = 𝛼 − (𝑐𝑗
𝑓
+ 𝜏𝑗
𝑓
) − 𝛽(𝑞1
𝑙 +⋯+ 𝑞𝑖
𝑙+. . +𝑞𝑀
𝑙 ) 
For all followers, we have the following system 
⟹
{
  
 
  
 2𝛽𝑞1
𝑓
+ 𝛽(𝑞2
𝑓
+⋯+ 𝑞𝑗
𝑓
+. . +𝑞𝑁
𝑓
) = 𝛼 − (𝑐1
𝑓
+ 𝜏1
𝑓
) − 𝛽(𝑞1
𝑙 +⋯+ 𝑞𝑖
𝑙+. . +𝑞𝑀
𝑙 )
⋮
2𝛽𝑞𝑗
𝑓
+ 𝛽(𝑞1
𝑓
+⋯+ 𝑞ℎ≠𝑗
𝑓
+. . +𝑞𝑁
𝑓
) = 𝛼 − (𝑐𝑗
𝑓
+ 𝜏𝑗
𝑓
) − 𝛽(𝑞1
𝑙 +⋯+ 𝑞𝑖
𝑙+. . +𝑞𝑀
𝑙 )
⋮
2𝛽𝑞𝑁
𝑓
+ 𝛽(𝑞1
𝑓
+⋯+ 𝑞𝑗
𝑓
+. . +𝑞𝑁−1
𝑓
) = 𝛼 − (𝑐𝑁
𝑓
+ 𝜏𝑁
𝑓
) − 𝛽(𝑞1
𝑙 +⋯+ 𝑞𝑖
𝑙+. . +𝑞𝑀
𝑙 )}
  
 
  
 
  
The system can be rewritten as 
⟹ [
2𝛽 ⋯ 0
⋮ 2𝛽 ⋮
0 ⋯ 2𝛽
]
[
 
 
 𝑞1
𝑓
𝑞𝑗
𝑓
𝑞𝑁
𝑓
]
 
 
 
+ [
0 ⋯ 𝛽
⋮ 0 ⋮
𝛽 ⋯ 0
]
[
 
 
 𝑞1
𝑓
𝑞𝑗
𝑓
𝑞𝑁
𝑓
]
 
 
 
=
[
 
 
 𝛼 − (𝑐1
𝑓
+ 𝜏1
𝑓
)
𝛼 − (𝑐𝑗
𝑓
+ 𝜏𝑗
𝑓
)
𝛼 − (𝑐𝑁
𝑓
+ 𝜏𝑁
𝑓
)]
 
 
 
− [
𝛽 ⋯ 𝛽
⋮ 𝛽 ⋮
𝛽 ⋯ 𝛽
] [
𝑞1
𝑙
𝑞𝑖
𝑙
𝑞𝑀
𝑙
] 
⟹ [
2𝛽 ⋯ 𝛽
⋮ 2𝛽 ⋮
𝛽 ⋯ 2𝛽
]
[
 
 
 𝑞1
𝑓
𝑞𝑗
𝑓
𝑞𝑁
𝑓
]
 
 
 
=
[
 
 
 𝛼 − (𝑐1
𝑓
+ 𝜏1
𝑓
)
𝛼 − (𝑐𝑗
𝑓
+ 𝜏𝑗
𝑓
)
𝛼 − (𝑐𝑁
𝑓
+ 𝜏𝑁
𝑓
)]
 
 
 
− 𝛽 [
1 ⋯ 1
⋮ 1 ⋮
1 ⋯ 1
] [
𝑞1
𝑙
𝑞𝑖
𝑙
𝑞𝑀
𝑙
] 
⟹ [
1 ⋯ 1 2⁄
⋮ 1 ⋮
1 2⁄ ⋯ 1
]
[
 
 
 𝑞1
𝑓
𝑞𝑗
𝑓
𝑞𝑁
𝑓
]
 
 
 
=
1
2𝛽
[
 
 
 𝛼 − (𝑐1
𝑓
+ 𝜏1
𝑓
)
𝛼 − (𝑐𝑗
𝑓
+ 𝜏𝑗
𝑓
)
𝛼 − (𝑐𝑁
𝑓
+ 𝜏𝑁
𝑓
)]
 
 
 
−
1
2
[
1 ⋯ 1
⋮ 1 ⋮
1 ⋯ 1
] [
𝑞1
𝑙
𝑞𝑖
𝑙
𝑞𝑀
𝑙
] 
In a matrix form, we can write 
⟹ 𝐴𝑓𝑞
𝑓 =
1
2𝛽
𝑉𝑓 −
1
2
𝕝𝑓𝑞
𝑙 
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⟹ ?̂?𝒇 = 𝒎𝒂𝒙((
𝟏
𝟐𝜷
𝑨𝒇
−𝟏𝑽𝒇 −
𝟏
𝟐
𝑨𝒇
−𝟏𝕝𝒇𝒒
𝒍) , 𝟎) 
⟹ ?̂?𝒇 = 𝒒𝒇(𝒒𝒍) 
where 
𝒒(𝑁×1)
𝑓
=
[
 
 
 𝑞1
𝑓
𝑞𝑗
𝑓
𝑞𝑁
𝑓
]
 
 
 
, 𝒒(𝑀×1)
𝑙 = [
𝑞1
𝑙
𝑞𝑖
𝑙
𝑞𝑀
𝑙
],  
𝐴𝑓(𝑁×𝑁)
= [
1 ⋯ 1 2⁄
⋮ 1 ⋮
1 2⁄ ⋯ 1
],   𝕝𝑓(𝑁×𝑀)
= [
1 ⋯ 1
⋮ 1 ⋮
1 ⋯ 1
] 𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑉𝑓(𝑁×1)
=
[
 
 
 𝛼 − (𝑐1
𝑓
+ 𝜏1
𝑓
)
𝛼 − (𝑐𝑗
𝑓
+ 𝜏𝑗
𝑓
)
𝛼 − (𝑐𝑁
𝑓
+ 𝜏𝑁
𝑓
)]
 
 
 
 
Step 2: Leader's decision 
𝐌𝐚𝐱
𝒒𝒊
𝒍≥𝟎
𝝅𝒊
𝒍 = [𝑷(𝑸𝒍−𝒊+𝒒𝒊
𝒍 + ?̂?𝒇)𝒒𝒊
𝒍
⏟            
𝑪𝒂𝒔𝒉−𝒇𝒍𝒐𝒘
− 𝒄𝒊
𝒍𝒒𝒊
𝒍
⏟
𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑪𝒐𝒔𝒕
− 𝝉𝒊
𝒍 ×𝑴𝒂𝒙(𝟎;𝒒𝒊
𝒍 − 𝒌𝒊
𝒍) ⏟              
𝑰𝒏𝒗𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑪𝒐𝒔𝒕
 ]       𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒊 = 𝟏 𝒕𝒐 𝑴 
The ith leader profit function can be derived with respect to 𝑞𝑖
𝑙 as 
⇒
𝜕𝜋𝑖
𝑙
𝜕𝑞𝑖
𝑙 = 𝑃
′(𝑄𝑙−𝑖+𝑞𝑖
𝑙 + ?̂?𝑓)𝑞𝑖
𝑙 + 𝑃(𝑄𝑙−𝑖+𝑞𝑖
𝑙 + ?̂?𝑓) − (𝑐𝑖
𝑙 + 𝜏𝑖
𝑙) = 0 
⇒
𝜕(𝛼−𝛽(𝑄𝑙−𝑖+𝑞𝑖
𝑙+?̂?𝑓))
𝜕𝑞𝑖
𝑙 𝑞𝑖
𝑙 + (𝛼 − 𝛽(𝑄𝑙−𝑖+𝑞𝑖
𝑙 + ?̂?𝑓)) − (𝑐𝑖
𝑙 + 𝜏𝑖
𝑙)=0 
⇒ −𝛽𝑞𝑖
𝑙 − 𝛽
𝜕(?̂?𝑓)
𝜕𝑞𝑖
𝑙 𝑞𝑖
𝑙 + (𝛼 − 𝛽(𝑄𝑙−𝑖+𝑞𝑖
𝑙 + ?̂?𝑓)) − (𝑐𝑖
𝑙 + 𝜏𝑖
𝑙)=0 
⇒ −𝛽𝑞𝑖
𝑙 − 𝛽
𝜕(?̂?𝑓)
𝜕𝑞𝑖
𝑙 𝑞𝑖
𝑙 + (𝛼 − 𝛽(𝑄𝑙−𝑖+𝑞𝑖
𝑙 + ?̂?𝑓)) − (𝑐𝑖
𝑙 + 𝜏𝑖
𝑙)=0 
⇒ −𝛽𝑞𝑖
𝑙 − 𝛽
𝜕(?̂?1
𝑓
+⋯+?̂?𝑁
𝑓
)
𝜕𝑞𝑖
𝑙 𝑞𝑖
𝑙 + (𝛼 − 𝛽(𝑄𝑙−𝑖+𝑞𝑖
𝑙 + ?̂?𝑓)) − (𝑐𝑖
𝑙 + 𝜏𝑖
𝑙)=0 
⇒ −𝛽𝑞𝑖
𝑙 − 𝛽(
𝜕(?̂?1
𝑓
)
𝜕𝑞𝑖
𝑙 +⋯+
𝜕(?̂?𝑁
𝑓
)
𝜕𝑞𝑖
𝑙 )𝑞𝑖
𝑙 + (𝛼 − 𝛽(𝑄𝑙−𝑖+𝑞𝑖
𝑙 + ?̂?𝑓)) − (𝑐𝑖
𝑙 + 𝜏𝑖
𝑙)=0 
⇒ −2𝛽𝑞𝑖
𝑙 − 𝛽(𝑑𝑖1 +⋯+ 𝑑𝑖𝑁)𝑞𝑖
𝑙 + 𝛼 − 𝛽(𝑄𝑙−𝑖 + ?̂?𝑓) − (𝑐𝑖
𝑙 + 𝜏𝑖
𝑙)=0 
⇒ 2𝛽𝑞𝑖
𝑙 + 𝛽(𝑑𝑖1 +⋯+ 𝑑𝑖𝑁)𝑞𝑖
𝑙 + 𝛽𝑄𝑙−𝑖 + 𝛽?̂?𝑓 = 𝛼 − (𝑐𝑖
𝑙 + 𝜏𝑖
𝑙)=0 
 
For all leaders, we have the following system 
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⇒
{
 
 
 
 2𝛽𝑞1
𝑙 + 𝛽(𝑞2
𝑙 +⋯+ 𝑞𝑖
𝑙+. . +𝑞𝑀
𝑙 ) + 𝛽(𝑑11 +⋯+ 𝑑1𝑁)𝑞1
𝑙 + 𝛽(?̂?1
𝑓
+⋯+ ?̂?𝑗
𝑓
+. . +?̂?𝑁
𝑓
) = 𝛼 − (𝑐1
𝑙 + 𝜏1
𝑙 )
⋮
2𝛽𝑞𝑖
𝑙 + 𝛽(𝑞1
𝑙 +⋯+ 𝑞ℎ≠𝑖
𝑙 +. . +𝑞𝑀
𝑙 ) + 𝛽(𝑑𝑖1 +⋯+ 𝑑𝑖𝑁)𝑞𝑖
𝑙 + 𝛽(?̂?1
𝑓
+⋯+ ?̂?𝑗
𝑓
+. . +?̂?𝑁
𝑓
) = 𝛼 − (𝑐𝑖
𝑙 + 𝜏𝑖
𝑙)
⋮
2𝛽𝑞𝑀
𝑙 + 𝛽(𝑞1
𝑙 +⋯+ 𝑞𝑖
𝑙+. . +𝑞𝑀−1
𝑙 ) + 𝛽(𝑑𝑀1 +⋯+ 𝑑𝑀𝑁)𝑞𝑀
𝑙 + 𝛽(?̂?1
𝑓
+⋯+ ?̂?𝑗
𝑓
+. . +?̂?𝑁
𝑓
) = 𝛼 − (𝑐𝑀
𝑙 + 𝜏𝑀
𝑙 )}
 
 
 
 
 
In a matrix form, we can write 
⟹ [
2𝛽 ⋯ 𝛽
⋮ 2𝛽 ⋮
𝛽 ⋯ 2𝛽
] [
𝑞1
𝑙
𝑞𝑖
𝑙
𝑞𝑀
𝑙
] + 𝛽
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
∑𝑑1𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
⋯ 0
⋮ ∑𝑑𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
⋮
0 ⋯ ∑𝑑𝑀𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[
𝑞1
𝑙
𝑞𝑖
𝑙
𝑞𝑀
𝑙
] + 𝛽 [
1 ⋯ 1
⋮ 1 ⋮
1 ⋯ 1
] [
?̂?1
𝑓
?̂?𝑗
𝑓
?̂?𝑁
𝑓
] = [
𝛼 − (𝑐1
𝑙 + 𝜏1
𝑙)
𝛼 − (𝑐𝑖
𝑙 + 𝜏𝑖
𝑙)
𝛼 − (𝑐𝑀
𝑙 + 𝜏𝑀
𝑙 )
] 
⟹ 2𝛽 [
1 ⋯ 1 2⁄
⋮ 1 ⋮
1 2⁄ ⋯ 1
] [
𝑞1
𝑙
𝑞𝑖
𝑙
𝑞𝑀
𝑙
] + 𝛽
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
∑𝑑1𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
⋯ 0
⋮ ∑𝑑𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
⋮
0 ⋯ ∑𝑑𝑀𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[
𝑞1
𝑙
𝑞𝑖
𝑙
𝑞𝑀
𝑙
] + 𝛽 [
1 ⋯ 1
⋮ 1 ⋮
1 ⋯ 1
] [
?̂?1
𝑓
?̂?𝑗
𝑓
?̂?𝑁
𝑓
] = [
𝛼 − (𝑐1
𝑙 + 𝜏1
𝑙)
𝛼 − (𝑐𝑖
𝑙 + 𝜏𝑖
𝑙)
𝛼 − (𝑐𝑀
𝑙 + 𝜏𝑀
𝑙 )
] 
⟹ [
1 ⋯ 1 2⁄
⋮ 1 ⋮
1 2⁄ ⋯ 1
] [
𝑞1
𝑙
𝑞𝑖
𝑙
𝑞𝑀
𝑙
] +
1
2
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
∑𝑑1𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
⋯ 0
⋮ ∑𝑑𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
⋮
0 ⋯ ∑𝑑𝑀𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[
𝑞1
𝑙
𝑞𝑖
𝑙
𝑞𝑀
𝑙
] +
1
2
[
1 ⋯ 1
⋮ 1 ⋮
1 ⋯ 1
] [
?̂?1
𝑓
?̂?𝑗
𝑓
?̂?𝑁
𝑓
] =
1
2𝛽
[
𝛼 − (𝑐1
𝑙 + 𝜏1
𝑙)
𝛼 − (𝑐𝑖
𝑙 + 𝜏𝑖
𝑙)
𝛼 − (𝑐𝑀
𝑙 + 𝜏𝑀
𝑙 )
] 
⟹
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 +
1
2
∑𝑑1𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
⋯ 1 2⁄
⋮ 1 +
1
2
∑𝑑𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
⋮
1 2⁄ ⋯ 1 +
1
2
∑𝑑𝑀𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[
𝑞1
𝑙
𝑞𝑖
𝑙
𝑞𝑀
𝑙
] +
1
2
[
1 ⋯ 1
⋮ 1 ⋮
1 ⋯ 1
] [
?̂?1
𝑓
?̂?𝑗
𝑓
?̂?𝑁
𝑓
] =
1
2𝛽
[
𝛼 − (𝑐1
𝑙 + 𝜏1
𝑙 )
𝛼 − (𝑐𝑖
𝑙 + 𝜏𝑖
𝑙)
𝛼 − (𝑐𝑀
𝑙 + 𝜏𝑀
𝑙 )
] 
 
⟹ 𝐴𝑙𝑞
𝑙 +
1
2
𝕝𝑙?̂?
𝑓 =
1
2𝛽
𝑉𝑙 
Substituting ?̂?𝒇 into (.) and rearranging terms  
⟹ 𝐴𝑙𝑞
𝑙 +
1
2
𝕝𝑙 (
1
2𝛽
𝐴𝑓
−1𝑉𝑓 −
1
2
𝐴𝑓
−1𝕝𝑓𝑞
𝑙) =
1
2𝛽
𝑉𝑙 
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⟹ 𝐴𝑙𝑞
𝑙 +
1
4𝛽
𝕝𝑙𝐴𝑓
−1𝑉𝑓 −
1
4
𝕝𝑙𝐴𝑓
−1𝕝𝑓𝑞
𝑙 =
1
2𝛽
𝑉𝑙 
⟹ 𝐴𝑙𝑞
𝑙 −
1
4
𝕝𝑙𝐴𝑓
−1𝕝𝑓𝑞
𝑙 =
1
2𝛽
𝑉𝑙 −
1
4𝛽
𝕝𝑙𝐴𝑓
−1𝑉𝑓 
⟹ (𝐴𝑙 −
1
4
𝕝𝑙𝐴𝑓
−1𝕝𝑓)𝑞
𝑙 =
1
2𝛽
𝑉𝑙 −
1
4𝛽
𝕝𝑙𝐴𝑓
−1𝑉𝑓 
⟹ ?̂?𝒍 = (𝑨𝒍 −
𝟏
𝟒
𝕝𝒍𝑨𝒇
−𝟏𝕝𝒇)
−𝟏
(
𝟏
𝟐𝜷
𝑽𝒍 −
𝟏
𝟒𝜷
𝕝𝒍𝑨𝒇
−𝟏𝑽𝒇) 
⟹ ?̂?𝒍 = 𝒒𝒍(𝑪𝒍, 𝑪𝒇, 𝝉𝒍, 𝝉𝒇, 𝛼, 𝛽) 
 
Step 3: Follower’s final decision 
⟹ ?̂?𝑓 =
1
2𝛽
𝐴𝑓
−1𝑉𝑓 −
1
2
𝐴𝑓
−1𝕝𝑓 ((𝐴𝑙 −
1
4
𝕝𝑙𝐴𝑓
−1𝕝𝑓)
−1
(
1
2𝛽
𝑉𝑙 −
1
4𝛽
𝕝𝑙𝐴𝑓
−1𝑉𝑓)) 
⟹ ?̂?𝒇 = 𝒒𝒇(𝑪𝒍, 𝑪𝒇, 𝝉𝒍, 𝝉𝒇, 𝛼, 𝛽) 
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Appendix A.2: Estimation of development costs 
Box 1. Determination of mining CAPEX depreciation period  
Mining is a capital-intensive industry. Mining companies often require significant capital 
expenditures to develop a new mine or to expand an existing one. The estimation of the per unit 
CAPEX requires a determination of the period over which these CAPEX should be depreciated. 
This often represents one of the challenges for mining companies because it can have a significant 
impact on the mining project feasibility. It is clear that this period depend directly on the life of the 
mine project. However, there are various factors such as ongoing exploration activities, changing 
commodity prices and input costs that can have a significant impact on the useful life of the mine 
project, and therefore the total material extracted (KPMG, 2017).  
The unit-of –production method is commonly used in the mining industry to depreciate mineral 
reserves, property, plants and equipment (International Accounting Standards (IAS) 16) on the 
basis of proven and probable reserves. For example, a machine may be depreciated on the basis of 
output produced during a period in proportion to its total expected production capacity. Therefore, 
the useful life of an asset under the units-of-production method is stated in terms of production 
output or usage rather than years of service. 
Generally, the useful life of a mine project varies from 10 to 50 years. In this paper, we assume that 
the period over which mining companies depreciate their CAPEXs is equal to 25 years.  
Table 2.4: Selected phosphate rock projects 
Selected Projectsa Location 
CAPEX 
(million US$) 
Capacity 
(million tons) 
CAPEX to Capacity 
for 25b years 
(US$/t) 
Paris Hills US 121 0,9 5,38 
Lac à Paul Canada 1214,7 3,0 16,20 
Mine Arnaud  Canada 750 1,4 21,43 
Wapiti  Canada 2,2 0,8 0,11 
Angico dos Dias  Brazil 20 0,2 5,33 
Irecê  Brazil 15 0,2 3,00 
Santana  Brazil 396 0,5 31,68 
Serra do Salitre  Brazil 350 1,2 11,67 
Don Diego  Mexico 357,3 7,0 2,04 
Bayóvar Peru 350 2,5 5,60 
Dinner Hill  Australia 104,1 0,3 13,88 
Ouled Fares  Morocco 233 6 1,55 
Chaketma  Tunisia 364 1,5 9,71 
Cabinda  Angola 157 0,8 7,85 
Duyker Eiland  South Africa 122,2 0,49 9,98 
a: the selected project’s statue can be firm, probable or speculative. 
b: the 25 years represent an average period over which the mining CAPEX should be depreciated.  
Source: Phosphate Rock Cost Report, CRU, 2015 
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Figure 2.3: Phosphate Rock mining: CAPEX and Capacity 
 
Source: Phosphate Rock Cost Report, CRU, 2015 
Sensitivity Analysis 
As noted earlier, in order to evaluate how the parameter 𝛾 can affect the results, we carry out a 
sensitivity analysis with respect to this parameter using values of -0.09 and -0.26, in addition to the 
value of -0.17 used in our base specification. Table 2.5 lists the equilibrium quantities that each 
country could produce by 2100. The results show that the market structure at equilibrium is not 
very sensitive to a ±50 percentage change of this parameter. 
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Table 2.5: Sensivity analysis 
  Equilibrium Production Quantities (2100) 
Gam
ma 
 -0,09  -0,17  -0,26 
  '10^6t %  '10^6t %  '10^6t % 
1 United States 12,2 3,6  13,4 3,9  13,9 4,1 
2 Morocco 126,5 37,6  127,1 37,5  124,9 36,9 
3 Russia - -  - -  - - 
4 Jordan - -  - -  - - 
5 Brazil - -  - -  - - 
1 Egypt 15,4 4,6  15,6 4,6  15,7 4,6 
2 Tunisia 26,4 7,8  26,2 7,7  26,5 7,8 
3 Israel - -  - -  - - 
4 Peru 4,6 1,4  4,8 1,4  4,9 1,5 
5 Vietnam 2,5 0,7  2,1 0,6  2,2 0,6 
6 Saudi Arabia 26,0 7,7  26,1 7,7  26,3 7,8 
7 Australia 36,3 10,8  36,5 10,8  36,6 10,8 
8 South Africa - -  - -  - - 
9 Syria 37,0 11,0  37,3 11,0  37,3 11,0 
10 Mexico - -  - -  - - 
11 Kazakhstan 23,4 7,0  23,5 6,9  23,7 7,0 
12 India - -  - -  - - 
13 Senegal - -  - -  - - 
14 Algeria 26,4 7,8  26,6 7,8  26,6 7,9 
15 Togo - -  - -  - - 
16 Finland - -  - -  - - 
# Total 336,6 100  339,1 100  338,6 100 
 Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Appendix 2.3: Estimated parameters for inverse demand function 
Table 2.6: Estimated parameters for inverse demand function 
Estimated equation: 𝐿𝑛(𝑃) = 𝛼 − 𝛽 ∗ 𝐿𝑛(𝑄) 
 Morocco  Russia  Peru  Jordan  Egypt 
               
𝛼 7,259 ***  11,460 ***  6,264 **  3,254   1,080  
 (0,971)   (1,814)   (2,243)   (1,928)   (3,054)  
               
𝛽 0,255 **  0,822 ***  0,204   -0,202   -0,423  
 (0,106)   (0,239)   (0,285)   (0,245)   (0,391)  
               
Sample 2007-2016  2007-2016  2011-2016  
2007-
2016  2010-2016 
               
R-
squared 0,027  0,451  0,026  0,068  0,033 
Method: Least Squares with HAC standard errors & covariance (Pre-whitening with lags = 2 
from AIC max lags = 2, Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed bandwidth = 3.0000) 
 
42 
 
 
Chapter 3 
 
Economic impacts of phosphate extraction and 
valorization on the Moroccan economy: An 
input-output analysis 
 
 
Résumé  
Le troisième chapitre vise à évaluer quantitativement les effets d’entraînement que le Maroc dégage 
de son exploitation des phosphates. Pour atteindre cet objectif, la méthodologie utilisée repose sur 
l’analyse entrée-sortie de Leontief. La combinaison des données du Groupe OCP avec celles de la 
comptabilité nationale a permis de scinder les activités du Groupe OCP en deux branches « OCP-
Mine » pour l’activité d’extraction et « OCP-Chimie » pour l’activité de transformation. L’analyse 
empirique proposée compare les impacts socio-économiques de l’extraction à ceux liés à la 
transformation ou à la valorisation sur les autres secteurs de l’économie nationale. Les résultats de 
cette analyse montrent que la transformation des phosphates est plus reliée en amont avec les autres 
branches de l’économie et génère plus de valeur ajoutée, de revenues et d’emplois. Ainsi, la 
production d’engrais d’une valeur d’un dollar génère une production totale évaluée à 2,61 dollars 
dans l’économie tandis qu'une même quantité d’extraction de phosphate brut génère une 
production équivalente à 1,73 dollar. En termes de revenus, l’activité OCP-Chimie génère 3,11 
dollars pour chaque dollar de la production du secteur, tandis que l’impact OCP-Mine équivaut à 
2,25 dollars. En outre, les calculs montrent le multiplicateur d'emploi total est égal à 8 pour OCP-
Chimie, alors qu'il est d'environ 3 pour OCP-Mine. 
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3.1 Introduction 
The Moroccan mining sector is dominated by phosphate, which account more than 90% of the 
sector’s total production. With about 75% of the world's estimated reserves of Phosphate Rock6, 
Morocco is the second larger phosphate producer and the world’s leading phosphate rock exporter, 
accounting for roughly one-third of world trade. Morocco is also leader in the export of phosphoric 
acid and fertilizers with respectively 47% and 19% of global export (IFA7 statistics, 2013). 
Phosphate exploration and extraction are exclusively managed by a state-owned company named 
OCP8 Group, wheras the valorization activity (e.g. production of Phosphoric Acid and Fertilizers) 
is managed mostly by OCP along with some others foreign producers in the form of joint ventures. 
A brief presentation of the OCP group is reported in Appendix B.1 and the detailed capacity by 
site, logistics and target markets of finished products are presented in Appendix B.2  and Appendix 
B.3.  
At national level, both extraction and valorization activities significantly contribute to the 
Moroccan economy. For instance, between 2009 and 2014, phosphate and fertilizers exports 
represented on average 22% of  total exports (Figure 3.1) and contributed by 13% of total foreign 
exchange earnings (Figure 3.2). In addition, the OCP Group’s added value represented on average 
4.4% of the national value added (Figure 3.3). The company’s direct contribution, in terms 
dividends and corporate tax, amounted to an average of 7,2% of the government’s total revenues 
(Figure 3.4). In terms of investments, OCP Group started an expansion program in 2010, aiming 
at doubling   mining output and triple fertilizer production by 2020, with an overall budget of US$ 
12billion. Moreover, OCP Group is among the lagest employer in Morocco with a direct workforce 
of over 21000 employees and about 40000 indirect jobs, mainly through sub-contracting (a network 
of over 1500 local sub-contractors). This has a significant impact on employment at the regional 
level. For instance, OCP’s share in regional employment in the industrial branch reached 35% 
where OCP’s chemical activities are located and from 5 to 25% where the company has its mining 
activities(Table 3.1 and Figure 3.5). 
Beyond these direct macro-economic impacts, the sector has a substantial contribution when it is 
integrated into the economy. This is achieved through several channels: additional revenues from 
industries’ related activities, employment generated by these activities, intermediate inputs 
provision from and for other sectors, research and development activities and, finally, technology 
transfers. Therefore, the company also contributes to the services sector like banking, inssurance, 
financial services, transportations and logistics.  
This study aims to estimate and analyze the impact of phosphate extraction and valorization 
activities on the Moroccan economy. By using an input-output methodological framework, this 
work evaluates how an increase in demand adressed to each of these industries could potentially 
affect the Moroccan economy. A significant advantage of utilizing an input-output methodology is 
that the multipliers (output, income and employment) and linkage measures incorporate not only 
                                                 
6 According to the latest U.S. Geological Survey (2016), Phosphate rock reserves in Morocco are estimated at 50 billion 
tonnes (World phosphate reserves are estimated at 69 billions tons). 
7 International Fertilizers Association (www.fertilizer.org) 
8 Office Chérifien des Phosphates (www.ocpgroup.ma) 
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the direct effects, but also the indirect and the induced effects on the economy in response to an 
exogenous shock on one of the components of final demand (e.g. export demand, investment or 
stock variation). These detailed measures are useful for OCP Group’s decision makers in order to 
identify an industrial target for a region or to plan a future production program. It is also useful for 
national policy makers and planners who need to know in which sectors output, income and 
employment changes will occur. The next section discusses the application of I-O techniques to 
OCP’s mining and chemical activities. It is then followed by a presentation of the results and, 
finally, a concluding section summarizes the implications of theses results for future economic 
development in Morocco. 
OCP’s major economic impacts 
Figure 3.1: Contribution to total exports in % 
 
Figure 3.2: Contribution to foreign exchange earnings 
in %  
 
Figure 3.3: Contribution to national value added in 
% 
 
Figure 3.4: Contribution to government revenues in % 
 
Sources: Author’s calculations based on data from Office des Changes and Finance Ministry 
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Table 3.1: Employment contribution of OCP’s activities by region 
  Employment (jobs) 
  All Industries OCP sites in % 
Chaouia-Ouardigha 34 110 5574 16% 
Marrakech-Tensift-Al-Haouz 21 177 1088 5% 
Laâyoune-Boujdour-Sakia El Hamra 7105 1780 25% 
Doukkala-Abda 27 781 9769 35% 
 Sources: Author’s calculations based on data from Haut Commissariat aux Plans (HCP) and OCP Group. 
 
Figure 3.5: Location of OCP Group’s activities by region 
 
3.2 Methodology and data 
3.2.1 Input-output analysis 
Input-output analysis, an analytical framework developed by Wassily Leontief in the late 1930s, 
represent the interdependencies between different branches (or industries or sectors) of a national 
economy or different regional economies (Leontief, 1936, 1951, 1986 and Thijs Ten Raa, 2010). 
Input-output analysis specifically shows how industries are linked together through supplying 
inputs for the output of an economy. Since it was initially developed, the framework has been 
continually improved and it is, today, one of the most applied methods in economics (Baumol, 
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2000). The advantage of the I-O framework  is the easy-to-understand, transparent and very 
detailed picture it provides regarding the structure of the economy at a specific point of time, 
making disaggregated analyses possible. Another advantage is that the model does not incorporate 
any specific behavioral equations for individuals or companies so it is politically and ideologically 
neutral (Foran et al., 2005). 
The model is widely applied to analyze impacts at both national and local levels. In recent years, 
the I-O model has been used to analyze the effects of investments in South Africa (L.C. Stilwell et 
al., 2000), Chile (Aroca, 2001) and North Sweden (Ejdemo and Söderholm, 2011). At local level, 
we find an abundant literature using regional I-O tables based model to estimate the economic 
impacts of mining activities (Lagos and Blanco, 2010; Pascó-Font et al., 2001; Castillo et al., 2001; 
Eggert, 2001; Tonts, 2010; Ivanova and Rolfe, 2011; Rolfe et al., 2011; Xu et al., 2011; Tianya Qi 
et al., 2012).  
The I-O model is used in this study to describe the interactions between the phosphate mining and 
fertilizers sectors and the rest of the economy at a national level. We note that the Moroccan 
National Statistics Office (HCP9) does not publish I-O tables at a regional level. By using the model, 
we will evaluate direct, indirect (by associated industries) and induced (by households income 
spending interactions) effects of a change in final demand for a particular product (i.e. for OCP 
Group, it could be a new export demand for phosphate rock or for fertilizers).  
3.2.2 I-O table 
The I-O model is based on the input-output table (presented in detail in Appendix B.4) which, in 
general, can be divided vertically according to the type of demand (inter-industry demands and 
final demands) and horizontally according to the type of input (domestic intermediate goods, 
domestic primary factors of production and imports). The rows describe the distribution of a 
producer’s output throughout the economy. The columns describe the composition of inputs 
required by a particular industry to produce its output. In others words, the rows of an I-O table 
shows “who gives to whom” and its columns shows “who receives from whom” in economic 
sectors (Kerschner and Hubacek, 2009). These inter-industry exchanges of goods constitute the 
endogenous section of the table. The additional columns, labeled Final Demand, record the sales by 
each sector to purchasers (or final users) who are external or exogenous to the industrial sectors that 
constitute the producers in the economy, such as households, government, and foreign trade (rest 
of the world). The additional rows, labeled Value Added, account for the other (non-industrial) 
inputs to production (Miller and Blair, 2009). The Moroccan I-O table contain 19 sectors (Table 
3.2). 
  
                                                 
9 Haut-Commissariat au Plan (www.hcp.ma) 
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Table 3.2: Sectors classifications in Moroccan I-O table 
N° Code Sector 
1 A00 Agriculture and forestry 
2 B05 Fishing and aquaculture 
3 C00 Food products, beverages and tobacco 
4 D01 Textiles and leather  
5 D02 Chemicals and chemical products 
6 D03 Mecanical, metallical and electrical industries 
7 D04 Other manufacturing industries  
8 D05 Refined petroleum and other energy products 
9 D06 Electricity and water supply 
10 E00 Construction 
11 F45 Wholesale and retail trade 
12 G00 Hotels and restaurants 
13 H55 Transport  
14 I01 Post and telecommunications 
15 I02 Financial activities and Insurance 
16 J00 Real estate activities 
17 K00 Public administration and social security 
18 L75 Education, health and social work 
19 MNO Other non-financial services 
Source: Moroccan Classification of Activities, NMA, 2010 (HCP) 
3.2.3 Establishing the I-O table with OCP activities 
The present analysis is based on a dataset composed of the following informations: 
 The latest Moroccan Input-Output tables of the morocan economy in 2014 (evaluation at current 
prices and expressed in millions MAD) (HCP, National Accounts 2015) 
 The detailed data from OCP’s Profit and Loss (P&L) statement (OCP, Financial Report 2014 and 
internal data). OCP’s data show : i) the detailed expenditure on domestic inputs and employee’s 
wages and salaries for exploration, extraction, development and transformation activities; ii) 
imports of intermediate inputs and exports of final products; iii) taxes, dividends and others 
financial contributions to the Governement revenues; iv) the voluntary expenditures on local 
communities such as infrastructures, education, social actions, sports and other sponsoring 
activities. 
Since our focus is on OCP’s activities (mining and chemicals) and thier linkages, we have added to 
the I-O table two columns in order to separately show “OCP-Mining” activity [coded: C00-OCP] 
and “OCP-Chemical” activity [coded: D02-OCP], and two lines to represent “phosphate rock” product 
and “phosphate fertilizers” products respectively. We use OCP data to split intermediate purchases 
and sales, final demand decomposition and primary inputs components. Taking these facts into 
account along the data availability, we have constructed a 21x21 sectors (for an open system with 
respect to households) and a 22x22 sectors (for closed system) I-O flow table for the present study. 
The additional sector in the closed system contains “Households” activities. We will explain the 
difference between an open and a closed system in the next section. 
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3.2.4 I-O Model 
An I-O model shows the relationship between the productive sectors. By showing details of the 
flow of goods and services among industries, the model describe the process of production, the 
use of goods and services and the income generated in the production process. Under some 
assumptions such as constant returns to scale, linearity, sector homogeneity and no capacity 
constraints and by assuming that the economy can be categorized into n sectors, the relationship 
between productive sectors and final demand10 in an open system can be expressed as follows:  
𝑥𝑗 =∑𝑧𝑖𝑗 + 𝑓𝑗 =∑𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑥𝑗 + 𝑓𝑗
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛
𝑖=1
 (3.1) 
Where 𝑥j is the total output (production) of sector j; fj is the final demand for sector j’s product 
and zij represents inter-industry sales by sector i (also known as intermediate sales) to sector j 
(including itself, when j = i). The terms zij can be expressed as a multiplication of sector j’s 
production and 𝑎𝑖𝑗. Coefficients 𝑎𝑖𝑗 (𝑎𝑖𝑗 = 𝑧𝑖𝑗 𝑥𝑗⁄ ) represent the technical I-O coefficient or the 
proportion of input i used per unit output of product j.  
In simpler matrix notation, the system in (3.1) can be written as:  
𝑋 = 𝐴𝑋 + 𝐹 (3.2) 
 The I-O coefficients matrix (A) is used to estimate output, income and employment effects and 
linkages measures for the various sectors, which are expected to have linkages with OCP’s activities. 
In addition, if we can assume that the matrix A is non-negative, productive and (I-A) is singular11 
(Waugh 1950), the output can be written as an equation of final demand 
 𝑋 = (𝐼 − 𝐴)−1𝐹 = 𝐿𝐹 (3.3) 
With (𝐼 − 𝐴)−1 = 𝐿 = [𝑙𝑖𝑗] is the so-called Leontief inverse. This inverse represents the sum of 
direct and indirect effects from unitary changes in the exogenous vector, culminating in a matrix 
of multipliers: 
(𝐼 − 𝐴)−1 = (𝐼 + 𝐴 + 𝐴2 +⋯+ 𝐴∞) (3.4) 
Combining (3.3) and (3.4), we obtain: 
𝑋 = 𝐹 + 𝐴𝐹 + 𝐴2𝐹 +⋯+ 𝐴∞𝐹  (3.5) 
Equation (3.5) shows how the output of each sector is generated “round” by “round” to satisfy a 
given final demand (F) and how industrial interdependencies take place in the economy “down the 
                                                 
10 The final demand includes domestic final demand (Consumption, investments and government expenditures) and 
foreign final demand (exports).  
11 known as the Hawkins–Simon condition (see also Nikaido, 1970) 
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stream”. The equation give also a picture of the consolidated structure of the economy’s production 
chains. 
Table 3.3 reports the estimated technical coefficients for OCP-mining and OCP-chemical activities. 
The table contains two sets of technical coefficients for the both OCP activities. The first two 
columns show the technical coefficients for intermediate purchases by OCP Group from others 
sectors. The two last columns give technical coefficients for intermediate sales of OCP group to 
others sectors. Technical coefficients less than 0,001 (𝑎𝑖𝑗<0,001) are supposed to be not 
significants. The results point to a lack of linkage between mining activities and the rest of the 
Moroccan economy compared to chemical activities in terms of intermediate purchases. Export 
demand for fertilizers generates a significant effect for 12 sectors in the economy while export 
demand for phosphate rock generates a significant effect for 8 sectors. The sum of the technical 
coefficients for both OCP-Mining and OCP-Chemical activities is 34% lower than the average of 
0,646 for all 22 sectors in the I-O table. In terms of intermediate sales, the OCP-Mining sector sold 
0,202 unit per output unit to its downstream industry. Inter-industry sales of OCP-chemical 
products are mainly confined to the agriculture sector as fertilizers and the OCP-chemical sector 
itself in the form of sulfur acid and phosphoric acid. The sum of technical coefficients (total 
intermediate sales) for OCP-Mining and OCP-chemical sectors is 30% below average (0,646). The 
whole I-O coefficients table for Moroccan economy for 2014 is reported in Appendix B.6. 
Table 3.3: Technical coefficients for the mining and chemical activities, 2014 (bold type indicates coefficients >0,001) 
OCP Group purchases from the sectors below Intermediate purchases of    Intermediate sales of  
 and  OCP Group activities  OCP Group activities 
OCP Group sales to the sectors below Mining  Chemical   Mining  Chemical 
Agriculture and forestry 0,0000 0,0000  0,0000 0,1733 
Fishing and aquaculture 0,0000 0,0000  0,0000 0,0000 
Mining industry 0,0000 0,0000  0,0000 0,0000 
OCP-Mining 0,0000 0,2022   0,0000 0,0000 
Food products, beverages and tobacco 0,0000 0,0000  0,0000 0,0000 
Textiles and leather  0,0000 0,0000  0,0000 0,0000 
Chemicals and chemical products 0,0077 0,0044  0,0000 0,0000 
OCP-Chemical 0,0000 0,0827   0,2022 0,0827 
Mecanical, metallical and electrical industries 0,0026 0,0029  0,0000 0,0000 
Other manufacturing industries  0,0054 0,0072  0,0000 0,0000 
Refined petroleum and other energy products 0,0383 0,0075  0,0000 0,0000 
Electricity and water supply 0,0114 0,0163  0,0000 0,0000 
Construction 0,0000 0,0000  0,0000 0,0000 
Wholesale and retail trade 0,0000 0,0000  0,0000 0,0000 
Hotels and restaurants 0,0003 0,0014  0,0000 0,0000 
Transport  0,0156 0,0029  0,0000 0,0000 
Post and telecommunications 0,0005 0,0009  0,0000 0,0000 
Financial activities and Insurance 0,0010 0,0018  0,0000 0,0000 
Real estate activities 0,0036 0,0031  0,0000 0,0000 
Public administration and social security 0,0000 0,0000  0,0000 0,0000 
Education, health and social work 0,0000 0,0000  0,0000 0,0000 
Other non-financial services 0,0020 0,0017  0,0000 0,0000 
Total intermediate purchases/sales 0,0886 0,3350   0,2022 0,2560 
Source: Author's calculations.  
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3.2.5 Limits of the I-O model 
Like every model, the static I-O model has a number of limitations relating to its basic assumptions. 
One major limitation mainly when used in impact analysis, lies in the fixed coefficients assumption 
which implyies that the amount of each input necessary to produce one unit of each output is 
constant. No consideration is made with regards to price effects, changing technology or 
economies of scale. An other major limitation is the lack of supply constraints. Supply is assumed 
to be infinite and perfectly elastic (OECD, 1992)12. Sometimes these limitations can be overcame 
by using some extensions. That is the case for the analysis of environmental and energy problems 
(Miller and Blair, 2009). Other extensions require changes to the model structure by introducing a 
time dimension (dynamic I-O model) to track both inter-temporal and inter-sectoral relationships.  
3.3 I-O techniques to estimate the impact of increased phosphate 
mining and valorization activities 
The economic impacts of a change in final demand are estimated through the multipliers and linkage 
measures. By using I-O model, we can decompose the final impact in three components: Direct, Indirect 
and Induced effects. For any an increase in final demand for a particular product (i.e for OCP group, it 
could be a new export demand for phosphate rock or for fertilizers), there will be an increase in the output 
of that product as the producers react to meet the increased demand; this is the direct effect. As these 
producers increase their output, there will also be an increase in demand on their suppliers and so on down 
the supply chain; this is the indirect effect. In parallel of the direct and indirect effects, the employment 
will increase and therefore the level household income throughout the economy will increase. A proportion 
of this increased income will be re-spent on final goods and services: this is the induced effect. Direct and 
indirect effects are estimated from open system and induced effect is estimated from closed system. 
3.3.1 Multipliers 
One of the major uses of the I-O model is to estimate the effects of exogenous changes, in a given 
sector, on i) the outputs of other sectors in the economy, ii) income earned by households in each 
sector and iii) employment (jobs, measured in physical unit) that is expected to be generated in 
each sector.  
By using I-O models, these effects are represented through, respectively, output, income and 
employment multipliers. The notion of multipliers represent the magnitude of an exogenous 
change between the initial situation and the total effects of that change. The total effects can be 
defined as the direct and indirect effects (when we use open system) or as direct, indirect and 
induced effects (when we use closed system). The multipliers that incorporate direct and indirect 
effects are known as simple multipliers. When direct, indirect and induced effects are captured, 
they are often called total multipliers.  
                                                 
12 See for Appendix B.5 more details. 
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Output multiplier 
An output multiplier for sector j is defined as the change in the total economy output resulting 
from a unit change in final demand for sector j’s output. In general, there are two types of output 
multipliers: a Simple Output Multiplier and the Total Output Multiplier. The first one is obtained from 
a model with households exogenous (open system) and it is defined as a ratio of the direct and 
indirect effect to the initial effect. Formally, as we assume constant returns to scale, this multiplier 
is obtained by the flowing formula: 
 𝑚(𝑜)𝑗 = 𝑖
′(𝐼 − 𝐴)−1 =∑𝑙𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑖=1
 (3.6) 
where 𝑖′ is the transpose unit vector using here to generate the j column sum of the Leontief 
inverse. 
The second one is derived from a closed I-O model matrix with respect to households (i.e the 
households are considered as an endogenous sector).The Total Output Multiplier capture direct and 
indirect effects and the additional induced effects that generating by households –as consumers- 
demand on goods and services. Similarly, the total output multiplier, for sector j, is given by 
 ?̌?(𝑜)𝑗 = 𝑖
′(𝐼 − ?̌?)−1 =∑ 𝑙𝑖𝑗
𝑛+1
𝑖=1
 (3.7) 
here [𝑙𝑖𝑗] is the augmented coefficient matrix, with an add household’s row and column. 
Income and Employment Multipliers 
In order to analyze the economic impacts of a change in final demand in terms of employment, 
jobs needed to satisfy this additional demand, measured in physical units (the employment 
multiplier) or in monetary units (the income multiplier), can be computed using the I-O approach. 
Both multipliers are computed using the same approach, the only difference lays in the unit of the 
L matrix elements (monetary or physical units). Income multiplier measures the income generated 
in the economy by a unit change in final demand. It is calculating by the ratio of total direct and 
indirect income effects to the direct income effect. In general, for the simple household income 
multiplier for sector j, 
𝑚(ℎ)𝑗 =∑𝑎𝑛+1,𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑖=1
 (3.8) 
with, 𝑎𝑛+1,𝑖 = 𝑧𝑛+1,𝑖 𝑥𝑗⁄  indicating household income received per dollars’ worth of sector output. 
As before, we can also calculate the total (direct plus indirect plus induced) household income 
effects for sector j using the augmented coefficient matrix by 
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?̌?(ℎ)𝑗 = ∑𝑎𝑛+1,𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑗
𝑛+1
𝑖=1
 (3.9) 
3.3.2 Backward and forward linkage 
Another application of the I-O models is linkage analysis, which analyses the backward and forward 
linkages of each industry. An industry’s backward and forward linkages measure the industry’s 
economic interdependence with other industries along the supply chain. The direction of 
interconnection with the upstream sectors from which the sector j purchases its inputs is called 
backward linkage. The increased output in sector j also means that additional product j which can 
be used as inputs to other sectors as inputs. This direction of interconnection with the downstream 
sectors from which the sector j sells its outputs is called forward linkage. To calculate the linkage 
measures, we use the formulas given in Table 3.4. 
Table 3.4: Linkage Measures 
 Backward linkage Forward linkage 
Direct  
𝐵𝐿(𝑑)𝑗 =∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑖=1
 𝐹𝐿(𝑑)𝑖 =∑ 𝑏𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
 
Total  
𝐵𝐿(𝑡)𝑗 =∑ 𝑙𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑖=1
13 𝐹𝐿(𝑡)𝑖 =∑ 𝑔𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
14 
According to Hirschman (1958), we use normalized linkages to compare how closely linked sectors 
are with each other. In this case, sector j’s backward (forward) linkage is divided by the simple 
average of all backward (forward) linkages. The average value of normalized backward (forward) 
linkages is equal to unity. 
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Output multipliers 
Column (1) of Table 3.5 shows the direct output effect for each of the industries. The result 
indicates that for one additional dollar for OCP products, the output of OCP group increases by 
0,202US$ if the new order is for the phosphate rock and by 0,256US$ if the new order is for the 
fertilizer products. In column (2) of Table 3.5, we show the combined direct and indirect output 
change for one additional dollar of final demand for the various sectors in Moroccan economy. 
The estimation indicates that the output will rise by 1,299US$ as result of one additional dollar 
increase in the final demand for phosphate rock and by 1,481US$ for fertilizer products. The 
Column (3) of au-dessous shows the combined direct, indirect, and induced output effects for each 
of the industries in turn. As the results show, an additional dollar of exogenous final demand for 
the fertilizers will generate 2,611 US$ in overall production from all sectors in the economy. The 
                                                 
13 The elements  𝑙𝑖𝑗  from the Leontief inverse 𝐿 = (𝐼 − 𝐴)
−1 are colled the input inverse 
14 The elements 𝑔𝑖𝑗 from the Ghosh inverse = (𝐼 − 𝐵)
−1 , are interpreted as measuring “the total value of production 
that comes about in sector j per unit of primary input in sector i.” (Augustinovics, 1970, p. 252.) 
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effect for phosphate rock is 1,729US$. Comparing the results obtained from these output 
multipliers, we observe that the added household endogeneity has generated a consistent impact in 
terms of the magnitude of the multiplier effects for OCP chemical activity compare to OCP mining 
activity. We also note that the additional induced effects cause a significant changes in terms of the 
relative ranking amongst sectors (column (5) and (6) of Table 3.5). The decomposition of the 
OCP’s total output multipliers by activity is reported in Table 3.6. The result suggest that an 
additional 1US$ of final demand for OCP products, generate a changes in output of major sector 
of the economy. This can be interpreted as a measure of linkage of OCP group and the rest of the 
economy.  
Table 3.5: Output Multipliers(a) for different sectors in Morocco with a focus on OCP activities  
 (a)The multipliers show the direct, indirect and induced effects on output of a one dollar increase in exogenous final demand. 
For instance, a one dollar increase in demand for phosphate fertilizer would generate 2,611 dollars in total national production. 
(b) The multipliers show the impact on output of a one dollar increase in demand for phosphate rock and a one dollar 
increase in demand for phosphate fertilizer simutanisouly. 
Source: Author's calculations.  
  
N° Sector 
Direct 
Effect 
Direct 
& 
Indirect 
Effect 
Direct, 
Indirect 
& 
Induced 
Effect 
Rank 
for 
Col (1) 
Rank 
for 
Col (2) 
Rank 
for 
Col (3) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
1 Agriculture and forestry 0,634 2,067 7,794 (5)  (7)  (2)  
2 Fishing and aquaculture 0,491 1,789 3,179  (10)   (11)   (10)  
3 OCP Mining 0,202 1,299 1,729  (17)   (16)  (20)  
4 Food products, beverages and tobacco 0,277 1,452 2,172  (12)   (15)   (17)  
5 Textiles and leather  0,582 2,381 5,608 (6)  (6)  (4)  
6 Chemicals and chemical products 1,735 6,603 10,399 (1)  (1)  (1)  
7 OCP Chemical 0,256 1,481 2,611  (13)   (14)   (15)  
8 Mecanical, metallical and electrical industries 0,945 3,638 4,657 (4)  (3)  (5)  
9 Other manufacturing industries  1,179 3,088 4,388 (3)  (4)  (6)  
10 Refined petroleum and other energy products 1,448 4,379 5,815 (2)  (2)  (3)  
11 Electricity and water supply 0,512 1,909 3,721 (8)  (9)  (9)  
12 Construction 0,033 1,061 2,757  (20)   (19)   (13)  
13 Wholesale and retail trade 0,036 1,040 4,218  (19)   (20)  (8)  
14 Hotels and restaurants 0,209 1,289 3,087  (15)   (17)   (12)  
15 Transport  0,226 1,542 3,170  (14)   (12)   (11)  
16 Post and telecommunications 0,191 1,272 1,460  (18)   (18)   (22)  
17 Financial activities and Insurance 0,526 1,953 2,621 (7)  (8)   (14)  
18 Real estate activities 0,495 1,849 2,026 (9)   (10)   (18)  
19 Public administration and social security 0,000 1,000 1,976  (22)   (22)   (19)  
20 Education, health and social work 0,021 1,028 2,523  (21)   (21)   (16)  
21 Other non-financial services 0,203 1,510 1,641  (16)   (13)   (21)  
- OCP activities(b) 0,458 2,780 4,339  (11)  (5)  (7)  
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Table 3.6: Decomposition of the OCP’s total output multipliers by activity 
    OCP Mining   OCP Chemicals 
N° Sector 
Total 
effect* 
(Rank)   
Total 
effect* 
(Rank) 
1 Agriculture and forestry 0,008 (19)  0,121 (3) 
2 Fishing and aquaculture 0,003 (22)  0,007 (22) 
3 OCP Mining & others extractive industries 1,000 (1)  0,008 (21) 
4 Food products, beverages and tobacco 0,056 (4)  0,114 (4) 
5 Textiles and leather  0,020 (7)  0,056 (7) 
6 Chemicals and chemical products 0,009 (18)  0,024 (18) 
7 OCP Chemical 0,219 (2)  1,085 (1) 
8 Mecanical, metallical and electrical industries 0,028 (5)  0,080 (5) 
9 Other manufacturing industries  0,020 (8)  0,055 (8) 
10 Refined petroleum and other energy products 0,014 (11)  0,041 (11) 
11 Electricity and water supply 0,010 (16)  0,030 (16) 
12 Construction 0,021 (6)  0,060 (6) 
13 Wholesale and retail trade 0,013 (13)  0,035 (13) 
14 Hotels and restaurants 0,012 (14)  0,033 (15) 
15 Transport  0,019 (9)  0,055 (9) 
16 Post and telecommunications 0,012 (15)  0,034 (14) 
17 Financial activities and Insurance 0,014 (12)  0,041 (12) 
18 Real estate activities 0,018 (10)  0,052 (10) 
19 Public administration and social security 0,010 (17)  0,027 (17) 
20 Education, health and social work 0,008 (20)  0,022 (19) 
21 Other non-financial services 0,007 (21)  0,020 (20) 
22 Households 0,210 (3)  0,610 (2) 
- Total OCP activities 1,729     2,611  
 (*) Total effect= Direct + Indirect + Induced effects 
Source: Author's calculations.  
3.4.2 Income multipliers 
Table 3.7 shows the Direct, indirect and induced income multipliers for all sectors in the economy. 
The results show that, for instance, every additional one dollar increase in demand for the 
phosphate rock would result immediately in a rise of 0,149US$ in income OCP mining sector. We 
note also that the income will rise by 0,162US$ for OCP chemical sector in response for an 
equivalent change in final demand for fertilizers. As an increase of final demand for a particular 
sector’s product implies an expansion of output in sectors that are directly and indirectly linked to 
the industry experiencing the change in demand. In column (2) of Table 3.7, we show the combined 
direct and indirect income change for one US$ change of final demand for the various industries 
in morocco. For example, the data for OCP mining sector indicates that the income will rise by 
0,711US$ as result of an increase in the demand for phosphate rock. Similarly, we can see for the 
OCP chemical sector, the corresponding income increase is 0,980US$. This rise in income 
stimulate a further change in consumption expenditures and generate further rounds. Column (3) 
of Table 3.7 shows the combined direct, indirect, and induced income effects for each sector. As 
the results show, the total income effect for OCP mining sector is 2,253 US$ and for OCP chemical 
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sector is 3,109 US$. According to our estimates, the ranks of OCP mining and OCP chemical 
sectors are respectively 9 and 3 among the 21 sectors in the economy. 
Table 3.7: Income Multipliers(a) for different sectors in Morocco with a focus on OCP activities  
N° Sector 
Direct 
Effect 
Direct 
& 
Indirect 
Effect 
Direct, 
Indirect 
& 
Induced 
Effect 
Rank 
for 
Col 
(1) 
Rank 
for 
Col 
(2) 
Rank 
for 
Col 
(3) 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
1 Agriculture and forestry 0,214 0,939 2,978  (6)  (4)  (4) 
2 Fishing and aquaculture 0,120 0,411 1,302  (11)  (18)  (18) 
3 OCP Mining 0,149 0,711 2,253  (10) (9) (9) 
4 Food products, beverages and tobacco 0,110 0,445 1,410  (13)  (17)  (17) 
5 Textiles and leather  0,111 0,455 1,442  (12)  (16)  (16) 
6 Chemicals and chemical products 0,094 0,031 0,100  (14)  (22)  (22) 
7 OCP Chemical 0,162 0,980 3,109 (9) (3) (3) 
8 Mecanical, metallical and electrical industries 0,239 0,848 2,689  (4)  (6)  (6) 
9 Other manufacturing industries  0,342 0,850 2,694  (2)  (5)  (5) 
10 Refined petroleum and other energy products 0,495 0,818 2,593  (1)  (8)  (8) 
11 Electricity and water supply 0,168 0,541 1,714  (8)  (12)  (12) 
12 Construction 0,010 0,301 0,954  (19)  (19)  (19) 
13 Wholesale and retail trade 0,006 0,495 1,569  (20)  (13)  (13) 
14 Hotels and restaurants 0,051 0,472 1,496  (18)  (15)  (15) 
15 Transport  0,085 0,482 1,527  (15)  (14)  (14) 
16 Post and telecommunications 0,059 0,608 1,927  (17)  (10)  (10) 
17 Financial activities and Insurance 0,229 0,822 2,607  (5)  (7)  (7) 
18 Real estate activities 0,175 1,004 3,184  (7)  (2)  (2) 
19 Public administration and social security 0,000 0,098 0,311  (22)  (21)  (21) 
20 Education, health and social work 0,006 0,169 0,536  (21)  (20)  (20) 
21 Other non-financial services 0,068 0,597 1,892  (16)  (11)  (11) 
- OCP activities(b) 0,311 1,691 5,362 (3)  (1)  (1) 
(a)The multipliers show the direct, indirect and induced effects on income of a one US$ increase in exogeneous final demand. 
For instance, a one US$ increase in demand for phosphate fertilizer would generate 3,109US$ in total national economy. 
(b)The multipliers show the impact on income of a one dollar increase in demand for phosphate rock and a one dollar 
increase in demand for phosphate fertilizer simutanisouly. 
Source: Author's calculations.  
3.4.3 Employment multipliers 
Similar to three income effects, we have also estimated three employment effects for the 21 sectors. 
Here also, we assume that the change in final demand consists of one million MAD increase in 
final demand for a given industry' output by the final consumers. The column (1) of Table 3.8 
shows the direct employment effects for each of the industries. A value of 5 for OCP chemical 
sector means that employment of about 5 man-years is generated in this sector as a result of 
increase in export demand by one million MAD for this sector's output. The result indicate that 
the direct effect of one million MAD change in final demand for phosphate rock is not significant 
in term of employment generated by OCP mining activity (just 0,5 man-years). Column (2) of Table 
3.8 shows the direct plus indirect employment impacts as the industries adjust their outputs to meet 
the additional demand. The employment multipliers for the OCP chemical sector is 7 jobs while 
the OCP mining sectors have employment multiplier of about 2 man-year. 
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We have also estimated employment effects associated with the induced consumption-income 
interactions by the similar procedure used to compute the income multipliers. The results show 
that in total 8 jobs is generated in response of a change in final demand for fertilizers when the 
computation of employment expansion multiplier takes into account the changes which takes place 
as a result of the increase in income and consumption (see column (3) of Table 3.8). The 
corresponding value for the OCP mining sector is 3 man-years. The ranks of OCP chemical and 
OCP mining sectors are respectively 17 and 21 respectively. 
Table 3.8: Employment Multipliers(a) for different sectors in Morocco with a focus on OCP activities  
N° Sector 
Direct 
Effect 
Direct 
& 
Indirect 
Effect 
Direct, 
Indirect 
& 
Induced 
Effect 
Rank 
for 
Col (1) 
Rank 
for 
Col (2) 
Rank 
for 
Col (3) 
   (1)     (2)     (3)    (4)    (5)    (6)    
1 Agriculture and forestry 5 35 38 (4)    (2)    (2)    
2 Fishing and aquaculture 2 10 15 (14)    (10)    (11)    
3 OCP Mining 0 2 3 (21)    (21)    (21)    
4 Food products, beverages and tobacco 3 6 6 (10)    (17)    (18)    
5 Textiles and leather  4 17 30 (7)    (4)    (3)    
6 Chemicals and chemical products 12 46 48 (1)    (1)    (1)    
7 OCP Chemical 5 7 8  (6)    (15)    (17)    
8 Mecanical, metallical and electrical industries 4 13 15 (8)    (8)    (10)    
9 Other manufacturing industries  7 15 18 (3)    (6)    (7)    
10 Refined petroleum and other energy products 11 26 20 (2)    (3)    (5)    
11 Electricity and water supply 3 15 19 (9)    (5)    (6)    
12 Construction 0 8 15 (18)    (14)    (12)    
13 Wholesale and retail trade 0 14 27 (19)    (7)    (4)    
14 Hotels and restaurants 1 10 17 (17)    (11)    (8)    
15 Transport  2 11 16 (13)    (9)    (9)    
16 Post and telecommunications 1 2 3 (15)    (22)    (22)    
17 Financial activities and Insurance 3 8 10 (12)    (13)    (15)    
18 Real estate activities 3 5 5 (11)    (18)    (19)    
19 Public administration and social security 0 4 9 (22)    (19)    (16)    
20 Education, health and social work 0 7 13 (20)    (16)    (13)    
21 Other non-financial services 1 3 3 (16)    (20)    (20)    
- OCP activities(b) 5 9 10  (5)    (12)    (14)    
(a)The multipliers show the direct, indirect and induced effects on employment of a one million MAD increase in exogenous 
final demand. For instance, a one million MAD increase in demand for phosphate fertilizer would generate 8 additional jobs in 
the economy (5 jobs from which in the OCP chemical units, 2 jobs in industries expected to have linkage with OCP chemical 
units and one additional job in other sectors associated with the secondary or induced consumption-income interactions). 
(b)The multipliers show the impact on income of a one dollar increase in demand for phosphate rock and a one dollar 
increase in demand for phosphate fertilizer simutanisouly. 
Source: Author's calculations.  
3.4.4 Backward and forward linkages analysis 
Table 3.9 presents two sets of the backward and forward linkages for each sector within the 
Moroccan economy. The first set of measures is derived from open system with no impact of 
households spending (open system). A broad examination of theses linkages within the Moroccan 
economy indicates that ‘Chemical industy’ has the highest direct backward linkage sore (2,33), 
followed by ‘energy sector’ (1,55), ‘Mecanical, metallical and electrical industries’ (1,28), ‘Other 
 
57 
 
manufacturing industries’ (1,09) and ‘OCP activities’(0,98). The intermediate direct backward 
linkage of OCP activities is mainly due to weak linkage of OCP-Mining sector. As we have seen in 
Table 3.3, extraction activity does not require more intermediate inputs from others sectors. In 
term of direct forward linkages, what is of interest is that within the wider Moroccan economy, 
‘OCP activities’ sectors are occupied the second place as the strongest forward linkages sectors. 
This because two reason. The first one is phosphate rock (output of OCP-Mining sector) is used 
as intermediate input for OCP-Chemical sector. The second reason is that sulfur acid and 
phosphoric acid are used as intermediate input by OCP-chemical sector itself and fertilizers are 
also used as intermediate input by agriculture sector.  
To continue the analysis, the second set of linkages measures is computed with endogeneity of 
households spending (open system). From Table 3.9, one can see that the two OCP sectors are 
ranked within the top 10 with the strongest backward linkages. The magnitude of the OCP 
chemical sector backward linkage is 1,19US$. This implies that for every 1US$ produced within 
the OCP chemical sector, 0,19US$ is backward linked to its direct, indirect and induced 
downstream suppliers. The story is very different when we examine the total forward linkages. As 
result shows, OCP sectors are not within the most forward linkages sectors in Moroccan economy. 
We find that the intensive employment sectors (e.g. Chemicals industry; Food products, beverages 
and tobacco and textiles; Hotels and restaurants; Education, health and social work and Energy 
sectors) generates the largest upstream impacts. The weakness total forward linkage of OCP 
activities is because OCP-chemical products (phosphoric acid and fertilizers) are mostly exported 
and the additional household’s income is spending in goods and services produced by non-OCP 
activities related sectors. 
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Table 3.9: Comparison of backward and forward linkages (Direct and Total measures) 
Linkages are ranked as either strong, intermediate or weak:  
(***) Strong if Linkage index > 1; (**) Intermediate if 0,9 ≤ linkage index ≤ 1; (*) Weak if Linkage index < 0,9. 
Source: Author's calculations.  
3.5 Conclusion  
This Chapter attempted to evaluate the macroeconomic impact arising from the OCP activities 
within the overall economy using an Input-Output Analysis model. We have combined the detailed 
Profit and Loss (P&L) statement from OCP group with the latest 2014 Moroccan I-O table to 
bring out OCP activities and to split them into two sectors: “OCP-Mining” and “OCP chemical”. 
Two types of I-O models, open and closed models, were estimated to measure the direct, indirect 
and induced effects of a change in final demand for OCP products. The difference between open 
and closed models is that the open model is estimated with households exogenous, while the closed 
model uses households as endogenous. Several multipliers, such as output, income and 
employment multipliers were estimated as well as backward and forward linkages measures for all 
21 sectors in the economy. The output, income and employment multipliers results are presented 
in Table 3.5, Table 3.7 and Table 3.8. The backward and forward linkages results are shown in 
Table 3.9. These detailed measures are useful for OCP group decision makers and for national 
    Open System   Closed System 
 Sector 
Direct 
Backward 
Linkage 
Ran
k 
Direct 
Forwar
d 
Linkage 
Ran
k 
  
Total 
Backward 
Linkage 
Rank 
Total 
Forward 
Linkage 
Rank 
1 Agriculture and forestry 0,7* (7) 0,8* (14)  1,2*** (6) 1,0** (12) 
2 Fishing and aquaculture 0,6* (11) 0,8* (16)  0,6* (17) 0,8* (16) 
3 OCP Mining 0,5* (16) 0,9** (11)  0,9** (9) 0,6* (18) 
4 
Food products, beverages and 
tobacco 
0,5* (15) 1,1*** (8)  0,6* (19) 1,7*** (2) 
5 Textiles and leather  0,8* (6) 1,5*** (3)  0,8* (14) 1,5*** (3) 
6 Chemicals and chemical products 2,3*** (1) 2,0*** (1)  0,8* (10) 1,9*** (1) 
7 OCP Chemical 0,5* (14) 0,7* (20)  1,2*** (7) 0,3* (22) 
8 
Mecanical, metallical and electrical 
industries 
1,3*** (3) 1,5*** (4)  1,3*** (3) 1,1*** (11) 
9 Other manufacturing industries  1,1*** (4) 1,4*** (5)  1,2*** (5) 1,2*** (8) 
10 
Refined petroleum and other 
energy products 
1,5*** (2) 1,3*** (6)  1,4*** (2) 1,4*** (5) 
11 Electricity and water supply 0,7* (9) 1,0*** (10)  0,8* (12) 1,2*** (9) 
12 Construction 0,4 (19) 1,3*** (7)  0,4 (20) 0,8* (15) 
13 Wholesale and retail trade 0,4 (20) 0,9** (12)  0,6* (18) 0,6* (19) 
14 Hotels and restaurants 0,5* (17) 0,9** (13)  0,6* (16) 1,5*** (4) 
15 Transport  0,5* (12) 1,0*** (9)  0,7* (15) 1,1*** (10) 
16 Post and telecommunications 0,4 (18) 0,8* (15)  0,8* (13) 1,3*** (7) 
17 Financial activities and Insurance 0,7* (8) 0,7* (19)  1,1*** (8) 0,9** (14) 
18 Real estate activities 0,7* (10) 0,6* (22)  1,3*** (4) 0,6* (17) 
19 
Public administration and social 
security 
0,4* (22) 0,7* (18)  0,2* (22) 0,4* (20) 
20 Education, health and social work 0,4* (21) 0,6* (21)  0,3* (21) 0,4* (21) 
21 Other non-financial services 0,5* (13) 0,8* (17)  0,8* (11) 1,4*** (6) 
- OCP activities 1,0** (5) 1,6*** (2)  2,1*** (1) 0,9** (13) 
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policy makers and planners who need to know in which sectors output, income and employment 
changes will be more significant.  
Although the OCP activities as whole has a significant macroeconomic contribution in the 
Moroccan economy as shown in the Figure 3.1, Figure 3.2, Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4 , this study 
found that there are some differences between the OCP-mining and OCP-chemical sectors. Our 
results indicate that the OCP-chemical sector has a high production-inducing effect and a high 
income and employment-inducing effect compared to OCP-mining sector. The OCP-chemical 
sector impact on output implies that for each US$ sold fertilizers generate 2,61US$ in the Moroccan 
economy while the same amount demand for phosphate rock generate just 1,73US$. In term of 
income, OCP-chemical activity generate 3,11US$ for each US$ increase for the sector’s product. 
On the other hand, OCP-mining impact on income is equal to 2,25US$. In addition, the result 
show that OCP-chemical sector has more capacity to generate employment opportunities on a 
large scale compare to the OCP-mining sector. The total employment multiplier is equal to 8 man-
years for OCP-chemical sector while it is about 3 man-years for OCP-mining sector. This result is 
justified by the lower linkage of OCP-mining activity. As we have shown in the Table 3.9, OCP-
chemical sector is strongly backward linked with the others sectors of the economy compared to 
OCP-mining sector that is intermediately backward linked with the rest of the economy. The two 
OCP sectors are ranked within the top 10 sectors with the strongest backward linkages (rank of 
Total backward linkage in Table 3.9). However, their position, relative to other sectors, drop 
considerably when we take out the induced effect. This result demonstrates that households’ 
additional (induced) income is spending mostly in goods and services produced by national 
industries. In addition, we note that the both OCP sectors have a low forward linkage effect. This 
is because the OCP products are mainly oriented to external market.  
Finally, OCP group is engaging in important investment program during the period 2010-2020. 
This program aimed to increase significantly production capacity for its both mining and chemical 
activities, reducing production costs and increase flexibility by introducing new production tools 
and technologies. Also, OCP group announced that this investment program would have a positive 
impact on the environment and local communities (OCP group activity report, 2013). A future 
extensions of the framework presented in this paper will involve introducing a time dimension in 
the model (dynamic I-O model) in order to measure the socio-economic and environmental 
impacts of the OCP investment program.  
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3.7 Appendices B 
Appendix B.1 : OCP Group Background 
Founded  
Established as a state owned company in 1920 and privatized in 2008. 
Industry focus  
Involved in exploration, mining and production of phosphates and fertilizers. 
Scale 
In 2014, the group employs a direct workforce of over 21,000 employees and generate revenues of 
US$ 4.9billion. 
Global presence  
OCP started its phosphate mining operations at Khouribga in 1921 and Youssoufia in 1931. 
Construction of the Benguerir mine began in 1974. In 1976, OCP took control of Phosboucraa, 
which operates its Bou Craa mine, around 400km south-west of its Gantour Hub. The company 
has long been the world’s largest phosphate rock exporter, accounting for a stable market share 
above 30%. OCP has direct access to Morocco’s reserves, accounting for about three quarters of 
the world’s mineable phosphate. In addition to its extensive mining and beneficiation operations 
at the Khouribga and Gantour hubs, OCP produces 
phosphoric acid and phosphate fertilizers at Jorf Lasfar and Safi, and is also engaged in a variety of 
JV and partnerships in Morocco and abroad. 
Expansion program 
The company is planning a huge downstream expansion in two phases - the Jorf Phosphate Hub 
1-4 and 5-10 projects, which will be fed by the addition of new phosphate rock capacity at Ouled 
Fares and Extension Centrale Zone. The expansion program started since 2010, OCP included 
plans to raise downstream capacity to 4.8 Mt/year P2O5 and increase mining capacity to 50.0 
Mt/year by 2020. The company aimed to connect its mining sites Khouribga and Gantour, with 
its units at Jorf Lasfar and Safi through a network of slurry pipelines. 
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Capacity of OCP group and its JVs by product, 2014 
Product Capacity (Mt) 
Phosphate Rock 36,2 
Phos. acid (P2O5) 5,165 
DAP 3,417 
MAP 2,597 
TSP 1,366 
Source, CRU Phosphate Rock and Fertilizers cost reports 2015 and 2016 
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Appendix B.2 : OCP-Mining activity (capacity, production and Target Market by site) 
Site Location Start-up 
Capacity 
(Mt) 
Production 
(Mt) 
Logistics Target Market 
Bou Craa Lâayoune 1973 3,0 2,4 
All rock mined at Bou Craa is conveyed to 
the beneficiation plant in Laâyoune 
(100km), adjacent to the Port of Laâyoune. 
All of the rock mined at Bou Craa is 
exported (Canada, Russia and Oceania) 
Gantour 
Hub 
Youssoufia 
and 
Benguérir 
1932 7,6 4,2 
The Gantour mines are connected by 
railway to OCP’s downstream facilities in 
Safi (90 km from Youssoufia and 160km 
from Benguérir). The Port of Safi is 
around 11km from the downstream plants 
and is also used for the direct export of 
rock. 
Rock from Gantour is used for 
downstream processing in Safi Hub and 
the rest is exported via the port of Safi to 
North America and India. 
Khouribga 
Hub 
Khouribga 1922 25,6 19,0 
Rock is pumped to Jorf Lasfar (Slurry 
Pipeline 235km) or railed to OCP’s 
downstream facilities in Jorf Lasfar. Rock 
for export is directly railed to the Port of 
Casablanca (145km). 
Rock from Khouribga is used for 
downstream processing in Jorf LAsfar 
Hub and the rest is exported via the port 
of Casablanca to North America and 
India. 
 Source, CRU Phosphate Rock and Fertilizers cost reports 2015 and 2016 
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Appendix B.3 : OCP-Chemical activity (capacity, production and Target Market by site) 
Site 
  
Location 
  
Start-up 
  
Capacity ('000tonnes) 
Logistics 
  
Target Market 
  
Sulphuric 
acid 
Phos 
acid 
(P2O5) 
DAP MAP TSP 
Maroc Chimie 1 Safi 1965 762 215  -   -  900 Phosphoric acid and TSP are railed 14 
km to the Port of Safi for export. 
OCP primarily supplies TSP to the South Asian (Bangladesh) 
and South American (Brazil) markets, phosphoric acid is mainly 
sold to the Indian market and feed phosphate is exported to 
Latin America, USA and Europe. 
Maroc Chimie 2 Safi 1965 592 215  -   -   -  
Maroc Phosphore  Safi 1976 1 900 730  -   -   -  
Jorf Lasfar  Jorf 
Lasfar 
1986 6 020 2 150 2 977 1 738 - The finished products are conveyed 
approximately 2km to berths 1 and 2 at 
the Jorf Lasfar Port for export. 
DAP is primarily exported to Europe, Turkey and USA. MAP 
is primarily exorted to Brazil 
Indo Marco Phosphore  
(IMACID) 
Jorf 
Lasfar 
2000 1 200 430  -   -   -  Phosphoric acid is transported 
approximately 500 m to berth 6 at the 
Jorf Lasfar Port for export. 
The Indo-Maroc Phosphore plant (IMACID) is a JV between 
OCP, Chambal Fertilizers and Tata Chemicals, which each own 
a third stake. All of the phosphoric acid produced is exported 
to Chambal's Indian production facilities for phosphate 
fertilizer granulation. 
Pak-Maroc Phosphore  
(PMP) 
Jorf 
Lasfar 
2008 1 125 375  -   -   -  Phosphoric acid is transported 
approximately 500 m to berth 6 at the 
Jorf Lasfar Port for export. 
The Pak-Maroc Phosphore plant (PMP) is a 50:50 JV between 
OCP and Fauji Fertilizers. Fauji has an exclusive contract with 
OCP for the import of 300,000 tonnes of phosphoric acid from 
PMP. The plant's remaining volume is sold on the merchant 
market. 
Jorf Fertilizer Company V 
(JFCV) 
Jorf 
Lasfar 
2009 1 125 375 - 340 270 The finished products are conveyed 500 
m to berths 1 and 2 at the Jorf Lasfar 
Port for export. 
The Bunge Marco Phosphore plant was initially a 50:50 JV 
between OCP and Bunge Fertilizantes. In September 2013, 
OCP acquired Bunge's 50% stake and the plant was renamed 
JFC V. The finished product is primarily destined to the South 
American market, mainly to Brazil where it is distributed 
through OCP's subsidiary, OCP Fertilizantes, and Heringer, 
which OCP has a 10% stake in. 
Jorf Lasfar (JPH 1-4) Jorf 
Lasfar 
2015 1 890 675 440 519 196 The finished products are conveyed 
approximately 2km to berths at the Jorf 
Lasfar Port for export. 
DAP is mainly exported to Europe, USA, and MENA, while 
MAP to Brazil. 
Source: Phosphate Fertilizer Cost Report 2016, CRU   
 
65 
 
Appendix B.4 : Input-Output Table 
Total 
Demand
1 … j … n C I G E X
1 X 11 … X 1j … X 1n C 1 I 1 G 1 E 1 X 1
. . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . .
i X i1 … X ij … X in C i I i G i E i X i
. . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . .
n X n1 … X nj … X nn C n I n G n E n X n
W W 1 … W j … Wn WC WG W
R R 1 … R j … R n R
Imports M M 1 … M j … M n M C M I M G M
Total Supply X X 1 … X j … X n C I G E
Where:  
X i__ value of the output of sector i (i = 1・・・n)
X ij__
W j__ wages in sector j (j = 1・・・n). It represents the paymcnts to labor in sector j
Rj__ interest and profits in sectorj. It represents the payments to the owners of capital in sector j
M j__ imports of sectors j
C i__ personal consumption expenditures on the output of sector i
I i__ investment expenditures for the output of sector i
G i__ government purchases of the output of sector i
E i__ exports of the output of sector i
M C , M I , M G__ imports of final goods by consumers, firms, and the government, respectively
Matrix 1 (n xn)__
Matrix 2 (n x4)__
Matrix 3 (3 xn)__
Matrix 4__
represents the final demands for the output of sector i: by consumers or personal consumption (Ci), firms (Ii), the government (Gi), and 
foreigners (Ei).
represents the value added which accounts for the other (nonindustrial) inputs to production. It is composed of the factor payments by 
each sector to labor (Wj) and the owners of capital (Rj), and payments to foreigners for imports (Mj).
accounts for the final consumption of labor (e.g., domestic help hired by households, WC, and the employees of the government,WG), and 
imports of final goods by consumers (MC), firms (MI) and the government (MG). 
Intermediate Users :
Sectors/Industries
Sales by: 
Sectors/
Industries
Final Demand
Value-Added
sales by sector i to sector j, or the value of inputs from sector i used to produce the output of sector j (i = 1・・・n; j = 1・・・n). 
represents the interindustry transactions
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Appendix B.5 : Limitations of the I-O approach, according to the OECD 
The limitations of the I-O approach, according to the OECD document “Structural 
Change and Industrial Performance” are:  
‒ The basic input-output analysis assumes constant returns to scale. The input-output model 
assumes that the same relative mix of inputs will be used by an industry to create output 
regardless of quantity.  
‒ Each industry is assumed to produce only one type of product. For example, the automobile 
industry produces only cars. The distribution and sale of this product is fixed.  
‒ Each product within the industry is assumed to be the same. Also, there is no substitution 
between inputs. The output of each sector is produced with a unique set of inputs. 
‒ Technical coefficients are assumed to be fixed: that is, the amount of each input necessary to 
produce one unit of each output is constant. The amount of input purchased by a sector is 
determined solely on the level of output. No consideration is made to price effects, changing 
technology or economies of scale.  
‒ It is assumed that there are no constraints on resources. Supply is infinite and perfectly 
elastic.  
‒ It is assumed that all local resources are efficiently employed. There is no underemployment 
of resources.  
‒ Timeliness of input-output data. There is a long time lag between the collection of data and 
the availability of the input-output tables. The sporadic nature of input-output tables means 
that continuous time series are impossible to construct without estimating input-output 
tables for the years between benchmarks. In effect, input-output tables provide a snapshot 
of the complete economy and all of its industrial interconnections at one time. 
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Appendix B.6: Input-output coefficient Matrix for Moroccan economy, 2014 (bold type indicates coefficients >0,001) 
  A00 B05 C00 
C00_ 
OCP 
D01 D02 D03 
D03_ 
OCP 
D04 D05 D06 E00 F45 G00 H55 I01 I02 J00 K00 L75 MNO OP0 Total 
A00 0,151 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,095 0,004 0,091 0,173 0,003 0,001 0,117 0,044 0,003 0,001 0,000 0,021 0,003 0,007 0,000 0,000 0,004 0,000 0,718 
B05 0,000 0,131 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,001 0,001 0,046 0,001 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,001 0,000 0,005 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,187 
C00 0,000 0,000 0,012 0,000 0,000 0,001 0,002 0,000 0,004 0,005 0,055 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,010 0,000 0,002 0,002 0,000 0,000 0,006 0,099 
C00_OCP 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,008 0,000 0,003 0,005 0,038 0,011 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,016 0,000 0,001 0,004 0,000 0,000 0,002 0,089 
D01 0,436 0,327 0,006 0,000 0,128 0,002 0,105 0,000 0,019 0,085 0,075 0,033 0,001 0,000 0,001 0,018 0,004 0,013 0,022 0,000 0,000 0,017 1,294 
D02 0,006 0,001 0,001 0,000 0,001 0,527 0,113 0,000 0,010 0,031 0,009 0,018 0,000 0,000 0,002 0,003 0,002 0,007 0,007 0,000 0,000 0,011 0,748 
D03 0,008 0,006 0,957 0,000 0,000 0,001 0,366 0,000 0,002 0,010 0,010 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,001 0,001 0,002 0,002 0,006 0,000 0,000 0,003 1,375 
D03_OCP 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,202 0,000 0,000 0,004 0,083 0,003 0,007 0,008 0,016 0,000 0,000 0,001 0,003 0,001 0,002 0,003 0,000 0,000 0,002 0,335 
D04 0,000 0,001 0,112 0,000 0,000 0,002 0,128 0,000 0,538 0,080 0,039 0,036 0,002 0,000 0,006 0,009 0,005 0,026 0,029 0,000 0,000 0,017 1,031 
D05 0,007 0,000 0,100 0,000 0,000 0,018 0,515 0,000 0,055 0,185 0,109 0,058 0,001 0,000 0,002 0,010 0,003 0,011 0,014 0,000 0,000 0,030 1,118 
D06 0,000 0,000 2,122 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,001 0,000 0,001 0,002 0,001 0,003 0,001 0,000 0,000 0,002 0,000 0,001 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 2,134 
E00 0,000 0,000 0,449 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,010 0,000 0,015 0,001 0,081 0,026 0,002 0,000 0,000 0,001 0,003 0,022 0,007 0,000 0,000 0,020 0,638 
F45 0,000 0,000 0,203 0,000 0,000 0,001 0,105 0,000 0,151 0,587 0,110 0,018 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,002 0,005 0,048 0,016 0,000 0,000 0,006 1,253 
G00 0,012 0,000 0,006 0,000 0,007 0,004 0,105 0,000 0,062 0,095 0,126 0,046 0,005 0,002 0,003 0,038 0,031 0,054 0,062 0,000 0,000 0,016 0,672 
H55 0,009 0,024 0,000 0,000 0,038 0,001 0,009 0,000 0,001 0,004 0,010 0,019 0,000 0,000 0,006 0,000 0,002 0,011 0,014 0,000 0,000 0,006 0,156 
I01 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,001 0,004 0,000 0,016 0,010 0,428 0,020 0,001 0,005 0,003 0,040 0,010 0,012 0,084 0,000 0,000 0,001 0,636 
I02 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,004 0,000 0,028 0,005 0,026 0,026 0,001 0,000 0,020 0,002 0,018 0,016 0,031 0,000 0,000 0,002 0,180 
J00 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,009 0,000 0,014 0,004 0,000 0,037 0,009 0,021 0,138 0,055 0,000 0,002 0,000 0,290 
K00 0,001 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,002 0,025 0,000 0,009 0,012 0,014 0,006 0,002 0,001 0,000 0,001 0,007 0,107 0,042 0,000 0,000 0,020 0,248 
L75 0,001 0,000 0,037 0,000 0,004 0,016 0,039 0,000 0,010 0,022 0,117 0,083 0,008 0,026 0,108 0,023 0,058 0,037 0,056 0,000 0,008 0,013 0,668 
MNO 0,001 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,001 0,002 0,077 0,000 0,010 0,011 0,021 0,026 0,002 0,002 0,012 0,009 0,014 0,003 0,029 0,000 0,006 0,011 0,235 
OP0 0,001 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,001 0,001 0,024 0,000 0,004 0,010 0,008 0,008 0,000 0,000 0,006 0,007 0,002 0,001 0,011 0,000 0,001 0,020 0,104 
Total 0,634 0,491 4,006 0,202 0,277 0,582 1,735 0,256 0,945 1,179 1,448 0,512 0,033 0,036 0,209 0,226 0,191 0,526 0,495 0,000 0,021 0,203 14,208 
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Chapter 4 
 
Natural Resources Revenues, Agriculture 
Development and Urbanization in African 
Countries: Evidence from a Static and Dynamic 
Panel Data 
 
 
Résumé 
Le dernier chapitre s’évertue à traiter à de nouveaux frais la question de la malédiction des 
ressources naturelles en reliant la performance agricole et l’explosion urbaine à l'abondance de ces 
ressources. Deux hypothèses principales sont testées. La première hypothèse stipule que 
l’abondance des ressources naturelles entraînerait l’éviction des secteurs productifs en particulier le 
secteur agricole. Ceci aurait comme conséquences la baisse de la production agricole, l’amplification 
de la dépendance alimentaire, l’augmentation du chômage dans milieu rural et donc un mouvement 
massif vers les villes (exode rural). La deuxième hypothèse suggère que les revenus pétroliers et 
miniers sont généralement dépensés dans les villes, notamment en amélioration des conditions de 
vie (logement, eau, électricité, santé, éducation, etc.). Cela aurait normalement un effet positif sur 
la croissance mais ce processus d’urbanisation se trouve accéléré par l’exode des populations venant 
chercher leur part de ces revenus dégagés du secteur extractif. Ce qui aurait comme conséquence 
une urbanisation dégénérée (villes entourées de taudis, développement du secteur informel, 
problèmes de sécurité, etc.). L’étude empirique, basée sur un panel de 39 pays africains, exhibe un 
lien significatif entre l’abondance de ces ressources, le sous-développement du secteur agricole et 
l’explosion urbaine. 
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4.1 Introduction 
The possession of natural resources such as oil, natural gas, diamonds or other mineral deposits 
does not necessarily lead to economic growth. Many African countries such as Nigeria, Angola, 
Sudan, Algeria and Congo are classified as resource-rich countries with non-significant economic 
development, less democracy, a low per capita income and poor living standards. Richard Auty 
(1986) is apparently the first one who used the term “natural resources curse” to describe this 
puzzling phenomenon. Empirically, the most popular study by Sachs and Warner (1995) found a 
strong correlation between natural resources abundance and poor economic growth. Since then, 
abundant literature has evaluated the effects of natural resources on a wide range of economic, 
institutional and political performance indicators, and offered a variety of theories and explanations 
to this complicated phenomenon. The purpose of this study is to propose new possible explications 
for the resource curse in African countries. In particular, the literature on the subject does not 
consider explicitly the impact of natural resources revenues on agricultural performance and 
urbanization. As such, this study seeks to answer the following questions: first, can oil and mineral 
resources abundance explain the agricultural poor performance? Second, is there a relationship 
between natural resources abundance and urbanization trends?  
Two main hypotheses are tested. The first one suggests that the abundance of oil and mineral 
resources allows policy makers to specialize in primary commodities and prevents the development 
of other productive sectors, especially agriculture. This would have a negative consequence on 
agricultural production, rural employment, food security and would therefore lead to an 
acceleration of rural-urban migration. The second hypothesis suggests that oil and mining revenues 
are mostly spent in cities in order to improve living conditions (housing, water, electricity, health, 
education, etc.). In general, this could have a positive effect on economic growth. However, the 
urbanization trend is accelerated by the migration of a rural population looking for jobs and a better 
life. This may explain the current situation of major African cities with considerable urban 
problems (slums, pollution, crime, overcrowding, informal sector, etc.). At this point, we note that 
the available empirical studies show no clear effect of urbanization on growth. The causal 
relationship between economic growth and urbanization remains unclear, according to the 2010 
UN-HABITAT’s report15.   
This study differs from others on three points. First, we use the same framework to present two 
explanations (or channels) for the natural resources curse in African countries. We link natural 
resources abundance to the poor agricultural performance and the current urbanization situation. 
Second, our findings are derived from an empirical analysis based on a panel of 39 African 
countries. Therefore, the results can provide a global picture of the resource curse for the whole 
continent. Third, we conduct both static and dynamic panel regression models. The static 
specification allows the estimation of a country-specific effect while the dynamic specification 
captures the second round effects and reduces the effects of unobserved or missing variables. This 
help us better capture the complexity of the resource curse paradox. 
                                                 
15 UN-HABITAT’s report, Urban Trends: Urbanization and Economic Growth (2010). 
 
70 
 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the literature review related to 
natural resources curse channels in Africa and the most used proxies for natural resources 
abundance or dependency measures. The analytical framework is introduced in Section 3. The next 
section displays a description of the selected variables, data sources and some statistical evidences. 
We discuss our empirical investigation in Section 5. Finally, we make concluding remarks in Section 
6. 
4.2 Review of natural resources curse explanations in Africa  
The resource curse is a paradoxical phenomenon observed in countries with abundant natural 
resources, specifically non-renewable resources like oil and minerals tend not to perform as well 
economically as those without. The Sub Saharan Africa (SSA) region has become a classic case of 
the resource curse in the literature. Many countries in the region like the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC), Chad, Mali, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan and several others, are rich in natural 
resources, notably oil, minerals and precious metals, but are still classified as low-income 
economies. Only one country, Botswana has succeeded in becoming an upper middle-income 
country using its natural resources and has escaped the Resource Curse (Engelbert, 2002; Sarraf 
and Jimanji, 2001; Iimi, 2006).  
How could resources abundance be a curse? What could be the mechanism for this 
counter-intuitive relationship? 
The literature proposes several theories to explain this phenomenon. Several authors (e.g. Frankel, 
2010; Van der Ploeg, 2011; Torres et al., 2013; Badeed et al., 2017) have conducted a very thorough 
literature review and summarized potential mechanisms for the resource curse. Broadly speaking, 
there are at least four lines of arguments: Dutch Disease, volatility in commodity prices, rent 
seeking/corruption and institutional quality. The first explanation based on the Dutch Disease 
suggests that the resource curse might occur when a boom in the resource sector causes a persistent 
appreciation of the real exchange rate and inflation. This appreciation makes non-resource 
commodities exports more expensive and imports cheaper and leads to a trade balance deficit in 
the short term. In the medium and long terms, this situation can create barriers to investments in 
non-resource tradable sectors and consequently curbs development (Sachs and Warner, 1995, 1997 
and 2001; Gylfason, 2001a, Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2004). This negative effect is commonly called 
the “spending effect”. In addition, the natural resources sector attracts capital and labor from other 
parts of the economy. As a result, the input production costs of other traditional export sectors 
such as manufacturing and agriculture increase. This resource reallocation is usually denominated 
“indirect-deindustrialization” (Corden and Neary, 1982; Corden, 1984) or “resource pull effect” 
(Humphreys et al., 2007). For African countries, both effects are reflected in the decline of the 
agriculture sector. Other explanations for the resource curse, often cited in the literature as 
symptoms of the Dutch Disease, are related to the disincentive for entrepreneurship (Sachs and 
Warner, 2001), the decrease in savings and physical investment (e.g., Gylfason, 2001a; Papyrakis 
and Gerlagh, 2007) and lower investment in education and human capital (e.g., Gylfason, 2001b; 
Birdsall et al., 2001; Bravo-Ortega and Gregorio, 2005). This might explain why one out of three 
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young people in SSA region fail to complete primary school and need alternative pathways to 
acquire basic skills for employment (UNESCO, 2012)16.  
The second explanation suggests that the resource curse may operate because oil and mineral 
commodity prices are more volatile than the prices of other manufactured products. Volatility 
increases uncertainty in government revenues, and makes it difficult to conduct effective planning 
and therefore reduces economic growth (Davis and Tilton, 2005).This situation also explains the 
debt crisis observed in resource-rich countries during the 1980’s (Van der Ploeg, 2011). In order to 
ensure debt repayment and economic restructuring, the IMF and the WB created the so-called 
Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) for a majority of African countries. Poor countries were 
forced to reduce spending on health, education and infrastructure, while debt repayment and 
budget balance became the priority.  
The third explanation associates the resource curse with rent seeking behaviors and corruption 
(Auty 2001). According to Collier and Hoeffler (2005), Rent-seeking occurs when “individuals or 
firms compete to obtain economic rents that arise when government restrictions are imposed” 
while corruption is defined, according to Kaufmann and Vicente (2011), as the abuse of public or 
private office, position, or power for private gain in contravention of established rules or norms. 
These two economic challenges are the principal reasons for underdevelopment in many African 
regimes (Coolidge and Rose-Ackerman 1999). In addition, Ross (2001) concludes that oil 
abundance hampers democracy. More recently, Arezki and Gylfason (2013) examined the impact 
of the interaction between resource rents and democracy and corruption for a panel of African 
economies. They found that large resource rents lead to more corruption, but that the effect is 
lower for more democratic countries. Finally, the literature shows evidence of the negative impact 
of resources abundance and the quality of institutions. For example, Mehlum et al. (2006) have 
demonstrated, using regression analysis that the resource curse is strongly present in countries with 
weak institutions but is barely present in countries with strong institutions. Other authors like 
Isham et al. (2005), Bulte et al. (2005), Robinson et al. (2006) and Collier (2010) conclude that 
natural resources abundance is a cause of poor institutional quality. 
4.2.1 Resource Curse studies using panel data 
In order to test the resource curse for a panel of countries, the literature proposes different 
methodologies. Some authors use cross-sectional analysis while others use panel data analysis. In 
cross-sectional analysis, an equation is estimated for a number of countries at a specific point of 
time. The estimation does not incorporate any temporal dynamics. This method has been used by 
several authors (see Table 4.1). In this case, two problems can rise. The first one may stem from  a 
potential endogeneity of resources abundance proxies with growth variables. The second lies in the 
control of all country-specific effects. In addition, cross-section estimation is more sensitive to 
omitted variables that may reflect country specific characteristics.  Panel data seem to be a solution 
for these problems. Compared to cross-sectional data, the advantages of panel data lie in using 
information for both temporal and individual dimensions and it is possible to estimate the country-
                                                 
16 The tenth Education for All Global Monitoring Report, UNESCO (2012) 
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specific effects. This would reduce the effect of unobserved or omitted variables bias (See Manzano 
and Rigobón 2001 for comments and justification).  
Regarding the results of cross sectional and panel data analysis, a relationship between resources 
abundance and economic growth might differ. Some authors find evidence of the resource curse 
while others do not. Based on Torres and Afonso (2013) and Zagozina (2014) surveys and several 
other studies, Table 4.1 summarizes recent cross sectional and panel studies on the resource curse 
and their main findings. The major outcomes presented in the table reflect the importance of 
choosing relevant resource abundance proxies. In the following section, we discuss different 
proxies used in the literature to measure this concept. 
4.2.2 Measures for non-renewable resource abundance  
The literature proposes a number of natural resources abundance or dependency proxies. There 
are at least four measures for natural resources abundance mostly used by authors (see Table 4.1): 
(i) Ratio of natural resources exports to gross domestic product (GDP), (ii) Share of natural 
resources exports in total exports, (iii) Ratio of mineral production to gross national product 
(GNP), and (iv) Rents from natural resources over GDP or per capita. Other proxies are used in 
the literature. For instance, Stijns (2005) measures natural resources abundance by the present value 
of mineral reserves and finds no correlation between this variable and economic growth. Lederman 
and Maloney (2008) use the Leamer index (natural resources net exports/labor force) and find no 
significant impact with respect to GDP per capita growth.  
In this study, we use non-renewable resources rents to GDP, which we note “Rent”, as a measure 
of natural resources abundance. We use GDP as a denominator to take into account the country 
size. As we hope to evaluate the impact of resource rent on agricultural performance, we include 
only minerals, oil and gas rents and exclude forestry and other agricultural resources rents to deal 
with a possible endogeneity problem. According to the World Bank, the rent for a given commodity 
is calculated as the difference between the price of this commodity and it average cost of 
production. The unit rent is multiplied by the physical quantity extracted and expressed as a share 
of GDP. The choice of this measure is justified by two reasons. First, the use of production or 
exports of natural resources tend to overestimate the abundance or dependence as no deduction 
of production cost is made. Second, there are data availability and homogeneity problems for all 
selected countries.  
  
 
73 
Table 4.1: Summary of selected panel and cross-sectional studies and different Natural Resources (NR) proxies 
Reference NR proxy Panel 
Cross-
sectional 
Main findings 
Sachs and Warner (1995) NR exports over GDP No Yes Negative relationship between natural resources and growth. 
Manzono and Rigobon 
(2006) 
NR exports over GDP Yes No No effect or positive effect once fixed effects are introduced into a 
model. 
Arezki and Van der Ploeg 
(2011) 
NR exports over GDP No Yes Negative relationship between natural resources and income per 
capita, especially in countries with bad rule of law or bad policies. 
Boschini et al. (2013) NR exports over GDP Yes Yes The interaction of ores and metals rents with institutional quality has 
a negative effect on growth. 
Leite and Weidmann 
(1999) 
NR exports over GNP No Yes Natural resources abundance creates opportunities for rent-seeking 
behaviors and it is an important factor in determining a country's level 
of corruption. 
Davis (1995)  NR exports over total 
exports 
No Yes Resource abundance have a positive relationship with economic 
development. 
Dietz al. (2007) NR exports over total 
exports 
Yes No Resource abundance has a negative effect on genuine saving. 
Beck(2011) NR exports over total 
exports 
No Yes The paper tested for the existence of a natural resources curse in 
financial system development. The finance and growth relationship 
seems as important for resource-based economies as it is for other 
economies, so that underinvestment in the financial sector will have 
long-term negative repercussions for economic growth. 
Daniele (2011) NR exports over total 
exports 
Yes No Human development is negatively correlated with natural resources 
dependence, but positively correlated with resource abundance. These 
effects are particularly significant in countries with comparatively 
lower institutional quality. 
Barajas et al. (2013) NR exports over total 
exports 
Yes No The beneficial effect of financial deepening on economic growth is 
smaller in oil exporting countries. 
Papyrakis and Geragh 
(2003) 
NR production over 
GDP 
Yes No Natural resources have a negative impact on growth when considered 
in isolation, but a positive impact on growth when include in the 
analysis with other variables such as corruption, investments, 
openness, terms of trade, and schooling, and treating these variables 
as independent. 
Brunnschweiler (2008) NR production over 
GDP 
No Yes A positive relationship between natural resources abundance and 
economic growth. 
Collier and Hoeffler 
(2009) 
NR rents over GDP Yes No Natural resources abundance considerably increases the potential of 
violent civil conflict. 
Ross (2001) NR rents over GDP Yes No Oil exports are strongly associated with authoritarian rule; that this 
effect is not limited to the Middle East; and that other types of mineral 
exports have a similar antidemocratic effect, while other types of 
commodity exports (agricultural commodities) do not. 
Auty (2001) NR rents over GDP Yes No The presence of abundant natural resources (especially minerals) leads 
to rent-seeking behavior and corruption, thereby decreasing the quality 
of governance, which in turn negatively affects economic 
performance. 
Bhattacharyya and Collier 
(2013) 
NR rents over GDP Yes No Resource rents significantly reduce the public capital stock. The 
adverse effect on public capital is mitigated by good institutions. The 
depletion of non-renewable (mineral) resources reduces the public 
capital stock whereas rents from sustainable sources (forestry and 
agriculture) do not. 
Bhattacharyya and Hodler 
(2010) 
NR rents per capita Yes No The relationship between resource rents and corruption depends on 
the quality of the democratic institutions. 
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4.3 Empirical models 
4.3.1 Identification 
The objective of our empirical study is to evaluate the impact of non-renewable resources 
abundance on the development of agriculture and urbanization in a sample of African countries. 
We seek to verify two main hypotheses. The first (H1) suggests that oil and mineral rents can lead 
to the underdevelopment of the agriculture sector in resource-rich African countries (relation (1) 
Figure 4.1). The second (H2) indicates that oil and mineral rents are mostly invested in cities to 
develop infrastructure and services which, in turn, can attract more people and lead to an 
acceleration of urbanization (relation (4)). We suppose that the link between the two hypotheses is 
that poor performance of agriculture exposes the countries to two main problems. First, an increase 
in rural-urban migration (3) since more than 2/3 of Sub-Saharan African people work in the 
agricultural sector according to the World Bank estimations,. The second problem is the food 
security. Indeed, faced with the inability of the agricultural sector to satisfy food needs locally, 
countries cover their deficits through imports (2a). Indirectly, food imports become more attractive 
for governments in order to feed growing urban populations rather than investing in agriculture17 
(2b).   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 This policy was supported by World Bank and IMF structural adjustment programs by eliminating government 
support for agriculture and poor farmers. 
Figure 4.1: Oil and mineral rents and its relations with agriculture and urbanization. 
Oil and mineral 
rents 
Agriculture 
underdevelopment 
Rural urban 
migration 
Food import 
dependency 
Rapid urbanization 
(1) (3) 
(2a) (2b) 
(4) 
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We test these hypotheses, using the following models with interaction effects: 
𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0
1 + 𝛽1
1𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 +∑𝛽𝑗
1𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑗,𝑖𝑡
𝑝
𝑗=3
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡
1 (4.1)
𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑑_𝑀_𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0
2 + 𝛽1
2𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2
2𝑨𝒈𝒓𝒊𝒊𝒕 ∗ 𝑹𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒕 +∑𝛽𝑗
2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑗,𝑖𝑡
𝑝
𝑗=3
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡
2 (4.2𝑎)
𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑑_𝑀_𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0
3 + 𝛽1
3𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2
3𝑼𝒓𝒃𝒂𝒏𝒊𝒕 ∗ 𝑹𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒕 +∑𝛽𝑗
3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑗,𝑖𝑡
𝑝
𝑗=3
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡
3 (4.2𝑏)
𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0
4 + 𝛽1
4𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2
4𝑨𝒈𝒓𝒊𝒊𝒕 ∗ 𝑹𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒕 +∑𝛽𝑗
4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑗,𝑖𝑡
𝑝
𝑗=3
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡
4 (4.3)
𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0
5 + 𝛽1
5𝑹𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒕 + 𝛽2
5𝑨𝒈𝒓𝒊𝒊𝒕 ∗ 𝑹𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒕 +∑𝛽𝑗
5𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑗,𝑖𝑡
𝑝
𝑗=3
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡
5 (4.4)
 
The dependent variables are:  𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡 agricultural value added per capita used as a measure of sectorial 
performance for country i at time t; 𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑑_𝑀_ 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑡 food imports dependency measured by the share 
of food consumption covered by imports; 𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 rural-urban migration. Ideally, a rural-urban 
migration estimate can be obtained from a direct survey that gives information on the type of 
previous residence. This is not the case for Africans countries for which no data are available. 
Therefore, we opted for an indirect estimation. We assume that the natural population growth 
(births-deaths) in both urban and rural areas has remained unchanged during the last fifteen years 
(estimation period) and we assume that the proportion of international migration (people coming 
from other countries) remain stable. Under these assumptions, we can use simply the ratio of urban 
population to rural population as a proxy of rural-urban migration. A rise of this ratio would be a 
result of population movements from rural to urban areas; and 𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑡 is the ratio of urban 
population out of the total population. 
The explanatory variable of interest is 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 which is the non-renewable resources abundance 
measured by the ratio of oil and mineral rents to GDP.   
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑗,𝑖𝑡  is a set of other explanatory variables that affect the corresponding dependent variable. 
Theses  variables include:  𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑡 which is grain yield as a proxy for agricultural productivity; 𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 
is arable land in percent of total area; 𝑅𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 is the percentage of rural population used as a proxy 
for labor availability. This approximation is justified because Africa’s agriculture is characterized by 
a high percentage of small-scale family farms where each family member has a role to play;  𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑖𝑡 
is population growth; 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita measured in constant 
2005 US dollars and 𝑅𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙_𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the ratio of agricultural GDP measured in constant 2005 US 
dollars to rural population and used as a proxy for per capita income in rural area. 
The advantage of an interactive model compared to an additive model resides in the fact that the 
coefficients in an additive model describe the effects of each independent variable on the 
dependent variable as constant (Ceteris Paribus), regardless of the level of the other independent 
variables; whereas the coefficients in an interactive model assume that the effects of each 
independent variable on the dependent variable are varying, depending on the level of the other 
independent variable. In our case, the interactive model enables us to adequately evaluate the 
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impact of agricultural performance on rural-urban migration, food imports dependency and the 
urbanization rate in African countries conditional to their dependence level on natural resources 
revenues.  
4.3.2 Expected results 
Equation (4.1) measures the direct impact of oil and mineral rents on agricultural performance. We 
test the null hypothesis that resource abundance has no significant effect on agricultural 
performance (𝐻0: 𝛽1 = 0) against the alternative hypothesis that resource abundance negatively 
affects agricultural performance (𝐻1: 𝛽1 < 0). The other explanatory variables are referred to 
productivity and inputs18 (land and labor). These variables are: 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑡 , 𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 and 𝑅𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡. We expect 
positive coefficients for these three variables.  
Equation (4.2a) evaluates the impact of agricultural performance on food import dependency 
conditional to oil and mineral rents. We expect 𝛽1 < 0 and 𝛽2 > 0 (Figure 4.2).  
Figure 4.2: Impact of agriculture performance on rural-urban migration and food import dependency 
depending on oil and mineral rents level 
 
Equation (4.2b) evaluates the impact of urbanization dynamics on food imports dependency 
conditional to oil and mineral rents. Since we suppose that food imports become more attractive 
for decesion makers in resource-rich countries in order to feed growing urban population rather 
than investing in agriculture, we expect a positive effect of urbanization on food imports 
dependency. Then, the coefficients 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 in equation (4.3b) should be positive (Figure 4.3). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 We explicitly ignore other inputs because Africa’s agriculture uses minimal levels of fertilizers, pesticides and 
infrastructure facilities such as irrigation equipments, machinery, transport and communication.   
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Figure 4.3: Impact of urbanization on food import dependency depending on oil and mineral rents level 
 
For both equations (4.2a) and (4.2b), we use two additional explanatory variables. First, population 
growth (𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑖𝑡). Intuitively, more population means more food needs. The sign and significance of 
the coefficient associated with this variable depend on the capacity of agricultural sector to satisfy 
additional needs. A significant positive coefficient would reflect that the additional food 
requirements are covered by imports. The second tested variable is 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 which we expect to 
have a positive coefficient. In Africa, this phenomenon is very visible in cities where urban 
population –with a higher income level than in rural areas- is heavily dependent on imported wheat 
and rice (Tchamda et al. 2015). 
Equation (4.3) measures the impact of agricultural performance on rural-urban migration 
conditional to oil and mineral rents. As illustrated in Figure 4.2, we expect that a marginal increase 
of agricultural performance to be associated with a decrease in rural-urban migration when a 
country is none or lowly dependent on oil and mineral rents (𝛽
1
< 0). The effect becomes positive 
when the dependence of oil and mineral rents exceeds a given threshold (𝛽
2
> 0). Therefore, the 
marginal increase in agricultural performance will be associated with an increase in migration. We 
use as control variables: population growth (𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑖𝑡) to capture the structural changes (its effect 
should be positive), and 𝑅𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙_𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡  which hopefully will have a negative and significant effect. 
Finally, equation (4.4) tests both the direct effect of oil and mineral rents and the effect conditional 
to agricultural performance on urbanization dynamics. As shown in Figure 4.4, the coefficient 𝛽1 
captures the effect of an increase in oil and mineral rents on the urbanization rate when agricultural 
performance is absent.  
Figure 4.4: Impact of oil and mineral rents on urbanization depending on agriculture performance 
 
Since our hypothesis suggests that oil and mineral rents lead to an acceleration of urbanization, we 
expect to find a positive sign for 𝛽1. For countries with good agricultural performance, we suppose 
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that the urbanization rate grows at a slowler rate because of low rural-urban migration. Then, the 
effect of resources rents on urbanization conditional to agricultural performance should be 
negative (𝛽2 < 0).   
4.3.3 Estimation strategy  
We first estimate a static panel data model to control for the country-specific effects. Secondly, we 
estimate a dynamic panel data model to deal with missing variables effects.     
The Static Panel Data Estimations 
We start by estimating a static panel data model spelled as follows (equation 4.5).  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽
′𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑐 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 ,                 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁(𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦);  𝑡 = 1,… , 𝑇(𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒)      (4.5) 
where yit is the observed dependent variable for country i at time t, xit are regressors, β the 
parameter vector to be estimated, c the constant term and vit the residual disturbance term with 
zero mean, constant variance, and supposed to be uncorrelated across time and individuals. The αi 
terms represent the country-specific effects and capture the unobserved heterogeneity in the 
model.  
We first test for the presence of panel heterogeneity using the redundant fixed effect test. The null 
hypothesis of the redundant fixed effect is that the pooled regression model is more appropriate 
(𝐻0: 𝛼1 = ⋯ = 𝛼𝑁 = 𝛼), with the alternative hypothesis being that the fixed effect model is 
preferable. Then, we test both fixed and random effects models. The fixed effects model involves 
estimating a parameter (αi) for each country, in our case the 39 selected countries. The random 
effects model assumes that country-specific terms (αi) are randomly distributed. In this case, we do 
not need to estimate a parameter for each country and this can be a considerable as an  efficiency 
gains. However, the random effects estimator will be inconsistent due to the presence of correlation 
between the country-specific effects and one or more independent variables (Baltagi, 1995). We 
test for random effects estimator consistency in our analysis below by conducting a standard 
Hausman test. A significant value for the Hausman test statistic would mean that the random 
effects estimators are inconsistent and that fixed effects estimates are more appropriate. We can 
easily estimate these models by using standard methods (Least squares dummy variables or LSDV) 
for fixed effects model and Generalized least squares (GLS) for random effects model or ordinary 
least squares (OLS) for both, if we can assume heteroskedastic disturbances. 
The dynamic Panel Data Estimations 
In addition to the static approach, we also test for dynamic effects in the models. A dynamic 
approach may be particularly relevant to evaluate the influence of natural resources rents on 
agricultural development and urbanization trends. Dynamic panel data models use the lags of the 
dependent variable as explanatory variables (See equation 4.6). 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽
′𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑐 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 ,                 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁;  𝑡 = 1,… , 𝑇  (4.6) 
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It is evident that the model suffers from an endogeneity problem, because yti −1 is correlated with 
αi. In this case, the standard estimators (GLS and OLS) would be inappropriate. To solve this 
problem, we use the generalized method of moments (GMM) approach proposed by Arellano and 
Bond (1991). We start by transforming the equation into first differences to eliminate the bias 
arising from individual heterogeneity (equation 4.7) and then we estimate the transformed equation 
through the GMM method using lagged values of the endogenous variables as instruments. 
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾∆𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽
′∆𝑋𝑖𝑡 + ∆𝑣𝑖𝑡 ,                 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁;  𝑡 = 1,… , 𝑇 (4.7) 
The consistency of the GMM estimator depends on the validity of the assumption that the error 
terms do not exhibit serial correlation and on the validity of the instruments. To address these 
issues, we use two specification tests suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Sargan (1958). 
The first one, commonly called “m-test” examines the presence of serial correlation in error terms. 
As, we run the test on the differenced equation, we only report the test for second-order serial 
correlation. The second one, commonly called “J-test” of over-identifying restrictions, regresses 
the residuals from a GMM regression on all instruments and test if all instruments are uncorrelated 
with the error term. For both tests, we should not reject the null hypothesis to confirm the 
consistency of the GMM estimators. We note that Arellano and Bond (1991) compared, using 
simulations, the performance of GMM, OLS, and Within-Group (WG) estimators and they found 
that GMM estimators exhibit the smallest bias and variance. 
4.4 Data and statistical analysis 
4.4.1 Data description and sources 
The data are gathered from the World Bank (World Development Indicators), the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Urbanization Prospects and 
Millennium Development Goals (United Nations). All these sources are characterized by 
considerable lack of data, forcing us to make an arbitrage concerning the number of countries in 
the sample, the number of variables to include in the equations and the estimation period. In fact, 
according to the United Nations, the total number of African countries is 54. Out of this group, 
15 countries were excluded due to missing data, both on the dependent and the control variables. 
We assume that the resulting panel of countries is not endogenous. The estimation is based on 
annual data span from 2000 to 2013. The selected variables are summarized in Table 4.2 and the 
list of selected countries is presented in Table 4.3.  
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Table 4.2: Data description and sources 
Variable  Abbreviation Description Source 
Oil and 
Mineral rents 
dependency 
indicator 
Rent We include the sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents 
(hard and soft) and mineral rents. 
According to the World Bank, the estimates of a resource 
rents are calculated as the difference between the price of a 
commodity and its average cost of production. This is done 
by estimating the world price of units of specific 
commodities and subtracting estimates of average unit costs 
of extraction or harvesting costs (including a normal return 
on capital). These unit rents are then multiplied by the 
physical quantities countries extract or harvest to determine 
the rents for each commodity as a share of gross domestic 
product (GDP). 
Estimates based on 
sources and methods 
described in "The 
Changing Wealth of 
Nations: Measuring 
Sustainable 
Development in the 
New Millennium" 
(World Bank, 2011 ). 
Agriculture 
performance  
Agri Agriculture value added (VA) divided by total population. 
Agriculture VA is the net output of  agriculture sector after 
adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. It 
is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of 
fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of natural 
resources. 
World Bank national 
accounts data, and 
OECD National 
Accounts data files. 
Cereal yield yield Cereal yield, measured as kilograms per hectare of harvested 
land, includes wheat, rice, maize, barley, sorghum and others 
grains. 
FAO 
Arable land land Arable land as defined by the FAO measured as a % of total 
land area. 
FAO 
Rural 
population 
Rural Rural population refers to people living in rural areas as 
defined by national statistical offices. It is calculated as % of 
total population. 
World Bank estimates 
based on United 
Nations, World 
Urbanization 
Prospects. 
Food import 
dependency  
Food_M_Dep Share of food imports in total food consumption. Total 
food consumption is derived from a Demand/Supply 
equilibrium equation. 
World Bank estimates 
from the Comtrade 
database, United 
Nations Statistics 
Division. 
Population 
growth 
demo Annual population growth rate. World Bank from 
United Nations 
Population Division, 
World Population 
Prospects 
Prosperity 
indicator 
Income GDP converted to 2005 constant international dollars using 
Purchasing power parity (PPP) rates divided by total 
population. 
World Bank, WDI 
Rural area 
standard of 
living 
indicator 
Rural_income Agriculture value Added expressed in constant 2005 US$ 
and divided by rural population. 
World Bank, WDI 
Urban 
Population 
Urban Share of people living in urban areas as defined by national 
statistical offices on total population. 
United Nations, World 
Urbanization 
Prospects. 
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Table 4.3 : Selected countries 
n° Country 
Rent to 
GDP   n° Country 
Rent to 
GDP   n° Country 
Rent to 
GDP 
1 Libya 54,78  14 Tunisia 5,87  27 Senegal 0,88 
2 Angola 52,31  15 Ghana 5,60  28 Burundi 0,54 
3 Gabon 43,73  16 South Africa 4,58  29 Liberia 0,49 
4 Algeria 37,59  17 Zimbabwe 4,58  30 Ethiopia 0,40 
5 Mauritania 31,14  18 Mozambique 4,50  31 Swaziland 0,37 
6 Nigeria 30,91  19 Eritrea 4,17  32 Sierra Leone 0,34 
7 Equatorial Guinea 29,25  20 Burkina Faso 3,74  33 Madagascar 0,28 
8 Chad 25,65  21 Botswana 3,45  34 Uganda 0,13 
9 Sudan 15,87  22 Tanzania 2,43  35 Rwanda 0,09 
10 Zambia 11,14  23 Morocco 2,05  36 Kenya 0,07 
11 Guinea 9,78  24 Niger 2,03  37 Central African Rep. 0,06 
12 Cameroon 8,27  25 Namibia 1,57  38 Benin 0,06 
13 Mali 6,63   26 Togo 1,46   39 Malawi 0,03 
Table 4.4 presents descriptive statistics (i.e. mean value, maximum and minimum values, standard 
deviation and number of observations) for the selected variables. For each variable, we compare 
computed averages for the whole sample with the average of the top 10 resource-rich Africans 
countries. It is evident from the data, that natural resources dependency is high for the top 10 
group with an average rate close to 33%, compared to the sample average (10.4%). In addition, the 
top 10 group has a lower agricultural performance in terms of value added per capita, yield and  
availability of land and labor compared to the whole sample. The Urbanization rate is also higher 
in the top 10 group (48.6%) compared to the sample average (37.6%). 
Table 4.4: Descriptive statistics of selected variables (2000-2013) 
4.4.2 Correlation between oil and minerals rents and agriculture  
Figure 4.5 shows that on average over the period from 2000 to 2013, agricultural value added per 
capita is negatively correlated with oil and minerals rents (in percentage of GDP). These two 
variables have a correlation coefficient of -0.10. In other words, when a country strongly depends 
on revenues from extractive industries, there is a probability that its agricultural production will be 
Variable  Unit 
Mean 
Max Min Std. Dev. Obs. 
All Top 10a 
Rent % 10,4 33,2 84,7 0,0 17,2 546 
Agri 000’$/cap. 35,2 32,9 163,2 1,5 30,8 478 
yield Kg/hect. 1252,4 1107,3 4412,6 130,7 627,9 532 
land % 13,5 6,7 48,7 0,3 12,4 542 
Rural % 62,4 51,4 91,8 13,3 17,4 546 
Food_M_ Dep % 28,0 25,7 101,1 0,0 22,4 355 
demo % 0,5 0,3 6,6 -3,0 1,1 546 
Income US$/cap. 1778,9 3661,8 16847,6 132,6 2700,3 546 
Rural_income US$/cap. 324,5 529,4 2889,8 20,3 418,2 498 
Urban % 37,6 48,6 86,7 8,2 17,4 546 
(a) Top 10 highly resource dependent countries (see table 3) 
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lower and vice versa. However, this chart does not mean that there is a causal link between 
resources rents and agricultural performance. 
Figure 4.5: Natural resources rents and Agricultural performance 
 
4.4.3 Correlation between oil and mineral rents and urbanization  
Similarly, Figure 4.6 shows that on average over the period 2000-2013, the urbanization rate in 
Africa is positively correlated with oil and minerals rents. These two variables have a correlation 
coefficient of 0.54. This result suggests that countries highly dependent on natural resources 
revenues tend to have a higher proportion of urban population. However, this chart does not 
confirm a causal link between natural resources dependency and urbanization levels.  
Figure 4.6: Natural resources rents and Urbanization 
 
In addition, the positive correlation between urbanization and natural resources rents does not 
mean that urban people live in better conditions. Indeed, if we classify the African countries 
according to the share of resources rents in GDP (Table 4.5), we can see that the group of countries 
heavily dependent show higher percentages of urban population living in unhealthy housing (with 
less access to water and sanitation) compared to the group of countries less dependent. 
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Table 4.5 : Natural resources rents and urbanization conditions. 
 Country groups by Oil and Mineral rents (% of GDP) 
 Group 0  Group 1  Group 2 Group 3  
 <5% [5-10%[ [10-25%[ >=25% 
  Less dependent   …………………………   Highly dependent 
Urban population (% of total) 47,58 36,75 35,21 50,81 
Improved water source, urban (% of urban 
population with access) 
95,1 89,8 90,8 80,6 
Improved sanitation facilities, urban (% of urban 
population with access) 
71 43,7 42,7 50,6 
Population living in slums, (% of urban 
population), 2009 
45,3 60,7 61,7 63 
Source:  World Bank and United Nation Millennium Development Goals database  
4.5 Empirical results 
4.5.1 Econometric validation of static and dynamic panel data estimations  
Table 4.6 presents the results of the static panel regressions and Table 4.7 reports the results of the 
dynamic panel regressions. Each column, in tables 4.6 and 4.7, presents the best specification for 
the corresponding equation.  
In order to validate the model, we run some important specification tests. For static panel 
regressions, we first conduct the redundant fixed effect test (R-test) for each regression. The result 
shows that the R-test statistic is significant for all regressions, suggesting a presence of a country 
specific effect. Moreover, we run the Hausman test to check if this specific effect is fixed or 
random. The result suggests a fixed effect specification for all regressions as the test is strongly 
significant (Prob(H-test)<5%). For dynamic panel regressions, we conduct two specification tests 
(m-test and J-test) to validate our results. As we can see, for all estimated regressions, the m-test is 
insignificant suggesting the absence of second order serial correlation in residuals, whereas, the J-
test of over-identifying restrictions provides support for our choice of instruments.  
4.5.2 Analysis of the Static Panel Data Estimations 
Column 1 in table 4.6 presents the estimated coefficients for equation (4.1) using panel fixed effects. 
The results show that oil and minerals rents have a negative and significant effect on agricultural 
performance. These findings are in line with the first hypothesis (H1), which suggests that oil and 
minerals rents can lead to the underdevelopment of the agricultural sector in resource-rich African 
countries. Looking at the control variables, as expected, the two main production factors (arable 
land and work force) as well as cereal yields are significant and positive determinants of agricultural 
performance in African countries. Columns (2) and (3) report the estimated coefficients for 
equation (4.2a) and (4.2b) respectively. The result shows a negative and significant effect of 
agricultural performance on food import dependency at 1% level when the conditioning variable 
(resources rents) is absent. The coefficient is equal to -0.27. Therefore, a one-percentage point 
increase in agricultural performance leads to a decrease in food imports dependency of 0.27 
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percentage points, on average, in the selected panel of African countries. The effect becomes 
positive when we include the conditioning variable. The coefficient of the interaction term between 
agricultural performance and resource rents is positive and significant at the 10% level. This result 
can be interpreted as follow: the marginal increase in agricultural performance leads to an increase 
- i.e. becomes more positive – in food import dependency when a country in highly resource rent 
dependent. Urbanization is a significant and positive determinant of food import dependency. The 
estimated coefficient is equal to 0.65 when we include the interaction between agriculture 
performance and resource rents (column 2), and 0.67 when we include the interaction between 
urbanization and resource rents (column 3). The interaction between urbanization and resource 
rents (column 3) is also significant and positive, suggesting that urbanization leads to more food 
import dependency in countries with high resource rents. The estimation results for equation (4.3) 
are shown in column (4). Agricultural performance has a negative and significant effect on rural-
urban migration, but in terms of magnitude the effect is only 0.05. This would suggest that a one-
percentage point increase in agricultural performance leads to a decrease in migration flows by only 
0.05%. The interaction between agricultural performance and resources rents is positively 
significant at the 1% level. This means that agricultural performance plays the opposite role in 
countries highly dependent on resources rents. Perhaps this is becausethe agriculture sector, in 
resource rich-countries, cannot offer more job opportunities and better living standards than in the 
oil and minerals sector. The control variables used in equation (4.3) show evidence that population 
growth affects positively rural-urban migration and is statistically significant at level of 1%; and 
rural revenue effect is, as expected, negative but not significant. The estimated coefficients for 
equation 4 are presented in column (5). Our findings support the second hypothesis (H2), which 
indicates that oil and minerals rents are mostly invested in cities in order to develop infrastructures 
and services. This can attract more people and lead to an acceleration of urbanization as the 
coefficient associated with resource rents is positive and significant at level of 1% (0.16). When we 
introduce agricultural performance as a conditioning variable, the effect becomes negative (-0.217). 
This can imply that the effect on the urbanization rate is positive in countries highly dependent on 
resources rents but with poor agriculture performance. 
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Table 4.6 : Static Panel Estimations 
  Production   Food dependency   Migration   Urbanization 
Dependent variable Agri  Food_M_Dep  Migration   Urban 
  (1)   (2)    (3)      (4)      (5) 
              
Agri    -0,272 
*** -0,266 ***  -0,047 
** 
 0,172 
*** 
    (0,031) 
 
(0,035) 
 
 (0,019) 
 
 (0,032) 
 
Agri×Rent    0,080 
* 
 
 
 0,223 
*** 
 -0,217 
*** 
    (0,046) 
 
 
 
 (0,029) 
 
 (0,044) 
 
Urban    0,655 
*** 0,667 ***   
 
  
 
    (0,031) 
 
(0,031) 
 
  
 
  
 
Urban×Rent     
 
0,137 ***   
 
  
 
     
 
(0,025) 
 
  
 
  
 
Rent -0,354 ***   
 
 
 
  
 
 0,160 
*** 
 (0,091) 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 (0,036) 
 
Constant -0,103 ***  0,086 
** 0,064 *  0,042 
 
 0,123 
*** 
 (0,037) 
 
 (0,035) 
 
(0,033) 
 
 (0,030) 
 
 (0,029) 
 
Land 0,545 ***   
 
    
 
  
 
 (0,078) 
 
  
 
    
 
  
 
Rural 0,479 ***   
 
    
 
  
 
 (0,143) 
 
  
 
    
 
  
 
Yield 0,104 **   
 
    
 
  
 
 (0,047) 
 
  
 
    
 
  
 
Rural_income     
 
   -0,050 
 
  
 
         (0,040) 
 
  
 
Income          
 
 1,076 
*** 
          
 
 (0,048) 
 
Demo         0,561 
*** 
  
 
         (0,055)    
 
             
 
              
Adj, R2 0,582     0,415   0,421     0,394     0,612   
              
F-Statistic 17,009   76,209  78,036   78,466   188,862  
Prob(F-Stat) 0,000   0,000  0,000   0,000   0,000  
              
Redundant fixed effect test (H0: Pooled regression model is more appropriate)       
R-Statistic 18,182   34,380  34,206   269,781   442,398  
Prob(R) 0,000   0,000  0,000   0,000   0,000  
              
Hausman test (H0: Random effect test is more appropriate) 
H-Statistic 9,090   18,817  18,091   17,672   20,587  
Prob(H) 0,059   0,000  0,000   0,001   0,000  
              
Obs. 461   319  319   478   478  
N 37     30   30     38     38   
***, **, and * indicate significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively, against a two sided 
alternative, figures in parentheses are cluster standard errors and they are robust to arbitrary 
heteroskedasticity and arbitrary intra-group correlation. 
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4.5.3 Analysis of the Dynamic Panel Data Estimations 
Table 4.7 reports the estimation results of a dynamic panel using the GMM method with 
instruments to deal with measurement errors in dependent variables and potential omitted variable 
bias. Instruments are taken from lags dated from t-2 to t-5. We observe a positive and statistically 
significant effect of the lagged dependent variable for all regressions. This means that the omitted 
variable bias is now reduced. Similar to result obtained from the static panel specification, we find 
a significant negative impact of resource rents on agricultural performance (column 1). We also 
find a positive impact of agricultural performance on food imports dependency that is statistically 
significant at the 1% level (columns 2 and 3). The impact of resources rents on food imports 
dependency is positive whether it interacts with agricultural performance (column 2) or with 
urbanization (column 3). As obtained in the static estimation, agricultural performance is a 
determinant for rural-urban migration. The impact becomes positive and significant when we 
introduce an interaction with resources rents (column 4) but the estimated coefficient values is way 
smaller than the one obtained in a static specification. This may be due to the introduction of a 
lagged dependent variable. Our estimation indicates a positive and significant effect of resource 
rents on urbanization at level of 1% (column 5).  We do not find the expected sign for the 
interaction between agriculture and resources rents. The coefficient is positive but too small as it 
only equals 0.014. 
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Table 4.7: Dynamic panel estimations 
  Production   Food dependency   Migration   Urbanization 
Dependent variable Agri  Food_M_Dep  Migration  Urban  
 (1)  (2)  (3)   (4)  (5) 
          
 
   
lag 0,687 ***  0,137 
*** 0,170 ***  0,959 
*** 
 1,009 
*** 
 (0,0889) 
 
 (0,0150) 
 
(0,0069)   (0,0001) 
 
 (0,0035) 
 
Agri  
 
 -0,248 
*** -0,113 ***  -0,017 
*** 
 0,009 
*** 
  
 
 (0,0565) 
 
(0,0396)   (0,0001) 
 
 (0,0009) 
 
Agri×Rent  
 
 0,195 
*** 
   0,004 
*** 
 0,014 
*** 
  
 
 (0,0431) 
 
   (0,0001) 
 
 (0,0012) 
 
Urban  
 
 1,911 
*** -0,475 ***   
 
  
 
  
 
 (0,1734) 
 
(0,0740)    
 
  
 
Urban×Rent  
 
   0,133 
*** 
  
 
  
 
  
 
   (0,0373)    
 
  
 
Rent -0,607 ***        
 
 0,012 
*** 
 (0,1720) 
 
       
 
 (0,0012) 
 
Land 1,617 **        
 
  
 
 (0,7354) 
 
       
 
  
 
Rural 6,377 ***        
 
  
 
 (0,9439) 
 
       
 
  
 
Yield 0,406 ***        
 
  
 
 (0,0855) 
 
       
 
  
 
Rural_income  
 
      -0,009 
*** 
  
 
  
 
      (0,0004)    
 
Income  
 
          
 
             
 
Demo            0,012 
*** 
            (0,0017) 
 
             
 
              
Adj, R2 0,454   0,433  0,449   0,835   0,808  
              
J-Statistic 23,790   21,455  24,123   30,263   28,423  
Prob(j) 0,162   0,612  0,512   0,651   0,442  
m-Statistic 1,205   -0,564  -0,404   0,877   0,984  
Prob(m) 0,228   0,573  0,686   0,381   0,325  
              
Obs. 376   285  285   405   405  
N 35     29   29     37     37  
***, **, and * indicate significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively, against a two sided alternative, 
figures in parentheses are cluster standard errors and they are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and 
arbitrary intra-group correlation.   
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4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter examines the mechanism through which natural resources lead to poor agricultural 
performance and rapid urbanization in African countries. Using static and dynamic panel models 
covering the period 2000-2013 and 39 African countries, we show that resources rents affect 
negatively agricultural value added and positively food imports dependency. At the same time, 
results show a positively significant impact of resources rents on rural-urban migration and 
therefore the urbanization rate. These findings imply that resource-rich countries indeed have a 
tendency to neglect agriculture that can be justified by attractive world food commodity prices. 
However, since 2007-2008, food prices have shown a higher volatility and this situation can present 
a food security risk for millions of Africans.  
The positive impact of natural resources rents on the urbanization rate can be interpreted as both 
a cause and a consequence of policy choices. On the one hand, as policy-makers in resource-rich 
nations tend to invest in extractive industries to the detriment of other sectors like agriculture, they 
create a push factors for rural migration. On the other hand, as these policy-makers allocate the rents 
in priority to develop infrastructures in urban area (generally in port cities), they create some pull 
factors to rural population looking for a better life. In fact, this could explain the massive rural-urban 
migration which contributes to the ongoing debate about the inequality of resource rents 
distribution in a society.  
Generally, urbanization and economic growth are closely linked. The strong positive correlation 
between these two indicators has been numerously documented19. There is no doubt that much of 
the causation goes from economic growth to increased urbanization. However, as countries grow, 
they undergo structural changes. Labor forces are reallocated from rural agriculture to urban 
manufacturing and services sectors (Michaels et al., 2012) and when urbanization occurs without 
industrialization, serious urban and development problems can arise (Gollin et al, 2013). This is 
particularly the case for most African countries. The statistical analysis presented in table 5 shows 
evidence that the urbanization in rich-resource African countries is associated with huge social 
problems (Expansion of urban slums, limited access to improved water and sanitations facilities). 
Further research is needed to focus on this complex causal link between urbanization problems 
and resource dependence in rich-resources African countries. Future studies should also evaluate 
the final impact of rapid urbanization in many resource-rich African countries. A time-series 
analysis of this group of countries, over a longer period, will also allow for more conclusive results. 
 
                                                 
19 See for instance World Bank (2009) and Henderson (2002, 2010). 
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 General conclusion 
Management of non-renewable resources provides a broad field for research. I have tried in this 
thesis to look at a subset of  issues. The field allows researchers to engage in a wide range of topics, 
each with its own particularities, issues and interesting features. I focused my researcher on 
phosphate rock- a finite and non-renewable resource- for three reasons: first, the resource is mostly 
used in food production and, to this date, there is no known substitute for it. Second, global 
reserves are unequally distributed, with only few countries controling the global market. Third, 
phosphate prices rose significantly and have become more volatile during the last decade, 
prompting a debate  on its future availability.     
This thesis is divided into four chapters. Since each chapter starts with a section summarizing the 
main results and ends with a concluding section, this general conclusion will then be brief. 
In chapter 1, I provided an introduction to the global phosphate rock market. I showed, based on 
the last USGS data, that world phosphate rock reserves are concentrated in few countries mainly 
in the MENA region and global trade is concentrated, since some major producing countries are 
also among the major users. I discussed the “peak phosphorus” hypothesis and I demonstrated 
that, contrary to recent published articles predicting a peak of phosphate production in the nearest 
future, current available data show no clear indications that phosphate rock deposits are facing 
depletion any soon. In addition, as recent studies have predicted that Morocco is moving towards 
a near-monopoly position in phosphate production and this might potentially create a price-setting 
behaviour, I also discussed the political, technical and environmental risks that can seriously affect 
future supply. 
In chapter 2, I proposed a strategic game model to examine how phosphate producers, facing a 
growing demand, make their investment decisions in order to meet their optimal market share.  
The results show that the phosphate rock market will become, in the future, more concentrated 
than it is today. World phosphate rock will be produced by 11 countries and just 8 countries will 
provide more than 90% of global PR production by 2100 (China excluded). Besides China, long-
term supply will mainly come from Morocco (about 37% of global production), Syria (11%), 
Australia (10.8%), Algeria (7.8%), Tunisia and Saudi Arabia (7.7% each) and Kazakhstan (6.9%). 
In terms of capacities, the results suggest that new capacities will come from Morocco, with a 
capacity multiplied by 370% (from a present capacity of 36 Mt/y to over 133Mt/y by 2100). 
Additional capacities will mainly come from Australia, Syria and Algeria. Since all major PR 
producing countries are moving towards vertical integration, where mining companies will also 
produce fertilizers, phosphoric acid and other derivatives of phosphate rock, phosphate rock 
producers will face two options: exporting phosphate rock or exporting fertilizers. The proposed 
model could similarly be used to examine the equilibrium state and compute the equilibrium 
quantities of PR to be exported with or without transformation.  
Chapter 3 attempted to evaluate the macroeconomic impact arising from OCP’s activities within 
the overall economy using an Input-Output Analysis model. I have combined the detailed Profit 
and Loss (P&L) statements from OCP Group with the latest Moroccan I-O table to bring out 
OCP activities and to split them into two sectors: “OCP-Mining” and “OCP chemical”. I estimated 
the direct, indirect and induced effects of a change in final demand for OCP products on national 
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output, income and employment. The results indicate that OCP-chemical has a high production-
inducing effect and a high income and employment-inducing effect compared to OCP-mining. In 
addition, the results show that OCP-chemical has more capacity to generate employment 
opportunities on a large scale compared to OCP-mining. The linkage analysis shows that OCP-
chemical is strongly backward linked compared to OCP-mining which is  intermediately backward 
linked with the others sectors of the economy. However, I noted that both OCP sectors have a 
low forward linkage effect. Finally, OCP Group is engaged in an important investment program 
during the period 2010-2020 to increase production capacity, reduce production costs and increase 
flexibility by introducing new production tools and technologies. The Group announced that this 
investment program would have a positive impact on the environment and local communities 
(OCP Group Activity Report, 2013). A future extension of the framework presented in this paper 
will involve introducing a time dimension in the model (dynamic I-O model) in order to measure 
the socio-economic and environmental impacts of OCP’s investment program. 
The purpose of chapter 4 was to examine the mechanism through which non-renewable resource 
abundance leads to poor agricultural performance and rapid urbanization in African countries. 
Using static and dynamic panel models covering the period 2000-2013 and 39 African countries, I 
showed that non-renewable resources rents affect negatively the agricultural sector performance 
and positively rural-urban migration and therefore the urbanization rate. These findings imply that 
resource-rich countries have indeed a tendency to neglect agriculture that can be justified by 
attractive world food commodity prices. However, since 2007-2008, food prices have shown higher 
volatility and this situation can present a risk for food security for millions of Africans. The positive 
impact of natural resources rents on the urbanization rate can be interpreted as both a cause and a 
consequence of policy choices. On the one hand, as policy-makers in resource-rich nations tend to 
invest in extractive industries to the detriment of other sectors like agriculture, they create push 
factors for rural migration. On the other hand, as these policy-makers allocate in priority the rents 
to develop infrastructures in urban areas (generally in port cities), they create some pull factors for 
rural populations looking for a better life. In fact, this could explain the massive rural-urban 
migration which contributes to the ongoing debate about the inequality of resource rents 
distribution in society. In addition, the statistical analysis presented in this chapter shows evidence 
that urbanization in resource rich African countries is associated with huge social problems 
(expansion of urban slums, limited access to improved water and sanitations facilities). Further 
research is needed to focus on this complex causal link between urbanization problems and 
resource dependence in resource rich African countries. Future studies should also evaluate the 
final impact of rapid urbanization in many resource-rich countries in Africa. A time-series analysis 
of this group of countries, over a longer period of time, will also allow for more conclusive results. 
 
 
 
 
 
RÉSUMÉ 
Cette thèse a pour objet l’examen de la gestion durable des ressources non renouvelables en général et du 
phosphate naturel en particulier. 
Le premier chapitre expose l’état, les perspectives et les enjeux économiques et géopolitiques du marché 
mondial des phosphates. Il s’attache à mettre en exergue de cette analyse un important déficit, à long terme, 
de l'offre mondiale par rapport à la demande incitant les producteurs des phosphates, qui ont suffisamment 
des réserves, à investir dans des nouvelles capacités.  
Le deuxième chapitre développe un modèle Stackelberg à plusieurs joueurs, calibré sur des données 
effectives du marché des phosphates et permet de calculer les capacités optimales à mettre en place par les 
producteurs selon leurs niveaux de réserves et leurs coûts de développement. Les résultats de ce modèle 
montrent que le marché deviendrait plus concentré, en 2100, qu’il est aujourd’hui avec une dominance du 
Maroc, le pays qui détient les trois quarts des réserves mondiales.  
Le troisième chapitre vise à évaluer les effets d’entraînement que le Maroc dégage de son exploitation des 
phosphates. En utilisant le modèle Input-Output, l’analyse empirique proposée compare les impacts socio-
économiques de l’extraction à ceux liés à la valorisation ou à la transformation. Les résultats de cette analyse 
montrent que la transformation des phosphates est plus reliée en amont avec les autres branches de 
l’économie et génère plus de valeur ajoutée, de revenues et d’emplois. 
Le dernier chapitre s’évertue à traiter à de nouveaux frais la question de la malédiction des ressources 
naturelles en reliant la performance agricole et l’urbanisation à l'abondance de ces ressources. L’étude 
empirique, basée sur un panel de pays africains, exhibe un lien significatif entre l’abondance de ressources 
minières, le sous-développement du secteur agricole et l’explosion urbaine. 
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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the sustainable management of non-renewable resources in general 
and phosphate rock in particular. 
The first chapter presents the current situation, future trends and geopolitical issues pertaining to the global 
phosphate market. The analysis shows a large deficit in world phosphate supply in the future, inciting 
producers with sufficient phosphate reserves to invest in new capacities. 
The second chapter develops a multi-leader-multi-follower Stackelberg model, calibrated using real data from 
the phosphate market. This model derives the optimal future capacities for different producers according to 
their reserve levels and their development costs. The results show that the market would become more 
concentrated in 2100, with Morocco being the dominante country wich already holding three quarters of the 
world's reserves. 
The third chapter presents and calculates the linkage effects generated by Morocco’s phosphates 
exploitation. Using the Input-Output model, the proposed empirical analysis compares the socio-economic 
impacts of extraction to those related to transformation or valorization. The results of this analysis show that 
phosphates transformation is more linked to the other sectors and generates higher socio-economic impacts 
in terms of added value, income and employement. 
The last chapter contributes to the literature on the natural resources curse by linking agricultural performance 
and urbanization to the abundance of resources. The empirical study, based on a panel of African countries, 
shows a significant link between the abundance of mineral resources, the underdevelopment of the 
agricultural sector and urban explosion. 
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